# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philosophy of the Catholic University in the Southern African Context</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Neil McGurk &amp; Donovan Lowry</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Catholic Tertiary Education in South Africa Today</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Madge Karecki</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger and its Implications for Ethical Leadership in Organisations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Marilise Smurthwaite</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Review - Contrary: Critical Responses to the Novels of Andre Brink, Willie Burger and Karina Magdalenaz Szczurek (eds)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jessica Murray</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Contributors</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial Committee</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructions to Contributors</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Philosophy of the Catholic University in the Southern African Context

NEIL McGURK and DONOVAN LOWRY

INTRODUCTION: RE-VISITING NEWMAN’S THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY

The intention of this paper is not to address the many practical considerations related to the actual establishment of a Catholic university in Southern Africa, but only to explore its essential idea and the role it could play in the cultural life of the region.

As we plan for a new affordable education system, many questions are raised concerning the number of existing tertiary institutions in which student enrolment is not in disciplines in the scientific, technical and commercial fields which would serve the human resource requirements for needed economic development. These considerations are hugely important, but our own approach to the question of the establishment of a Catholic university cannot be guided only by such utilitarian considerations; in the first instance, our investigations will bear upon the nature of the Church’s intellectual ministry and its various dimensions in the region.

Further, we cannot confine these discussions to the explicit institutional requirements of the Church. The formation of practitioners, lay and clerical, in the various fields of evangelisation would be a consideration in deciding on the importance of the university for the work of the Church. However, by its very nature, a university can never have so limited a function; from the outset, we would have to be conscious of its particular intellectual contribution to the ethical, social and political issues in the region, and, generally, to the cultural development and intellectual wellbeing of its peoples. It would be serving people who are seeking a new definition of themselves, as well as material liberation.

1 All quotes from Newman’s The Idea of a University are taken from H. Tristram, Newman’s Idea of a Liberal Education (NILE), Harrap, London, 1952
If practical ends need to be assigned to the nature of the training of our university would offer, then, while imparting a Catholic intellectual formation to its students, its curriculum ideally would have to be universal enough to provide them with a genuinely liberal university education. Cardinal Newman described such an education as:

... the great ordinary means to a great ordinary end; it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life. (See H Tristram, NILE, pg 104)

We shall be discussing Newman’s idea of a liberal university education, but an initial observation is pertinent, especially in the situation that pertains in Africa. University graduates form a privileged elite whose education has given them access to social power: political, economic and professional. Implicit in Newman’s expectations of the outcome of a university education, in terms of returns for society, is the inculcation of a moral attitude, that, unfortunately, is often found wanting, even in the requirement of the ordinary honesty basic to any form of civic discourse. In the value-free model for a university, presented under the influence of Western scientific positivism, graduates without such moral formation are given access to social power – when power has a tendency of its own to corrupt people. We will have to develop more explicitly for our African context, Newman’s automatic presumption of the return to what is due to society for a university training, the qualities of responsibility, fidelity and the inherently ethical nature attached to a truly liberal education, as he understands it.

After Newman’s masterful handling of the topic in the series of tracts which he wrote in the period 1852-1858, and published under the title of *The Idea of a University*, any subsequent discussion would have to begin with a critical re-appraisal of his major theses, in the light of contemporary concerns and the understanding of certain concepts. Given the necessity for developing context and for re-interpretation, Newman’s prophetic insight, which also remains a constant source of inspiration in other areas of religious and philosophical studies, renders *The Idea of a University* still fresh and relevant today.
Three major theses are developed by Newman in a logically connected way:

1. Starting with the countries which surround the Mediterranean Sea, the emergence of a common Civilisation over the past three thousand years, which contains within itself a normative experience of Intellect and Mind, and which continues to systematically embrace Human Society as a whole as its home;

2. An organic unity of Knowledge has grown out of this experience of Mind and Intellect, which embraces all fields of human enquiry;

3. In its historical ideal, the University is an institution located within this process of Civilisation, whose responsibility is its transmission and advancement, in preserving and developing the organic unity of this body of Knowledge and whose practical end is a liberal education, which is no less than the ideals of which this Civilisation has ever consisted.

We shall have to confine our considerations to those aspects of Newman’s philosophy of a university education that have most bearing on our own concerns, which relate to the first and third theses, and leave for notes for the appendix a discussion of the second theses (Note 3). This paper as a whole endeavours to present a systematic response to Newman in the light of these concerns.

Newman’s first thesis is the existence of this unique mental association or social commonwealth which fitly deserves the abstract title Civilisation. Beginning with recorded history, whatever its reverses, changes and momentary dissolutions, it continues down to the present day, not precisely on the same territory, but with a combined and harmonious movement and a visible continuity. In his own words:

…Looking, then, at the countries which surround the Mediterranean Sea as a whole, I see them to be from time immemorial, the seat of an association of intellect and mind, such as to deserve to be called the Intellect and Mind of the Human Kind. Starting then as it does and advancing from certain centres, till their respective influences intersect and combine, a common thought has been generated and a common Civilisation defined and established. Egypt is one such starting point, Syria another, Greece a third, Italy a fourth and North Africa
a fifth, afterwards France and Spain. As time goes on, and as colonisation and
conquest work their changes, we see a great association of nations formed of
which the Roman Empire is the (first) maturity and the (first) intelligible
expression; an association, however, not political, but mental, based on the same
intellectual methods. (NILE, p10)

Despite the fact that the Catholic university we envisage would be located
on African soil and that we would have to define its role within an African
cultural context, Newman would consider it an institution that is part of the
complex pattern of its Civilisation in its historical development. This
responsibility imparts to it

… a solemnity and moment of a peculiar kind, for (it) would be but reiterating
an old tradition, and carrying on those august methods of enlarging the mind,
and cultivating the intellect, and refining the feelings, in which the process of
Civilisation has ever consisted. (NILE, pg 52)

MODERN WESTERN CIVILISATION: ITS DISCONTENTS AND
CHALLENGES

However, Western education systems have in reality largely abandoned
these lofty ideals for utilitarian goals – although still subscribing to them
cognitively in the notion of a secular liberal education. This may be only
one symptom of a more pervasive mendacity in the consciousness of
Western secular culture. It cannot be considered as co-extensive with
Newman’s conception of Civilisation, which indicates the requirement of a
critical retrieval of its ideals.

As Newman understands it, Civilisation has been closely linked to
Christianity in its historical development; but what we experience in
Western civilisation, in its modern cultural form, is a post-Christian
mentality. This is giving rise to an increasingly ambivalent relationship
between Western culture and Christianity. We shall speak therefore of
modern Western culture instead, to distinguish it from Civilisation as
Newman has defined it.

In Africa and other Third World contexts – such as Latin American and
the Philippines – the Church has found new and increasingly responsive
audiences with which it has an emerging community of interest in relation
to Western culture as these countries and the Church have experienced it.
In our post-Christian world both the Church and the Third world have something of an outsider’s critical, objective perspective on Western culture. This suggests a hope of new possibilities of global import for both Christianity and Civilisation. This could be an important part of the Church’s intellectual ministry and should set some of the interdisciplinary agenda for a Catholic university in Southern Africa.

The problematic nature of modern Western culture has been diagnosed by many secular thinkers, and it would be important to dialogue with them. Perhaps the most radical criticism has come from those great masters of suspicion, Marx and Freud, as they exposed the “discontents” of its bourgeois society. Their sociological and psychological insights into its mendacious and defective consciousness are helpful in many respects. We do not have the time to discuss in the main body of this paper recent developments in the Church’s intellectual traditions that are beginning to appropriate systematically these insights, but for the sake of presenting a comprehensive understanding of the issues involved, we have do so in Note 1 in the appendix. It is important that African thinkers evolve their own critical scholarship, so that they transform Western culture’s secular knower into the problematic known.

Arnold Toynbee has presented us with a more critical view of civilisation than we find in Newman, but along with a new historic challenge and a new hope too in this regard:

> By far the greatest and most significant thing that is happening in the world today is the movement on foot for giving the benefits of civilisation to that huge majority of the human race that has paid for civilisation, without sharing in its benefits, during the first five thousand years of civilisation’s existence. (Arnold Toynbee, *The Economy of the Western Hemisphere*, p. 2-4)

In Toynbee’s voluminous Study of History, his definition of the term civilisation was not what was ongoing, normative and universal; all civilisations have depended on cheap labour often violently mobilised, and their life has been characterised by war and conquest. Civilisations (plural) had had a life and death cycle of violent rise and decline and fall, however much they may have left behind them an incremental heritage of residual material and spiritual progress for the next civilisation to build on.
Exploitation and conquest have given them a more problematic aspect than the one Newman looks at; one that we need to emphasise if we are to be at all relevant to Third World concerns in general, and Africa’s cultural future in particular. Only if there is the spread of the benefits that Toynbee says have been denied so far, will Newman’s view of Civilisation be validated, and this will happen only if we acquire a more critical perspective in a continent that has suffered much from the spread of Western civilisation. We are concerned here with historical and moral imperatives of critical significance for Human Society, as to whether Civilisation, as Newman conceives it, has a bright future, and a history which it will be able to redeem.

**CIVILISATION AND CULTURE, CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORICAL PROCESS**

Modern historical criticism must be critical of Newman’s first thesis as ahistorical, especially in the classicist approach to the question of culture he seems to adopt. The modern understanding is more empirical and pluralistic; this results in important differentiations having to be made between concepts such as “civilisation” and “culture” (or between Civilisation and various civilisations as Toynbee does. We can no longer consider culture in its old classicist meaning of a single, superior, universal and normative ideal, imposed through education, and synonymous with, or at least necessarily in conjunction with, Civilisation, as Newman has defined its meaning. A distinction has to be made between Civilisation, as a cohesive historical movement and the various cultural forms it adopts in the process, and which often corrupts it.

Even if our view of Civilisation is no longer tainted with ethnocentricity, we still have to face the fact of labour mobilisation and exploitation: as the Chinese have put it, that it takes so many years of peasant or mindless factors work to support one scholar at a university.

However, leaving aside those complex issues, with the movement from a classicist to a more empirical and pluralist understanding of culture, for us the more important consideration becomes the re-think of the role Christianity has played in the historical process. The appeal to a Christian classicism, as somehow superior and normative in a conjunction of culture, religion and civilisation, as opposed to “primitiveness”, was used to justify
the imperialist expansion of Europe into Africa during the nineteenth century. Although this attitude still has its argent adherents in support of basically racist ideologies, - as we know only too well from recent historical experience in Southern Africa – it is becoming submerged by a new awareness of the complex historical processes of the interaction of the cultures, and of mutual acculturation, which have become the historical consequences of this imperialism.

We are only now learning of the complexity of the historical process in the encounter between cultures which is a necessary concomitant of culture itself. These processes have been present throughout history, and the present attention given to them is long overdue. These encounters between cultures are collective, unprogrammeable processes. While human individuals are involved in them this involvement is usually at the subconscious level beyond individual reflective choice. Their consequences at a conscious level can only be discerned “post factum” as historical data. In a sense, all cultures have an historical mission to transcend their own limits. The notion of fundamentalism, an overly concern for purism, is alien to the notion of culture itself, as a diachronic and dynamic historical process.

One of the consequences of moving from a classicist view of the conjunction of culture and Civilisation to an empirical view of culture is that the whole spiritual history of Civilisation requires to be reinterpreted. There is now critical, dialectic tension between Christianity and modern Western culture: to what extent is Christianity still the spiritual form of modern Western culture, and to what extent is Christianity in reality rejected now by it? Even in the dialectical manner in which we pose these questions, we are obviously concerning ourselves here with historical process and Christianity’s role in its mediation.

The present context in which Christianity finds itself is but one in an already long series of significant historical thresholds for it, and in which it has again to retrieve its essential nature as a revealed religion in relation to society generally. What is invariant and ongoing in Christianity as an historical movement: in its conversion to the God of Israel and its break from Judaism; in its proclamation of the manifestation in human history of the Word of this God in the person of Christ; in its expression of itself through a gradual appropriation and refining of the philosophical
achievement of classical Greece; in its sacralisation of the political and legal achievements of Imperial Rome; in its mediation of the emergence of Western culture in the cultural interaction between Imperial Rome and the European tribes; and in its continuity to the present day, as it embraces what endures of the cultural creations of the Mind and Intellect?

When Arnold Toynbee and Christopher Dawson maintain the historical conjunction of Christianity and Western culture in the making of Europe, is this a good ethnocentric observation? Is not the present historical process of the inculturation of Christianity into Africa equally providential: the sign of a dynamic religion expecting the cultures it inspires to accord with its own dynamic nature and to transcend them? Is more recent missionary action not a continuation of that by which Christianity transcended it Roman cultural form, mediating then an historical interaction between the culture of the Roman Empire and the cultures of the European tribes, to create then – and now – something new?

There are essential theological and critical historical questions for investigation; they are of importance for us if we are to evolve a critical, authentic, coherent, African intellectual account of Christianity’s mediation of the historical process – again an interdisciplinary task for a Catholic university of Southern Africa. The reality of inculturation, which finds its context in such considerations, is recognised today as the major cultural challenge facing the development of a vital indigenous Church in Africa.

If Christianity is distinguishable from all its cultural manifestations, then it is inherently a missionary religion, of its nature concerned with the historical process. As a missionary religion, it operates through this ordinary historical interaction between cultures in a reciprocal and critical process in which it, itself, is transformed through its ministry of reconciliation. In remaining authentic to its missionary nature, its message becomes reinterpreted and it is vitally renewed. The truth of Christianity as a revealed religion is preserved in its unlimited cultural re-expression and its progressive disclosure of revealed truth, revitalising the culture which it informs. In this way, it enables that culture to revitalise itself, through contact with other cultures, and by inspiring in it a readiness to transcend its limitations (its fundamentalism).
CONTENDING WITH A PROBLEMATIC WESTERN CULTURE

It is a modern historical fact, that, because of the immense economic and technological pressure it can exert on the world, modern Western culture has been able to dominate, alienate and suppress all the cultures with which it has come in contact. This Western cultural imperialism has been developing since the beginning of the modern era. Its historical origins are traceable to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which saw the beginnings of Europe’s physical conquest of the world. Any twentieth-century estimate of the prospects of the world as a whole needs to take account of how to contend with it.

Its aggressive, secular, superior attitude to cultural interaction is symptomatic of a certain spiritual impoverishment. Its secularity is a function of the hypertrophy of practical intelligence in its uncritical instrumentalisation with a major surrender before the demands of short-term material values and social power, and a consequent marginalisation of ultimate issues and terminal values.

A major task for any contemporary Christian intellectual apostolate today is the need for collaboration on a global secularizing dominance. This concern for the historical process will require an enlightened understanding of Christian mission in the formation of a world-cultural humanity, perhaps in a natural and evangelising alliance with peoples with whom it has a community of interest in the face of this cultural aggression. Such a development could then lead on to the re-evangelisation of this secular post-Christian culture too.

There are two levels at which the affirmation of cultural alternatives to this present situation have to be addressed: at the level of the evangelisation of the everyday, common sense cultural reality of people; and then at the level of the philosophic scientific and scholarly objectifications in the cultural superstructure. The latter would be an inter-disciplinary task of the human sciences, including theology, to mediate the significance of religion for the cultural matrix. This activity belongs to the intellectual ministry of the Church in its institutions of higher learning, and, therefore, it ought to be on the intellectual agenda of the University we envisage (See Note 1). It has, as well, important implications for the intellectual, moral and religious formation of the students.
What is required is firstly a scholarly and scientific discernment of the relationship among the constituent elements of society, political, technological, economic, spontaneous communal and cultural; and then, of how to mediate the transfer of the major technological and organisational achievements of modern Western culture into the service of local and national communities. This process inevitably involves a critical, dialectical interaction between modern Western culture and indigenous cultures, in which values at the personal, community and cultural levels are involved. The role of theology is to mediate the significance of religion for preserving personal and cultural integrity in the interaction between the cultures. At the personal level, this implies ensuring that people remain dramatic subjects of their own lives; their values refined and strengthened, their own intelligence and reason self-appropriated and affirmed, and their final, deliberate choices informed by their faith.

From within the school of the modern transcendental Thomists, Bernard Lonergan gives a descriptive account of the importance of cultural integrity for the person, as the foundation of a higher viewpoint over all the other social elements:

The dramatic subject, as practical, originates and develops capital and technology, the economy and the state. By his intelligence he progresses, and by his bias he declines. Still, this unfolding or practicality constitutes no more than the setting and the incidents of the drama. Delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow, aspiration and frustration, achievement and failure, wit and humour, stand not within practicality but above it. Man can pause and with a smile or a forced grin ask what the drama, what he himself is about. His culture is his capacity to ask, to reflect to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart. (Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 236)

In a recent publication, *Philosophy for Africa*, Augustine Shutte underscores the importance of the Thomist personalist tradition for formulating an indigenous African social philosophy. He maintains that the centrality of the understanding of the person as the focus and nexus of social power and relationships, in such African concepts as *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* (literally translated from Xhosa as “a person is a person through other persons”) and *seriti* (translated as “created force”), find a natural home in this tradition. This will require collaboration with a responsive and pro-active audience in Africa, to achieve a systematic philosophical account of the nature of persons and community, which at
the same time would re-vitalise and renew the relevance of the Church’s own intellectual tradition (See Note 1 and Note 2).

Such an African social philosophy which is personalist, African humanist, and communitarian, evolved from its own intellectual traditions, would be necessary for the development of an authentic Africa human rights culture, one that resolves the Western liberal dilemma between liberty and equality. The secular Western liberal democratic rights culture based on the absolute primacy of the individual incorporates irreconcilable tensions: between justiciable first-generation rights based on the value of liberty in the various freedoms of the individual, and the second-generation rights, based on the value of equality in access to socio-economic goods. In developing its own human rights culture, a truly African personalist response would have to reject both the liberal capitalist and the Marxist collectivist models.

**CONCLUSION: THE END OF A LIBERAL UNIVERSITY EDUCATION**

Newman’s idea of a liberal education can be very easily mistakenly appropriated by a modern liberal mentality from which it is separated by an unabridgeable ontological divide. His vision is firmly focused on the final destiny of the human person, in a mentality deeply imbued with his Christian faith. This destiny is the repose and enlargement of mind in the final beatific vision in the community of the Trinity – in which the human intellect is intentionally united to that of the Godhead. A truly liberal education, therefore, always subordinates practicality to a contemplation that borders on the threshold of supernatural reality, to give intimations of eternity, and in leading the person to his perfection and fully autonomous liberty.

There are numerous passages throughout Newman’s writings in which he elaborates on this ideal of a liberal education. The topic was dear to his heart, and he reserved the best of his inimitable prose to discourse on it. Many passages could be cited, but none are more eloquent than the following quotation from *The Idea of a University*, which is so suggestive of the beatific vision:

> The perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education, and its “beau-ideal” to be imparted to individuals in the respective measures is the clear, calm,
accurate vision and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind can
embrace them, each in its place, and with its own characteristics upon it. It is
almost prophetic from its knowledge of history; it is almost heart-searching from
its knowledge of human nature; it is almost supernatural in its freedom from
littleness and prejudice; it has almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly
contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things and the music of
spheres. (NILE, P. 103)

NOTES

1. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHURCH’S INTELLECTUAL TRADITION

After the publication of the encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII in 1879, the 20th
century has witnessed a veritable explosion of pluralistic approaches to a broad range of
philosophical and technological issues within the Catholic Church. This has totally
transformed what had been previously a very narrow field of an officially sanctioned
intellectual tradition, which was the doctrine of St Thomas, no matter how correctly, or
incorrectly it was interpreted.

Within the Thomist tradition itself, this century has witnessed a differentiation of
orientations, depending on particular emphases in dialogues with other modern intellectual
developments. In terms of their impact on the intellectual life of this century, two particular
schools have emerged both of which have greatly revitalised the Thomist tradition with
original and creative insights.

Within the more tradition metaphysical approach, there has been the work of original,
versatile thinkers such as Jacques Maritain, and the important historical retrieval of the
authentic tradition, in particular, by Etienne Gilson. The second organic development out of
the philosophy of St Thomas has been called Transcendental Thomism, since it has followed
the more subjective approach of modern philosophy. These latter developments within the
Thomist tradition, began with Pierre Rousselot and Joseph Marechal in the first half of this
century, were carried on in the second half by Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, and have
opened out in the last decade into a large field of endeavour by their followers.

In some ways, the two approaches, on the one hand, the more traditional metaphysical
approach, and, on the other hand, the more subjective approach, are complementary; and, in
other ways, the latter approach elaborates out of the traditional understandings, in dialogue
with developments in modern philosophy. However, what is of importance is that the
“perennial philosophy” is coming to terms with, and systematically appropriating many of
the major insights of modern philosophy, as expressed in its various schools of thought, to
list several, existentialism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis and Marxism.

It is especially the seminal work of Bernard Lonergan, in locating the foundations of
philosophical, theological and general scientific empirical methods on the normative and
invariant structure of human cognition and volition that has provided a fertile ground for
many subsequent developments. In founding the methodology of all human science on the
unvarying constituents of human nature and human activity, such as human attention,
intelligence, reasonableness and love, Lonergan has been able to affect a break with the narrow classicist notions of culture and history. He has provided the methodological foundations for a more pluralistic, empirical and historical-minded theological investigation of the relation between religion and culture.

Also, by carefully analysing the differentiations of interiority, at conscious and unconscious levels, a foundation has been provided for a more integral approach to, and a re-orientation of the human sciences, which allows for the appropriation of the major insights of the psychologists, such as Freud, Jung and Rank. This re-orientation and integration of the human sciences, including theology, also enables us to distinguish the various levels of the dialectics of the historical process, at the personal, community and cultural levels. On these foundations, a dialogue can be set up with Marx, Freud, Jung or Rank, for instance, and what is valid in their insights recovered and then appropriated in a way that deepens the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice.

Lonergan acknowledged his own indebtedness to Newman’s insights in the latter’s major philosophical work, *A Grammar of Assent*. It is a mark of Newman’s native genius, that having specialised in scriptural, patristic and literary studies, and without any serious academic formation in philosophy, that he was able to make an enduring contribution to an understanding of the personal element in all human support to these developments in modern Thomism; while providing the necessary nuances, in principle, they are in substantial agreement with his own ideas, expressed in a more literary idiom.

It is impossible to deal with our topic of the philosophy of a Catholic university, without having to peep into this Pandora’s Box of the whole range of the great intellectual debates of the day, with all the historical cul-de-sacs and the systematic and inexorable appropriation of the enduring valid insights by the “perennial philosophy”. In fact, these are the very debates that should be conducted with great intellectual vigour within the interdisciplinary context of a Catholic University.

**2. BEGINNING A CRITIQUE OF WESTERN MAN: UNDERSTANDING THE METAPHYSICAL ROOTS OF HIS INTELLECTUAL DILEMMA**

An interdisciplinary effort is required as part of the agenda of our Catholic University of Southern Africa to produce a critical cultural anthropology of modern Western Man, the knower becoming the problematic known.

This note serves to outline one of the possible ways of establishing the basis of such critique, by exposing the metaphysical roots of the modern Western intellectual dilemma, which permeates the whole of Western society, its human rights culture, its economic system and the impoverishment of its culture through increasing commodification. We also argue for the desirability of evolving an African scholarship which dialogues with the Church’s philosophical tradition, in order to develop an authentic African intellectual school, without overly prescribing to it.

Modern philosophy, since Descartes, through Kant, Hegel, Comte and Marx and to the more recent phenomenologists, have not managed to escape the original dualism of mind and body in which Descartes placed the modern project of founding philosophical enquiry on the thinking subject. In the modern tradition, every line of enquiry as ended up in an implicit or explicit metaphysical materialism; and, eventually, in post-modernism, we witness the end of the very integrity of the thinking subject itself, which is its final despair.
The modern philosophical enterprise has endeavoured to create an anthropomorphic humanism to escape creature-hood, but in so doing it has only managed to increasingly detach the modern from a sense of participating in some form of super-individual unity with the cosmos necessary for the production of cultural values. Otto Rank has described the importance of a unity between anthropological and cosmological constitutive meanings as

… the individual urge to restore a lost unity with the cosmos, symbolised in the unity of the infant with the immediacy of its world, … the essential psychological factor in the production of human and cultural values. (Otto Rank, Art and Artist)

There has been an historical development in this dialectical tension between the anthropological and cosmological constitutive principles in the formation of culture, from the more primitive mentality to that of the modern. The anthropological principle establishes the subject as creating its cultural world in its own right, while the cosmological principle establishes the nature of that world in an immediacy of imagination, perception and mental evocation.

The scientific ideologies have progressively reduced the modern’s world to a complex mechanomorphic model of material particles unrepresented in the immediacy of imagination and perception, and which are the “really” real. The modern has become increasingly isolated from Being and the cosmos, caught up in a psychological and spiritual immanence. When these models of the physical sciences are combined with the animistic notion of the primordial material forces and evolutionary theories, then this pseudo-scientific mentality becomes an elaborate illusion, and it’s accompanying scientific ideologies of the nature of human society a contrived world-view to support totalitarian power.

What the modern mentality has lost, and an understanding of Thomist metaphysics will help to restore, is this cosmological sense of participation, a comfortable identity of a life psychological and spiritual unity with Being, a thinking subject not detached from its explicit ontological roots of a participation in an existence emanating from the God of Moses, the one who Is. It is metaphysics of creation, in which the psychological and spiritual essence of the human person becomes a creative form in its own right, the person its effective agency participating in the continuing Act of Creation, a relation which keeps the world in Being. In the modern philosophical understanding, human nature is not a natural essence, but an historical product, a self-creating social and cultural entity, detached from its ontological roots, whose social enterprise becomes a self-appreciating quest.

Those scholars who would hope to develop an authentic systematic African philosophical anthropology, which is personalist, communitarian and, at the same time, in the best African humanist tradition, would benefit from a dialogue with the evolving intellectual heritage of the Church.

3. THE UNITY OF MIND AND KNOWLEDGE, SCIENTISM AND MODERN ANIMISM AND THE RE-EDUCATION OF COMMON SENSE

In this note we discuss Newman’s second thesis on the intrinsic unity of the Knowledge which forms the curriculum of the University. For Newman, the university was the studium generale, in which every legitimate sphere of Knowledge was accorded its due place. Every science should be allowed its own proper method of enquiry, which defined the particular abstract way it viewed reality. However, every method of enquiry was but an aspect of the unity of Mind, whose object was Truth; every true assertion of fact belonged to a single
body of Knowledge, within which it was related mutually to other acts discerned by the other sciences, employing their own proper methods.

Truth is the object of Knowledge of whatever kind; … Knowledge is the apprehension of facts, whether in themselves, or in their mutual positions and bearings. And, as all taken together form one integral subject for contemplation, so that there are no natural or real limits between part and part; one is ever running into another; all, as viewed by the mind, are combined together and possess a correlative character one with another … (John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*)

Newman’s ideas were in sharp contrast to the arrogant and triumphal assertion of the method of the physical sciences, as the only legitimate method of human enquiry, by many of his contemporaries, especially among British philosophers, following on Francis Bacon, John Locke and David Hume. However, Newman’s metaphysical instincts were indeed sure and prophetic, when we view the present impoverished philosophical climates of many of our English-speaking universities, whose philosophy departments have stuck with a dogmatic adherence to often sterile linguistic and analytical studies that have come out of this British philosophical school.

The situation is more serious, when we view the complete disarray among scientists today, as to exactly what they are about. What has fired many physical scientists, virtually since Newton, has been a naïve belief, that in some way or another, they were delving into the nature of “matter”, the ultimate reality, the primordial constitution of all things. Indeed, the situation becomes more serious still, if having followed on the remarkable predictive powers of the physical sciences, and the enormous technological benefits that derived from the control of the natural environment that resulted, had not this achievement caught the imagination of people generally. Following a natural propensity of the human mind to seek ultimate answers, it was not long before the common sense world of ordinary people was also filled with the same animistic projections of those of the scientists, of various “forces” and “energy” into this ultimate “matter”. The implicit and unquestioned metaphysical worldview of a Marx and a Freud, for instance, are supported by these unquestioned primitive animistic beliefs, despite the validity of their psychological and social insights.

Modern critically-thinking scientists now realise that they are only dealing with formal mathematical formulae that express the symmetries and invariances of time and space measurements in an economic and aesthetical way; however, most admit with agnostic resignation, that questions on the ultimate nature of things are semantically meaningless in their positivist scheme of things; unlike Newton himself, who, on being unable to resolve the vexing question of action-at-a-distance, began to realise that he was not really dealing with ontological realities in his “natural philosophy”, and gave it up for Unitarian studies. His dissatisfaction was natural, since it is proclivity of the human mind to seek ultimate answers, and when the best intellects do not find them in their sphere of enquiry, they seek them elsewhere.

However, how many generations will it take to educate the common sense world of ordinary people, for instance, that there is no “force” in the “force of gravity”; that the notion of a “force” in gravity is but an anthropomorphism, an analogy of the experience of force in and through their bodies; and, when the apple falls from the tree, it is following a natural path which Einstein decided to call a geodesic; and we are only describing and not explaining what is happening to the apple? (Full-circle return to Aristotle!)
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The Role of Catholic Tertiary Education in South Africa Today

MADGE KARECKI

INTRODUCTION

I have been engaged in higher education in both the informal and formal sectors here in South Africa and in my native United States for several decades. While teaching at the University of South Africa (UNISA), my knowledge of educational theory was greatly enriched through my work with a professional curriculum designer, Marié Nöthling. She introduced me to authors Parker J. Palmer, Michael Gibbons, Susan Daloz Parks, David Helminiak and Jack Mezirow whose educational writings informed my innate sense of teaching and learning with new insights into adult learning principles. Nöthling, who belonged to another Christian ecclesial community, often remarked that in the content and design that shaped the three study guides I produced for the then Missiology Department, there was something different about my style from that of other lecturers. One day we met to discuss the final draft of Dynamics of Interreligious Encounter, the last of my trilogy of missiological texts. Marié sat quietly looking over the pages before her and I did the same with the sections of the texts on my desk and in a moment that Zen Buddhists might call satori she blurted out: “The difference is that the texts take the learners seriously and the activities call them to deeper levels of learning. They not only contain content, they teach learners to think critically about the meaning the study material holds for their lives and the lives of others!”

What Nöthling did for me was to point out authors who would confirm my approach and give me the tools to further theorize about a Catholic approach to tertiary education. Serving on the tuition committee at UNISA also helped to expand my perspective on transformative, values-based education in an African and ecumenical setting. I brought my experience of the Catholic Intellectual Tradition to bear upon my teaching and research and gave voice to it in respectful and yet creative ways to
share it with learners. This said, we turn now to South Africa today before we explore the role of Catholic tertiary education in this specific context.

**THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT**

The euphoria that accompanied the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements in 1990 and the first democratic elections in 1994 that resulted in Nelson Mandela becoming the State President has dissipated. Promises of unreal prosperity have evaporated. The realities of everyday living in post-apartheid South Africa have taken hold: the need for employment, housing, water, electricity, land redistribution, safety and security, honest and transparent governance, and education at every level. Mine is necessarily an etic or outsider’s perspective since I have not lived here for the past eight years. Some material progress has been made, but much deeper issues need to be confronted if the “new” South Africa can realize its full potential.

Thabo Makgoba, the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, pointed out that the first three months of 2013 were filled with reminders of the need to work of justice and peace. He lamented the events at Marikana, other incidents of police brutality, and the death of Mido Macia, a Mozambican taxi driver. Archbishop Makgoba regretted that the outrage over the brutal rape of Anene Booysen in Bredasdorp and the violent killing of Keamogetswe Sefularo in Mohlakeng had abated so quickly. His worry is that the very fabric of society is fraying and social cohesion is being damaged because people have no sense of responsibility for one another. Makgoba nevertheless has hope rooted in the Resurrection of Jesus and charted the way for those ready to take prophetic action. He wrote the following in the “Sunday Independent:”

> We cannot afford the luxury of losing hope, because then we will pay the price of continuing downward spirals.  
> The good news of Easter is that the seed of hope is always there, ready for us to nurture, if we only take courage, take the risk, and persevere (Makgoba 2013:online).

The African continent is in need of the witness of people who continue to work for a just and equitable society where people to spend themselves to make it possible for everyone to live in dignity, security and peace. Changing an economic or political system to correct injustices is indeed
necessary, but without forgiveness, respect, personal freedom and how living virtuously can benefit the society. Without these values nothing will change and social harmony will never be realized. Only when people have the will to work for the common good will hope take root in society. The goal is not more material possessions bred by a consumer mentality that only produces a “mirage of happiness,” (Gutting: 2013:18), but a way of life that is built on a worldview in which our common humanity motivates and directs our common concern for the welfare of all.

We are all familiar with the fact that while Hendrik Verwoerd was the Minister of Native Affairs, the National Party, to which he belonged, enacted laws to limit the educational possibilities of the majority of South Africa’s population to work as what he termed “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” This short-sighted and discriminatory legislation had such disastrous effects that they have reverberated through six decades of South African history. This lack of educational opportunities affected the economy, for sure, but more importantly the accompanying apartheid legislation of separate development wreaked havoc on the social relationships that are meant to create a cohesive and stable society. It negated the fact that all people are related because all people find their origin in the same source, God the Creator. In justice one group of people in the same country cannot claim rights for themselves and their group that they are not willing to give to others (Vol 2011:126). One of those rights is of course, the right to education. Given this context, we see how Catholic tertiary education can play a significant role in bringing hope and healing to South Africa.

**CATHOLIC TERTIARY EDUCATION**

Education provided by the Catholic Church was carried out in monasteries as early as the sixth century and then later, in Cathedral Schools. The University of Bologna founded in 1088 is the oldest of the continuous operating universities in Europe. This was followed by the Universities of Paris, Oxford, Modena, Cambridge and Salamanca. By 1200 many European cities were founded and education was in demand. Theology, the queen of the sciences, had pride-of-place followed by her handmaiden, philosophy, but the foundation of these subjects was laid in the arts: grammar, logic, rhetoric, music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and what we might call the social sciences. The conviction was that education
would enable persons to shape a culture of integrity and justice that was sustained by faith. There was an inherent conviction about the importance of the dialogue between faith and reason that has been an essential part of the enterprise of Catholic higher education and this remains part of Catholic education today. Catholic tertiary education aims to form well-educated and morally responsible persons who are convinced that authentic intellectual inquiry is compatible, even enriching, to openness to the transcendent dimension of human life. Academic excellence is the *sine qua non* of Catholic tertiary education. Just as the great medieval universities provided a worldview that helped to shape European culture, so Catholic tertiary education can serve to shape a world view here in South Africa that reflects a commitment to promoting respect for the dignity of the human person, the promotion of justice, the protection of nature, an equitable sharing of the world’s resources, a just economic and political order. It does so through its teaching and research that “seeks to discover the roots and causes of the serious problems of our time, paying special attention to their ethical and religious dimensions” (*Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (ECE) 32).

The document, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, written by John Paul II, established four defining characteristics of Catholic institutions providing tertiary education. These qualities of Catholic higher education are to be present not only in every professor’s teaching content and research projects, but in the very life of the institution and especially as it confronts “the great problems of society and culture” (ECE 13). Let’s take a look at each of these essential characteristics:

1. A Christian inspiration not only of individuals but of the university community as such;
2. A continuing reflection in the light of Catholic faith upon the growing treasury of human knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research;
3. A fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the Church;
4. An institutional commitment to the service of the people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the transcendent goal which gives meaning to life (ECE 13).
These four characteristics are meant to shape the identity of a Catholic college or university so that it can be at the service of the world and therefore prepare students to participate in the Church’s mission in the light of the Christian message (ECE 14). Universities and colleges are asked to enable students to “scrutinize reality” not only in the light of their specific discipline of study, but in collaboration with other disciplines for mutual enhancement (ECE 15). In this way Catholic higher education helps students to acquire skills that facilitate the integration of knowledge. They learn not to accept the compartmentalization of knowledge as they search for truth through interdisciplinary learning.

ECE sees one of the specific aims of a Catholic University as the promotion of dialogue between faith and reason, “so that it can be seen more profoundly how faith and reason bear harmonious witness to the unity of all truth” (ECE 17). The Catholic Intellectual Tradition enhances the intellectual process by emphasizing the spiritual dimensions of human reason. Perhaps Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI said it best when he said:

> When a person limits his thoughts to only material objects . . . he closes himself to the great questions about life, humanity itself and God. While modern science has granted humankind numerous benefits, it has also led many to believe that the only real things are those which can be experimented with…Authentic Christian faith does not limit human liberty and reason. Instead, faith supports reason and perfection; and reason, illuminated by faith, finds strength to raise itself to the knowledge of God.

The Catholic University makes a commitment to take seriously the religious dimension of human life as a proper area of intellectual inquiry. The dialogue between faith and reason has been an integral part of Western philosophy since at least the time of St. Augustine. The Catholic University is the place where sincere seekers of the truth can be led not only to knowledge, but to wisdom, the real aim of philosophy.

Because of the profound reverence that the Catholic Intellectual Tradition has for the dignity for the human person, it is concerned about the ethical and moral implications of teaching and research. In light of this concern priority is given to the ethical over the technical, the primacy of persons over things and the conviction that the human person is served best when knowledge is joined to conscience (ECE 18).
Theology plays an important role in the synthesis of knowledge and in the dialogue between faith and reason. It also serves other disciplines in their search for meaning so that students “acquire an organic vision of reality” that is enhanced by Scripture, Tradition, and the Church’s Magisterium so that Gospel principles will enrich the pursuit of knowledge and human life and dignity. ECE (20) summarises well the mission of the Catholic University:

Through research and teaching the students are educated in the various disciplines so as to become truly competent in the specific sectors in which they will devote themselves to the service of society and of the Church, but at the same time they are prepared to give the witness of their faith to the world.

THE MISSION OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICA TODAY

In light of the specific context of South Africa today, I would say that beyond academic excellence that needs to characterise every discipline’s teaching and research a Catholic University must witness to and enable persons to grow in openness to the Transcendent dimension of life in their intellectual search for truth. It is this element of the Catholic Intellectual Tradition that enriches the development of the human person. We are not autonomous beings; we flourish in relationship to others and to THE OTHER, who is God. The person who thinks he owes nothing to anyone is not free but rather isolated. We are not more ourselves with ourselves alone. The notion of person means not autonomy but openness to others: We cannot be educated, let alone live, without any reference to others.

Catholic tertiary education offers to South Africans an alternative vision of the human person as an embodied spirit made for union with God, the Creator who revealed himself in Christ through the Incarnation. This self-revelation of God is a model for the human person’s own self-transcendence to be in relationship to others. Only when we go out of ourselves in service to others as a practical demonstration of our faith do we become the persons we are meant to be.

In light of the corruption, violence and economic disparity of South African society Catholic tertiary education offers a prophetic alternative that is founded on the kenotic example of Christ Jesus. It educates people
through rigorous intellectual inquiry in relationship to the faith dimension of human life by introducing them to a biblical and theological worldview that emphasises self-transcendence and service to the common good.

The second significant contribution that Catholic tertiary education can make to South Africa today is the emphasis on solidarity, one of the elements of Catholic Social Teaching. The document, *Sollicitudo rei Socialis* clarified the meaning of solidarity within Catholic Social Teaching and I think it is important for understanding this virtue not only in a political sense, but also in terms of Catholic theology:

[Solidarity] is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all (*Sollicitudo rei Socialis* 38).

The heart of solidarity is the life of Jesus, because it is through the incarnation that God is in a very real way in solidarity with humanity and that we are in solidarity with God. The historical reality of the life of Jesus as a human being lifts solidarity beyond the fellowship of people into something altogether more mystical and profound. In addition, because we know, as Christians, that all of us are formed in the image of God, loving our neighbour becomes also an act of solidarity towards and with God. Such is the teaching of 1 Cor 12, where Saint Paul reminds us of our unity as the body of Christ.

Every act of solidarity, understood in this light, becomes an act of communion with God; an action in which we transmit and reflect the love with which God loves both the person who is the object of the action and with which we love God. The ability to recognise God in every individual person and to recognise every individual in God is necessary for authentic human development. Our belief in this and our faith as Christians draws us ever more strongly into a state of unity with each other and with God. Founded in Catholic Social Teaching solidarity becomes the life blood of the reciprocity between God and humanity and the Eucharist is the sacrament of that solidarity.
Solidarity recognises a deep bond between us all; a bond that goes beyond family and extends to the whole human race. This bond is in fact a commitment to the common good, i.e. “the good of all and of each individual because we are all really responsible for all. Solidarity is what is meant in Ephesians 4:25 when St Paul writes that we are all “members one of another.” So the opposites of solidarity are issues like inequality, exploitation and oppression, as well greed and selfishness. It is the value which requires that human rights are defended by the Church. Solidarity demands that all people have a right to food and drinkable water, to housing, to security, to self-determination, and freedom of association. Education ensures a greater ability to use their gifts to work for these things for the common good. Catholic higher education promotes the development use of talents and abilities in the search for knowledge and truth that leads to real liberation.

Solidarity between generations means that it is morally wrong as well as economically counterproductive to burden future generations with the costs of current activities. Probably the only way to ensure harmony and balance between the requirements of economic efficiency and the need for political participation and social justice is to have the value of solidarity at the heart of global political and economic systems.

Solidarity is much more than an idealistic principle for organising society; basically it is a moral value. It is the practice of solidarity, even in simple ways that guarantees the common good and the fostering of integral human development.

**CONCLUSION**

My first mentor in my study of missiology was the late David Bosch. In his magisterial work, *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission* he wrote:

> Mission remains an indispensable dimension of the Christian faith and that at its most profound level, its purpose is to transform reality around it. Mission, in this perspective, is that dimension of our faith that refuses to accept reality as it is and aims at changing it (1991:519).
Catholic tertiary education has the capacity to transform the reality of South African society today through academic excellence in teaching and research that leads not only to knowledge, but to wisdom, wisdom that can lead students to be people who have the capacity to transcend themselves in service to others.

Catholic tertiary education can serve South Africa well by creating an awareness of the transcendent dimension of life. It is this competence that enables people to see life in terms of eternal consequences that challenge them to weigh their choices in terms of what is ethical, moral and good. This makes for integrity in human interaction and helps to build a more just society.

Finally, because of its emphasis on the dignity of the human person and its conviction on the moral value of solidarity Catholic tertiary education can help South Africa develop a more just and equitable society that respects persons not only for what they can produce, but who they are as persons endowed with dignity because they have their origins in God, the Creator of all.

This is no small task. I close with these words from Christopher Fry’s (1953:62) play *A Sleep of Prisoners*, written in the aftermath of the bombing of London during World War II. He penned these well-known words about the need to meet the challenges before us with new freedom and awareness of fragility and the need for life to be rooted in God.

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Thank God our time is now when wrong
    Comes up to face us everywhere,
    Never to leave us until we take
The longest stride of soul men (sic) ever took.
    Affairs are now soul size.
    The enterprise
    Is exploration into God.
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Events are indeed soul size and Catholic higher education is poised to make a lasting contribution to South Africa today.
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This paper argues that those in leadership positions are confronted by many manifestations of anger at various levels of organisational life. They are required to deal with own and other anger. However, despite having access to numerous possible approaches to and guidelines for leadership, very little is ever said about anger and leadership. A brief survey of some of the leadership literature suggests, for example, that much of it details the various types of leader, desirable traits, skills, habits and/or qualities for leadership; various approaches to leadership; distinctions between managers and leaders; leader failure or problem leaders; emotional intelligence and leadership; and work on leadership for the future or on emerging issues in leadership. Rarely in this literature on leadership is there any mention of anger. The leadership literature excels in directing our attention to the ‘ideals’ for leadership, whether these be in terms of character or of conduct. There are many lists of those virtues and qualities required for the ethical leader, but of most vices, and of anger in particular, there is no mention. Therefore the paper suggests this silence needs to be acknowledged and broken and, to this end, examines the nature of anger as well as possible implications for ethical leadership in the organisation. It concludes by providing an ethical framework which may be used either reactively or proactively by leaders for ethically evaluating the anger process.

INTRODUCTION – ANGER & LEADERSHIP LITERATURE

It is not difficult to find evidence of anger in our world today, whether one considers national or global issues. There are myriad causes for this including continued economic injustice on a global as well as a national level; corporate greed and disregard for the common good as manifested in the many corporate failures;, careless disregard for proper environmental protection measures; human rights abuses; ongoing discrimination of
various kinds including that based on gender, religion, race and ethnicity; political and social injustice and so on. Such anger is manifested in various ways: personal vendettas; strikes, like the South African Public Servants Strike (2010) or the French protest about Pension Reforms and changes (2010); protests which demonstrate the anger of the poor and working class (e.g. in South Africa we have had various service delivery protests, as well as wage protests/strikes in 2010); violence both individual and group and, of course, war, described by Thurman (2005) as ‘organised anger’. It is significant that terms like “road rage”; “telephone rage” and “air flight rage” have become part of our everyday discourse. Rage incidents have, in some instances, led to court cases as a result of the physical harm that has been meted out to the victims of such rage. In addition, contemporary society has met the anger challenge with “anger management” courses and classes, which, we are told, aim to get the angry person to admit his/her rage, to examine the triggers for such anger and to learn how to “manage” it.(http://www.mg.co.za/printformat/single/2010-05-13-anger-management-101) accessed 5/11/2010).

Those in leadership positions are confronted by many manifestations of anger at various levels of organisational life. They are required to deal with own and other anger. However, despite having access to numerous possible approaches to and guidelines for leadership, very little is ever said about anger and leadership. A brief survey of some of the leadership literature suggests, for example, that some of this literature

- details the various types of leader, desirable traits, skills, habits and/or qualities for leadership (Bennis 2005; Goleman 2005; Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2002; Boyett and Boyett 1998; Northouse 2001; Sadler 2003; Hesselbein, Goldsmith and Beckhard 1996; Greenleaf 1977);
- details various approaches to leadership (Spears and Lawrence, 2002; Sadler 2003; Boyett and Boyett 1998; Northouse 2001; Greenleaf 1977; Spears 1998 etc).
- distinguishes leaders from managers (Boyett and Boyett 1998; Zaleznik 2005);
- discusses leader failure or problem leaders, the narcissistic leader being mentioned specifically (Lubit 2007; Maccoby 2005; Coutu 2005; Kets De Vries 2001, Kets Devries 2007; Conger 2007);
- discusses work on emotional intelligence and leadership (Kets De Vries 2001; Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2002)
examines leadership for the future or emerging issues in leadership (Kets De Vries 2001; Vechio (ed) 2007); Hesselbein, Goldsmith and Beckhard (eds) 1996).

Rarely in this literature is there any mention of anger. In fact, the leadership literature excels in directing our attention to the ‘ideals’ for leadership, whether of character or conduct. There are many lists of those virtues and qualities required for the ethical leader, such as respect, courage, justice, honesty, temperance, self-control, perseverance, humility, truthfulness and many others. But of the vices, of anger in particular, there is no mention. One could almost believe that people never experience or have to witness anger in the workplace.

However, this failure to mention anger in regard to leadership, does not mean that there is no research on anger in organisations. Gibson and Callister (2010), for example, have tried to sum up some of this diverse research using a combination of a psychological and organisational perspective. Their work focuses on employee anger, rather than leader anger and they contend that much of the anger research is in the field of psychology. They argue that research on anger in organisations has begun to focus more on the functional and adaptive aspects of anger in the workplace rather than merely looking at its negative effects. These authors believe that anger should be studied as a discrete emotion and be acknowledged as influencing many phenomena at all levels of the organisation. They examine causes of employee anger at work (e.g. stress) and develop both a definition and a model of anger in the organisation. The components of this anger model comprise a trigger event; an emotional reaction and expression and consequences. Each of these components may be influenced by certain ‘moderators’ such as gender, levels of trait anger, status differences and organisational and cultural emotional norms. This would seem to be useful information for those in leadership positions, but, as already observed, leadership literature is relatively silent about the importance of understanding the anatomy of anger, whether our own or that of those who work with us and for us. I argue that this silence needs to be acknowledged and broken. This paper will examine the nature of anger as well as its possible implications for ethical leadership in the organisation.
To begin our examination, let us consider the various terms for and definitions of anger: the shades of anger as it were. Biblical literature and the language of the seven deadly sins, seems to use the words wrath and anger interchangeably. For example, in Proverbs 15:1, we read “A mild answer turns away wrath/sharp words stir up anger”. Consulting a dictionary may reveal that wrath is defined in terms of anger as in “Vehement or violent anger, intense exasperation or resentment, deep indignation”. However, wrath is also used to refer to extreme forces of nature (The Shorter Oxford Dictionary). The word ‘anger’ in fact comes from the Old Norse angr meaning ‘trouble’, ‘affliction’ ‘pain’, suggesting that anger comes from pain and “moves to inflict pain” (Thurman 2005: 29). Anger has been variously defined, for example as:

- “that which pains or afflicts, or the feeling which it produces, trouble, vexation sorrow”; also “the active feeling provoked against the agent: passion, rage, wrath, ire”. (The Shorter Oxford Dictionary).
- “an inflammatory site in the body” (The Shorter Oxford Dictionary).
- “a strong passion or emotion of displeasure, and usually antagonism, excited by a sense of injury or insult. Synonyms: anger, ire, rage, fury, indignation, wrath…” (cited from Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary in Thurman 2005: 29-30).
- one of the ‘capital sins’, (in the Christian tradition) so-called because they can “easily become vices and sources of many other sins” rather than because they are always serious. Anger may be seen as “the intemperate outburst of dislike with the inordinate desire for another’s punishment. It is contrary to patience and meekness” (Peschke 2004: 309).
- “an emotion that involves an appraisal of responsibility for wrongdoing by another person or entity and often includes the goal of correcting the perceived wrong” (Gibson and Callister (2010).

This gives a psychological perspective on anger.

There is often disagreement about synonyms for anger and their meaning, but Thurman (2005:30), provides a useful distinction between some of these synonyms. Thus rage suggests ‘loss of self-control’ or temporary insanity; ire is more intense than anger but less so than rage; indignation is often a righteous anger as a result of insult; wrath could be rage or
indignation but “also implies a desire or intent to avenge or punish, or to get revenge”.

On the basis of the above definitions, we may conclude that, anger, therefore, seems to be a strong emotion triggered by the perception of a wrong done to oneself by another which causes pain. Anger includes a desire to make the other ‘pay’ in some way as compensation for the injury inflicted. Its expression seems to be forceful in some instances and may be registered in the body.

**EAST VERSUS WEST ON ANGER**

A second step in understanding more about anger might be to acknowledge that the above definitions have a strong Western/Christian perspective, and so to consider whether Western and Eastern understandings of this emotion differ and if they might contain similarities. Thurman (2005) has written on anger from both an Eastern and Western perspective and his observations are worth noting in some detail. Firstly, in both Christianity and Islam, anger is seen as a ‘deadly sin’, while in Buddhism it is viewed as an addiction or poison, being classified as one of the so-called ‘root’ poisons, along with greed and delusion. Buddhist psychology uses the same word for hate as for anger (dvesta) which is not the case in the Christian tradition where there are separate words. Secondly, Thurman notes that there are two extreme views on anger, both of which have secular and religious versions. The first extreme view, found in both Eastern and Western thought, is that we cannot do anything about anger, except moderate it a bit. The religious version of this extreme is to suggest anger comes from God, that in Christianity both God and Jesus show anger, and that anger is only sinful where it is excessive. The secular version of this extreme as found, for example in Social Darwinism, is that we are ‘hard-wired’ with anger and that it forms part of our biological make-up. The second extreme view on anger is the notion that we can completely eradicate it and be perfect. This view was exemplified in the West in Gnosticism and in most Christian, Judaic and Islamic mysticism and is widespread in the East, for example, in dualistic Buddhism and Hindu and Taoist mysticism. For Thurman, the one extreme represents a resignation to anger, the other, a resignation from anger.
In his view, contemporary society is resigned to anger. Although in both Christianity and Eastern thought anger was seen as deadly to the soul, people today do not necessarily believe in the soul. This means anger in our secular society is no longer seen as a great problem despite being viewed as a negative emotion which is bad for our health and relationships. It is more condoned in males than females. Furthermore, contemporary secular society neither meets nor challenges anger. In fact it condones the notion of righteous anger (e.g. against injustice or criminality) and its accepted outcomes such as severe prison laws, capital punishment etc. It also condones the right of contemporary women to anger as protest at previous male domination.

To illustrate, this resignation from anger from a Western perspective, Thurman reminds us of Seneca’s essay on anger. Seneca (3 BC-65AD), viewed anger as unnatural to humans, uncontrolled, very destructive and likened it to temporary insanity. According to Seneca, anger is acted out in various ways including murders, arson, devastation, killing, and backstabbing. Anger cannot be used as “a tool of reason” and, even in the case of so-called righteous anger, aimed at righting an injury to oneself or one’s family, is neither right nor reliable. Those issues which generate righteous anger are better dealt with by means of the virtues: virtues like courage, justice, endurance and wisdom which do not need assistance from anger. Anger must be seen as bad and must be conquered. (See Thurman 2005). Seneca’s view accords with the Stoics and he does not agree with Aristotle that anger can be appropriate.

An eastern perspective on resignation from anger is that of Buddhism which, according to Thurman, links anger to self-delusion. Anger leads to four further addictions, namely aggression, which means assault on another; vindictiveness, which means revenge on one’s enemy; malice, which means hurtful speech and violence, which means an overall desire to harm others (2005:55). To resign from anger, means to first acknowledge that anger is our greatest enemy: it is bad, negative, always harmful and destructive. Then one must decide to get rid of it. Patience, particularly with the injury done to us, is seen as the antidote to the destructiveness of anger. Dealing with potential anger at an early stage and refusing to be distracted from happiness by anger is also advocated. In fact, patience has more than one stage, and moves through endurance, to
“active forbearance based on insight” (75) to forgiving patience and finally to resignation from anger.

**PHILOSOPHERS ON ANGER: WHAT CAN WE LEARN?**

A third step in gaining a greater understanding of the anatomy of anger is to engage with some of the thoughts and ideas of great philosophers and theologians on the issue.

The ancient philosophers from ‘Plato to Plutarch’ viewed all vices, including anger, as defects which could be ‘overcome by education and discipline’ (Sommers and Sommers 2004:277). While virtuous people led orderly, rational lives, those controlled by vices were irrational, impulsive, anxious and discontented. The Stoic philosophers believed that anger was both immoderate and a sickness and that all emotions were ‘excluded’ from the wise and virtuous person. Aristotle believed anger and other emotions were ‘moderated by reason’ in the virtuous. (Regan 2005:111). Both Aristotle and Plutarch (late 1st century AD) extolled character development to counteract vice.

Considering Aristotle’s views in a little more detail, we find that he believed that feelings and emotions in themselves were neither virtues nor vices, but that they could affect us detrimentally if we had either too much or too little of the particular feeling. For Aristotle, anger was an emotion directed at someone in particular and aimed at gaining pleasurable revenge for an injury. In other words, anger was a reaction to some injury and, in fact, was provoked by this perceived injury. Excessive anger was equivalent to “irascibility”, with angry people being distressed and taking “pleasure in retaliating” (Broadie and Rowe 2002:136). Excessive anger is indicated when one is angry with those whom one ought not to be angry with, for too long, in circumstances where one ought not to be angry and where the anger is out of proportion to the event. Aristotle believed those who demonstrated excessive anger were of three types:

- ‘Irascible’ people, i.e. those who become angry inappropriately fast, but also cooled down fast and ‘retaliate’ rather than clinging to their anger
- ‘Hyper choleric’ people, i.e. those with very quick tempers who get angry quickly about anything, anytime
‘Bitter’ people i.e. those who remain angry for a long time despite the fact that they control their tempers. These ‘difficult’ people really only let go of anger after retaliating as this gives pleasure. However, if they do not or cannot ‘pay back’ and relieve their pain, the anger lasts and no one can persuade them to let it go. Such anger does harm to themselves and to those near to them. (Broadie and Rowe 2002).

On the other hand, to have too little anger amounted to “spiritlessness” and, in Western culture, would be the equivalent of not showing so-called “righteous” anger whether on behalf of self or others (for example by putting up with abuse of self or others). For Aristotle, the latter would be “slavish” behavior. The balanced state of so-called “mildness” meant a person was mild-tempered (Broadie and Rowe 2002:119). Mild anger was appropriate anger, neither overwhelming, nor seeking revenge. Aristotle observed that all extremes of anger would always attract censure, but that it was difficult to understand why some types of anger attracted more censure than others (e.g. ‘manly’ anger was less censured).

We have already made mention of Seneca and his view that anger can never be appropriate and should be eliminated. However, not everyone has agreed with this so-called overly optimistic view of some pagan philosophers that humans could control vice and develop a virtuous character (Sommers and Sommers 2004). St Augustine (354-430 AD) was one of these and felt such virtue could only occur with God’s grace as persons are both weak and corrupt and cannot attain total perfection in this world.

Let us turn now to the thoughts of Aquinas on anger. Like Aristotle and also influenced by him, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275) examined anger in some detail (Summa Theologica 1a2ae, 46-48). According to the contemporary philosopher Herbert McCabe, Aquinas was very interested in anger, which he saw as the emotion (passion) “most involved with rational assessment of the world” (Davies 2008: 78). Aquinas held that all passions belonged to the sensitive appetite, which could be divided into two parts: the concupiscible and the irascible appetites. The passions of the concupiscible appetite included love, hate, desire, flight, delight and sorrow and were aroused as a result of seeing something we view as good or bad. Those of the irascible appetite are aroused by things we see and view as good or bad, but that we have difficulty acquiring or avoiding.
They include hope, despair, daring, fear and anger (Gratsch 2004). Aquinas believed that all emotions were God-given, that “the good life is a passionate life” and that emotion should be “guided by virtues” rather than suppressed (Davies 2008:78). Like Aristotle, he argued that passions or emotions are not morally good or bad in themselves, but according to their relation with the will and need to be controlled: uncontrolled emotion is problematic.

For Aquinas, anger was contrary to gentleness and was

a desire for the pleasure of revenge and in that sense a matter of the appetites of desire, but excited by failure to ward off an evil and thus a matter for the aggressive appetites (Davies 2008: 78).

Anger is motivated by injury to the angry person, without which Aquinas believed no person would be angry. The ‘root cause’ of anger is really “another’s contempt for us” (Gratsch 2004:101). Anger aims to punish those who have offended us. Anger’s effects include compromising our judgment and being pleased at the punishment of the guilty as well as physical reactions such as flushing and increased heart rate.

For Aquinas, anger was the most ‘reasonable’ of the emotions, given that it could motivate the person to take action for a reason (i.e. as a result of the “injury suffered”). It is also an emotion needed by humans in order to be courageous and to defend justice. For Aquinas, anger bred from a zeal for justice and aimed at righting injustice was not sinful, because this anger is anger at sin. However, such anger must be governed by reason and the vengeance taken must be legal and in proportion to the injustice. Aquinas gives a nuanced account of anger and sin, carefully outlining how anger could be a mortal sin and how it could be a capital sin. Unrighteous anger is not governed by reason, and is seriously sinful. Such anger harms another seriously, is contrary to the demands of justice and seeks vengeance for vengeance own sake. A capital sin is one which can cause many other sins. This is true in the case of anger. Aquinas refers to Gregory the Great’s list of the so-called ‘daughters of anger’ (in Morals XXXI, 45, n. 88(PL76:621B) cited in Davies 2003:87) viz. quarrels, inflated ego, insults, exclamations, indignation, blasphemies (see Davies 2003: 387). What this means is that anger can result in our committing other sins such as blaspheming against God, ranting against our neighbour,
insulting others and so on. Aquinas refers to anger as a “special kind of sin” which is contrary to virtues like gentleness (which moderates anger), charity and true justice (Davies 2003: 387). He also believes that anger is less malicious than either envy or hate. While anger looks to harm the particular person who has injured us in proportion to the injury, hate is not proportionate to the injury received and can be directed against anyone or indeed any group whether he/she/they has/have injured us or not. For Aquinas, anger is a lesser sin than envy or hate because it

seeks a neighbour’s evil and prevents a neighbour’s good, only under the aspect of good, that is just retribution (Davies 2003: 385).

An interesting observation made by Aquinas was that those who demonstrate excellence in any particular sphere are more inclined to anger. Such persons take particular offence at the slights or contempt of someone less significant than themselves or at slights which touch on their particular area of competence or are undeserved (Gratsch 2004: 101). This, in itself, could be a useful insight for leaders.

**THE ANATOMY OF ANGER: SUMMARY**

Let us briefly summarise some of the key points from this discussion on the nature of anger, prior to discussing the relevance of these for ethical leadership in organisations.

Firstly, anger is widely understood to be an emotion in response to some trigger event, often an injury or perceived injury, such as contempt for self by another. It is also understood to incorporate a desire for retaliation or revenge of some sort to gain compensation for the injury suffered.

Secondly, anger, as with any emotion, is not viewed as right or wrong in itself. It is the expression of that anger, the action taken, which seems to constitute the wrong. Such wrong may be greater as in mortal or capital sin, but it may be less, as in the case where the anger causes little harm to another. In Western society, there is a common perception that righteous anger is not wrong at all, because its aim is to counteract wrongs such as injustice.
Thirdly, it is generally acknowledged that anger can cause harm. This harm may be physical as well as non-physical. In other words anger can harm the body, the spirit, the emotions, relationships, and so on. Such harm may vary in degree and intensity depending on the use of reason or virtues such as justice to control the anger or, perhaps, depending on certain moderating factors like personal or cultural emotional norms.

Fourthly, both Eastern and Western wisdom suggest that anger and its goal of vengeance can beget further wrongdoing. This is acknowledged in Christianity by describing anger as a deadly or capital sin, which can lead us to sin in other ways such as quarrelling, insulting others, blaspheming and so on. In Buddhism, for example, this is expressed by suggesting that anger gives rise to four further addictions namely, aggression, vindictiveness, malice and violence (Thurman 2005:55).

Fifthly, all and any humans may become angry, although people have different ways of being angry. Such differences are to be accounted for by factors like personality or temperament, gender, emotional norms in an organisation or culture, status, as well as by the extent of the perceived injury.

Sixth, there is disagreement as to whether all anger is dysfunctional and/or ‘bad’ and should be eliminated or whether some anger is adaptive and functional and/or ‘not bad’ or even righteous and should be controlled and used for the good.

Finally, both Eastern and Western wisdom suggest that anger may be moderated or eliminated or controlled or counteracted in various ways. These include moderating anger by the use of reason, and/or by cultivating and practicing such virtues as gentleness, patience, endurance, self-discipline and self-control, forgiveness, true justice and charity.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR ETHICAL LEADERSHIP IN ORGANISATIONS**

It is well-known that leadership involves influence, power and authority. Furthermore, it is also well-known that we have always been concerned with the ethics of our leaders and that we expect ethical leaders to act on the basis of ethical values, and principles, as well as being good and virtuous persons. And the reason that we expect this, is that leaders
influence others to a greater or lesser extent and influence has a moral dimension which involves values – respect for persons, fairness, building community and so on (Northouse 2001: 265). Now, for this reason alone, it would seem to me that an understanding of anger, both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ anger, would be useful in respect of both the conduct and character of the ethical leader. It is not difficult to understand that frequent outbursts of anger or habitually angry behavior or excessive anger as part of the leader’s character, would not only set a poor example to followers, but could also be destructive to their persons, their dignity and morale and obstructive to the work that needs to be done.

Given that we do have some indication of the values underlying ethical leadership conduct, as well as of the virtues of the good moral leader mentioned earlier, it would seem to me that these values and virtues could be used as a basis for a proactive evaluative approach to anger in the workplace whether we are referring to the anger of the leader or that of employees. Using an understanding of anger and its process, as detailed earlier in this paper, we could consider anger’s various components in the light of ethical values in order firstly, to clarify the nature and seriousness of the triggering events or causes or injuries which give rise to the anger of leaders or followers (employees), as well as to clarify the intensity of the emotional response. Secondly, using our value framework as a basis, we might also clarify and morally evaluate the expression of the anger and its consequences. This type of ethical reflection on and evaluation of the anger process, could be used reactively to examine instances of leader or follower (employee) anger, and to learn from these in retrospect. This would facilitate individual moral growth and development by providing an understanding of the anger process and perhaps, of how behavior could be improved or changed in the future. In addition, this type of ethical reflection could be used proactively by leaders during decision making processes on various issues, particularly those likely to incite employee anger. Such a proactive approach could assist leaders in organisations to demonstrate what Greenleaf (1977) calls “foresight”, that is the capacity to foresee events and to take appropriate action. Such foresight, could involve weighing up various decisions and courses of action in terms of the likelihood of causing injury or offence to particular stakeholders and the ensuing likely levels of anger and its consequences for the community as a whole. This would constitute a proactive approach to potential anger rather than merely being reactive to instances of anger. It would also help to
avoid what Greenleaf has termed ‘ethical failure’, that is, lack of foresight. Thirdly, such an approach might prove useful as a way of classifying anger as “righteous” or “unrighteous”. Finally, by ethically evaluating the expression of anger and its consequences, whether retrospective or potential, we may be better able to discern the degree or severity of sin (venial, mortal or capital) and the degree of culpability involved in particular situations.

To develop such a proactive ethical approach, it is necessary to construct an ethical framework for evaluating anger. I suggest that the values/principles that underlie ethical leadership would be:

- Respect for the dignity of all persons
- Justice and fairness
- Solidarity, sharing, building community
- Commitment to the common good
- Subsidiarity i.e. a commitment to facilitating and empowering others and service to others
- Commitment to the marginalized, least privileged, least powerful

These values/principles would constitute the ethical component of our framework and would be the first step in developing an ethical framework for evaluating anger. The second step would be to include the components of anger (cause/injury/trigger; emotional response; expression/retaliation; consequences/effects). The third step would be to include some questions about anger and its components which, when answered in the light of our ethical values, might assist us in our analysis whether before or after an “anger event”. For this third step, let us consider some of these questions which will form part of such an ethical framework.

Firstly, we might ask whether the cause/event/injury which has given or is likely to give rise to anger is, in itself, unethical (e.g. insulting another’s dignity, undermining a person, economic injustice). The answer to this question may enable us to distinguish between righteous and unrighteous anger.

Secondly, we may examine the nature of the emotional response to this event/trigger. Are the response and its intensity proportionate to the nature and severity of the trigger event? On whose behalf have we responded in
anger? Obviously, we must remember that we cannot morally evaluate a feeling in terms of the values, as emotion in itself is neither right nor wrong.

Thirdly, given the feeling of anger, how was it or will it be expressed? Are there alternatives? Will the retaliation be contrary to the underlying values of ethical leadership? If so, which values are or would be undermined? Could virtues like patience, forgiveness, gentleness, humility, respect, generosity and charity which are the mark of the good person, moderate the expression of the anger?

Finally, what are the consequences of the retaliatory options? Are the consequences in contravention of these fundamental ethical values and if so, which ones and to what extent? In addition, would the anger and its expression and consequences of that expression lead to further sins, the “daughters of anger” as mentioned earlier.

Such a framework could be used reactively or proactively to examine anger ‘after the event’ as it were or prior to such anger being expressed and, in so analyzing the process and its consequences, we may learn and understand more about the anger of ourselves or others.

In conclusion, I offer the following graphic representation of the above ethical framework for the evaluation of the anger process by leaders. The anger framework is based on a synthesis of Callister and Gibson’s components (2010) combined with what I believe to be their equivalents derived from the definitions of anger and work of the philosophers on anger.

(See Table 1 on page 43)
Table 1: An Ethical Framework for Evaluating Anger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Cause/injury/trigger</th>
<th>Emotional response</th>
<th>Expression/retaliation</th>
<th>Consequences/effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportionate?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate virtues?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Values</td>
<td>Does the trigger contravene ethical values?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Does the expression/retaliation contravene ethical values?</td>
<td>Do the consequences contravene ethical values?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for persons’ dignity</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and fairness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common good</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsidiarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commitment to least privileged</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 (overleaf) presents a grid which may be helpful for consolidation and synthesis purposes during or after the above analysis. In other words, the analysis grid enables us to document for each component of the anger process what occurred, the intensity, the proportion, the degree of harm, the righteousness/not and the gravity of the anger in terms of all its component parts.
The above discussion, ethical framework and analysis grid are an attempt to at least acknowledge that anger exists in the leader’s context and to begin a consideration of how to ethically reflect on anger and its implications for ethical leadership in the work context.

**REFERENCES**


Contry: Critical Responses to the Novels of André Brink.


Book Review

This collection of essays, edited by Willie Burger and Karina Magdalena Szczurek, attempts to fill a gap in South African literary scholarship by offering sustained critical engagement with the texts of André Brink. The editors correctly point out that Brink is one of South Africa’s most well-known, prolific and versatile authors and that he has received both popular and critical acclaim locally and abroad. Given this distinguished track record, the editors query why Brink’s textual corpus has not received more academic attention. Their reflections in this regard contain some interesting observations about the “politics of literary criticism in South African”, in which they identify “incestuous claustrophobia” (p. 12). Brink has always been a controversial figure in South Africa’s literary milieu and, while the editors acknowledge this, they bemoan the fact that critics have often neglected to engage with the complexity of Brink’s literary output and have, instead, focused on personalised attacks on the author. This is indeed a pity as Brink’s oeuvre offers rich analytical opportunities. To avoid falling into the trap of personalising Brink’s work, the editors explain that, in their choice of essays, they “steered clear of evidently biased, aggressive and abusive responses” in favour of “balanced, constructive criticism” (p. 13). This is a fine line and the editors are to be commended for negotiating responses to an author with whom many readers and critics have an either/or relationship in which they either love him or hate him. True scholarship can and should accommodate both admiration and critique of a writer’s body of work.

Readers and critics have always found it difficult to separate Brink the man and Brink the author when they engage with his texts. The first two essays in this collection are thus especially useful in terms of sketching the context within which all readings of Brink’s work are located. In “Out of the Laager”, Nicholas Wroe offers important insights into Brink’s journey
from the “Afrikaner heartland” (p. 27) to becoming “one of the most
dogged Afrikaner critics of the apartheid system” (p. 23). This overview of
Brink’s life is followed by a focused exploration of his literary oeuvre in
“André Brink’s Prose Oeuvre: An Overview” by Godfrey Meintjies. In
this latter essay, Brink’s extensive literary output is divided into four
distinct phases, namely experimental/existentialist/“engaged”
postmodernist/postcolonial, and post-apartheid. This schema will prove
useful to readers and scholars who are unfamiliar with Brink’s novels as it
offers a way of negotiating one’s way through his body of work. A number
of the contributions hone in on Brink’s representations of women and
sexuality. Feminist literary scholars have tended to have a somewhat
conflicted relationship with Brink’s work and he has often been accused of
misogynist gender representations. Christell Stander’s essay explores
whether Brink’s work challenges stereotypical representations of women
or whether he simply perpetuates gender stereotypes. Ampie Coetzee
continues the focus on gender and sexuality with his essay entitled
“Seksualiteit in die Werk van André P. Brink”. Although these are issues
that have received a great deal of scholarly attention in academic
discussions of Brink’s work, they are certainly important enough to
warrant additional scrutiny. A less well-known angle on the topic is
presented in Monica Bungaro’s essay entitled “Male Feminist Fiction:
Literary Subversions of a Gender-Biased Script”. While Bungaro insists
that feminism “remains women’s project” (p. 253) she also recognises that
feminist male authors, such as Brink, “are making an effort to transcend
standard sexual allegories, hence to resolve the problems of gender in
ways that run counter to the biases embedded in African male literary
tradition” (p. 254). This is an important acknowledgment that bears
repetition. Given the immensity of the gender inequities and challenges
facing the contemporary South African society, the feminist movement can
use all the help it can get and male feminist writers are potentially valuable
allies in the struggle for gender justice.

The roles that colonialism, slavery and apartheid have played in shaping
South Africa’s past and present socio-political reality are also themes to
which Brink has repeatedly returned in his work. It is thus fitting that these
issues are also the focus of a number of essays in this collection. In this
regard, special mention should be made of Louise Viljoen’s contribution
“Kan die Slaaf Praat? Die Stem van die Slaaf in Enkele Brink-Romans”.
The title of her essay is a play on Gayatri Spivak’s ground breaking
theoretical intervention entitled “Can the Subaltern Speak?” When a white male author explores issues of race and gender, one needs to be cognisant of the danger that “giving voice to the voiceless and speaking on behalf of the voiceless could be seen as a renewed attempt to exert a form of authority over them and to appropriate their voices for personal gain” (p. 412). Viljoen offers a sensitive and nuanced account of the ways in which Brink investigates the possibilities of representing the “Other” in a postcolonial context.

This collection constitutes a valuable resource for scholars of South African literature. The structure and style of Contrary also make it accessible to readers beyond academia and it will no doubt be of great interest to Brink’s many fans across the world.

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List of Contributors

NEIL NMCGURK has the degrees BSc Hons (Theoretical Physics)(Natal); BSc Hons (Mathematics) and MSc Hons (Theoretical Physics)(Unisa); PhD (Theoretical Physics)(Amsterdam). He was a teacher (1965-1975) and School Principal (1976-1995) at the Sacred Heart College, Johannesburg. In 1976 he pioneered the “Open School” movement with accepting black students into Sacred Heart College after the Soweto uprising. He was a member of the Five Freedom Forum delegation to Lusaka, a member of the Mandela Delegation and Joint Working Group and National Programme Manager of the RDP Culture of Learning Presidential Lead Project. He also assisted the Kwa-Zulu Natal and Northern Province Education Departments with Education Management and School Development Programmes.

DONOVAN LOWRY was a history teacher at the time of the apartheid regime who was active in NCFS, and in NUSAS and founded Neusa the first non-racial non-union organisation, in response to an ANC appeal after the banning or exile of Black Consciousness leaders. He also wrote a commissioned and published history of the Urban Training Project. The latter project underpinned trade union revival in the 1970s and the founding of Cosatu in 1985. In addition, he ran a bi-monthly political study group for five years in church venues after Sharpeville and, with Steve Biko’s blessing, taught matric History to black students for 6 years for the Institute of Race Relations during the post 1976 school boycott.

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The idea of founding a Catholic university in South Africa was first mooted in 1993 by a group of academics, clergy and business people. It culminated in the establishment of St Augustine College of South Africa in July 1999, when it was registered by the Minister of Education as a private higher education institution and started teaching students registered for the degree of Master of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy.

It is situated in Victory Park, Johannesburg and operates as a university offering values-based education to students of any faith or denomination, to develop leaders in Africa for Africa.

The name 'St Augustine' was chosen in order to indicate the African identity of the College since St Augustine of Hippo (354-430 A.D.) was one of the first great Christian scholars of Africa.

As a Catholic educational institution, St Augustine College is committed to making moral values the foundation and inspiration for all its teaching and research. In this way it offers a new and unique contribution to education, much needed in our South African society.

It aims to be a community that studies and teaches disciplines that are necessary for the true human development and flourishing of individuals and society in South Africa. The College's engagement with questions of values is in no sense sectarian or dogmatic but is both critical and creative. It will explore the African contribution to Christian thought and vice versa. Ethical values will underpin all its educational programmes in order to produce leaders who remain sensitive to current moral issues.

The college is committed to academic freedom, to uncompromisingly high standards and to ensuring that its graduates are recognised and valued anywhere in the world. Through the international network of Catholic universities and the rich tradition of Catholic tertiary education, St Augustine College has access to a wide pool of eminent academics, both locally and abroad, and wishes to share these riches for the common good of South Africa.
Instructions to Contributors

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Articles may be around 6 000 – 12 000 words in length and should be an original contribution. Articles may be e-mailed using software that is compatible with MS Word. The first page of the manuscript should carry the proposed title and author’s name with highest degree. Under the name should appear an identification line, giving title and position held, the institution and its location. Personal details and a short biography (10-15 lines) should also be submitted. A brief abstract (no more than 150 words) should follow the author identification data.

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The Harvard method should be used. All references should be specified in parentheses in the text (and in the text of notes) by surname(s) of the author(s), the year of the publication and page number(s), for example (Dworkin 1986:45-52). The complete citation should appear at the end of the manuscript (after the notes, if any) under the caption ‘References’. Such citations should be listed alphabetically by surname of author; for authors cited more than once, by year of publication, with the most recent references first. Please note the use of capital letters, punctuation marks and italics in the following examples:


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