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Abstract
In its particularity, African Catholic theology had its foundation in mission theology, a theology that facilitated the establishment of Christianity in Africa. As part of contemporary African theology (Theologia Africana), it was launched in the 1950s when young African intellectuals, writers, philosophers, and theologians began to question the authenticity of missionary Christianity in Africa. It is influenced by the long standing tradition of Catholic scholarship in the articulation of the tenets of faith for the African Church. In other words, African Catholic theology is a critical Christian response by African theologians, church leaders, and the ordinary people to cultural, social, and political issues that affect the people of Africa. Done in the spirit of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue, African Catholic theology is an “intellectual reception” of the Second Vatican Council in Africa. Thus, African Catholic theology fulfills functional, apologetic, foundational, pastoral, systematic, and hermeneutical functions in service of the church and society. Today, African Catholic theology continues to render an intellectual explication of the way in which the Catholic faith is lived, celebrated, and internalized for authentic Catholicism. And, African Catholic theologians are “interpreters” or “critical articulators” of the encounter between the Catholic faith and African cultural heritage.

Introduction
The story of African Christianity is a multifaceted and complex narrative often told from a Eurocentric perspective. The Eurocentric portrayal of Christianity compounds the way in which Africans understand the
Christian faith and its theology today. By and large, African Christianity, including Catholicism, continues to be presented as a purely Western enterprise, an alien religion brought to Africa by the nineteenth century European missionaries, without any historical ties to Africa.¹ Notwithstanding its nineteenth century foundation and ties to Europe (1792-1842), modern African Christianity traces its origins to the apostolic era itself. In its apostolicity and catholicity, the Christian presence in Africa goes back to the very times of the Apostles. Early Christian tradition describes St. Mark as the founder of the apostolic see of Alexandria in Egypt (AD 50-150).² At the time of St. Mark’s arrival, Alexandria had already grown into a cultural and philosophical metropolitan center of the entire Greco-Roman world. In the first five centuries of Christianity’s existence, Africa was a privileged home to extraordinary events in the development of Christian doctrine, liturgy, the systematization of theology, and the canonization of the New Testament.

Before Christianity was wiped out by the invading Arab Muslims in the seventh century (AD 640), classical period of Catholic theology coincided with the first 500 years of Christianity in Egypt and North Africa. In its proper sense of the word, Christian theology emerged in Alexandria at the Catechetical School of Alexandria which is believed to have been founded by Pantaenus about AD 180.³ The early Christian communities in both Palestine and the Mediterranean regions of North Africa were remarkably convinced that their faith was a unique and divinely revealed religion destined even to assimilate the sophisticated cultures and philosophies of the ancient world, especially the Greco-Roman philosophical and intellectual movements. The encounter between the biblical faith with Greek philosophy occasioned an interpretation of the Bible and a systematization of the Christian beliefs in formulas and categories akin to the Gnostic tradition of the day.

The Alexandrian Theological School, under the two renowned ancient theologians, Clement of Alexandria (AD 150-215) and Origen (AD 185-254), challenged the Gnostic influence on faith and its attempt to reduce Christianity to simple philosophical speculations by explicating and synthesizing the Christian faith in conformity to philosophical categories
into a coherent theological system. Above anybody else, Origen stood out as the first African Catholic theologian in antiquity to establish a solid foundation for a scientific study of the Bible and to adopt a systematic presentation of the Christian faith employing Hellenistic philosophical and literary traditions. With these classical African theologians, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Cyril of Alexandria, Athanasius of Alexandria, and later St. Augustine of Hippo, Roman Catholic theology emerged not only as an intellectual defense of faith (apologetics) but also as a ministry to the church.

However, the right of the African peoples to ponder the Christian faith in the light of their own cultural heritage was eclipsed by the imposition of Western European civilization and culture on Africa in the nineteenth century that lasted until the 1960s. African historiographers of missionary history describe how the evangelization of Africa, in all its three successive epochs (AD 62-500, 1400-1800, and 1792-1918), was dominated by a theology centered on the implanting of the church and the saving of souls. Relying upon the old scholastic and neo-scholastic adage of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* (outside the Church no salvation), Roman Catholic theology in particular neglected the fact that salvation could also be obtained through various means, including African cultures and religions. The theology of the conversion of souls led to the denigration of African cultures and religions leaving Africans to believe that only the Western Christian culture was normative for all the peoples in the world.

However, a paradigmatic shift in the Roman Catholic theology occurred at the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) in 1960s. This shift gave the Church of Africa and its theologians an opportunity to discover African cultures and social situations as a genuine place (*locus theologicus*) for constructing a functional theology in the service of the church and society. The council marked a major turning point in the modern history and life of the Catholic Church by introducing new theological methodology and discourse that allowed multiple theological discourses throughout the world. African Catholic theology is the fruit of this new Vatican II ecclesiology and theological methodology. Contextual in its nature, it emerged from the encounter between the new doctrinal and theological
realities in the Catholic Church and the African cultural, social, and political realities.

This short article, *African Catholic Theology*, characterized as a “functional theology” in service of the church and society, dwells on three important points in the development and nature of African theology. First, it deals with an historical overview highlighting the origin and development of African Catholic theology. Second, it describes the nature, method, and content of African Catholic theology exposing its criteria of relative adequacy or appropriateness as a contextual theology responsive to the African situation. Third, it outlines the expectations, hopes, and challenges arising from doing theology in Africa today. The article unveils African Catholic theology, in its origin and nature, as an “intellectual reception” of Vatican II in Africa that facilitated the development of unique African liturgies, ecclesial communities, and spiritualities. As a functional theology, it renders the Catholic doctrine (Scripture and tradition) intelligible to the people of Africa and beyond. Conversely, African Catholic theologians are “interpreters” or “critical articulators” of the encounter between the Christian faith and African cultural heritage and situation.

**Historical Overview: The Origin and Development of African Catholic Theology**

The origin of African Catholic theology should be examined in the context of the changing theological methodology and ecclesiology of the Catholic Church before and after the Second Vatican Council. The period between the First Vatican Council (1869-1870) and Vatican II was characterized by an agonizing clash between Roman Catholicism and modernity in Europe. The conflict between modernity and Catholicism emerged with the publication of the *Syllabus Errorum* in 1863 by Pius IX that condemned the errors of modernity and subsided with John XXIII’s promulgation of *Pacem in Terris* in 1959 that called for peace in the modern world. In the tumultuous years of cultural metamorphosis in Europe, the direction of Catholic theology was shaped by the forces of the eighteenth century Romantic Movement and German idealism.
The first route in the transformation of Catholic theology from the rigid neo-scholastic formulas to culturally and historically sensitive formulations was taken by the Catholic theologians of the Tubingen School of Theology in Germany, which included Johann Sebastian von Drey (1777-1853), Johann Adam Mohler (1796-1838), Johann Baptist Hirscher (1788-1865), Johannes Evangelist Kuhn (1806-1887), and Romano Guardini (1885-1968), who employed philosophical insights and historical-critical methodologies of the German idealists to bring new perspective and innovation to Catholic theology. The Catholic theologians of the Tubingen School understood that philosophical principles and methodologies could be helpful in analyzing revelation and tradition if the Christian faith could be allowed to engage with cultures and human experience unimpeded. Under the influence of historical-consciousness of Protestant theologians’ and philosophers’, especially of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s and the Young Hegelians’ threefold turn to the subject and human experience in religion, dogmatics, and hermeneutics, the Tubingen School theologians laid the foundation for contemporary Catholic theology that took seriously human cultures and experience.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century in the pontificate of Leo XIII (1893-1903), a second revival in Catholic theology took root at the Instituts Catholiques in France. This revival formed the background of the modernist movement in the twentieth century which was influenced by modern historical and biblical criticisms and the new apologetics of the philosopher Maurice Blondel. The renewal of scholasticism, the restoration of medieval theology and philosophy (St. Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Dun Scotus) in theology and philosophy, known as neoscholasticism, was the standard against which “every Catholic intellectual movement from Vatican I through the First World War to Vatican II had to be measured.” During this period, the architects of the Nouvelle Theologie, the “new theologies” (Alfred Loisy, A. Gardeil, M-D Chenu, Yves Congar, and Henric de Lubac) in France instituted a spectacular course of theological renewal within neoscholasticism by taking advantage of historical research and biblical criticism as their point of departure in theology. These two theological trajectories, the Tubingen
School of Theology and *Nouvelle Theologie*, formed the basis of the new theological methodology of Vatican II.

African Catholic theology owes its origins in part to twentieth century Catholic theologians’ disenchantment of neoscholasticism and their desire to return to the Bible, the patristic tradition for theological guidance, and to embrace openness to human experience and culture, and a commitment to ecumenical and interreligious dialogue. The encounter of Christian faith with African cultures led to the contextualization of theology in Africa, the attempt to understand Christian faith in terms of a particular cultural context. As observed by Stephen Bevans, doing theology contextually, which involves a critical interpretation of Christian faith and culture, is a theological imperative not an option. It demands recognition of the two *loci theologici*, the Christian faith (Scripture and tradition) and the cultural and experiential context in which Christianity comes into contact.

1. **Steps in the Development of African Catholic Theology**
   The effort to articulate the Christian message in the African cultures was launched by young French-speaking Catholic priests in the 1950s. With the publication of *Des Pretres Noirs s’interrogent* (Black Priests Question) in 1956, in which the young African priests based in Europe questioned the possibility of pondering the Christian truths in African terms, African Catholic theology was born. The original questions about African theology in general revolved around the issues of “adaptation” or “indigenization” of the Christian faith in Africa and the need to seriously take into account African cultural heritage in developing a practical or functional theology for Africa.

   The Faculty of Catholic Theology of Kinshasa, in Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo played the initial major role during the constructive years of African Catholic theology in the early 1960s. The first proponents of Catholic African theology were Vincent Mulago, Archbishop Tharcisse Tshibangu, M. F. Lufuluabo, and Alexis Kagame from French-speaking countries who underscored the urgency of integrating the Catholic faith with the socio-cultural life
of the African people. These theologians emphasized the importance of adapting Christianity to African cultural values while preserving the core or primary sources of Christian revelation, the Scriptures and tradition.

By the time of Vatican II the wheels of theological change in Africa were already spinning due to the innovative work of Archbishop Tshibangu and others who promoted a theology of adaptation as the stepping-stone for the creation of African Christianity. As a watershed event in the Catholic Church, Vatican II provided an impetus to the theological paradigm shift that had already started in the 1950s. The actual attempt to build a critical African Catholic theology resulted from the African Church’s desire to construct a functional theology in service of the African Church and society. In the years after Vatican II, the African bishops and theologians were convinced of the intellectual demands placed upon them to design a theology that would be responsive to the African needs. In the spirit of the council, the task of theology was nothing else other than an intellectual reception of Vatican II in Africa.

In 1975 the bishops of the Symposium of the Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) made a conscious decision to endorse the adoption of “incarnation” or “inculturation” replacing adaptation as an official theological term in the process of Africanizing the church in Africa. The 1970s and 1980s saw the most productive period in the development of African Catholic theology, especially in the areas of liturgy, ecclesiology, christology, and ministry. The 1994 African Synod of Bishops epitomized the extent to which the Church of Africa had grown in terms of its authenticity as a truly African local Church. At present, Catholic theology in Africa is still challenged by the need to be true to the acquired Western dominated Christian culture and to its African cultural, social, and political life.

African Catholic theology did not emerge in a vacuum. It was part of a larger theological movement in Africa that encompassed the
Protestant theological initiatives. On the Protestant side, the initial movement to develop African Christian theology began in the early 1950s and culminated a decade later in the 1960s under the auspices of All African Council of Churches. Some of the original Protestant theologians who offered a substantial contribution to the development of African theology in the 1960s through the 1970s were individuals such as Alioune Diop, Bolaji Idowu, Harry Sawyerr, Kwesi Dickson, John Mbiti, E. G. Parrinder, and Basil Davidson. They all sought to relate the indigenous concepts of God, Jesus, ritual practice, and cultural sensitivity to the Christian message. From its beginning, African Christian theology has exhibited a theological pluralism and an ecumenical unity evident within the wide varieties of social, cultural, denominational, and religious systems.

2. **Factors in the Development of African Catholic Theology**

African Catholic theology grew out of a contemporary Catholic theology that was shaped by what Hans Kung and David Tracy called the “paradigm change in theology.” The new paradigm shift in Catholic theology resulted in the Catholic Church’s retrieval of history, culture, and human experience in the understanding of divine revelation, especially the Bible and tradition. With the discovery of historical consciousness in the nineteenth century following their Protestant counterparts, Catholic theologians began to apply historical-critical methods in the study of the Bible and the Christian faith. The change in theological method coupled with the socio-political transformation in the African society provided favorable conditions for the emergence of African theology in the 1960s. Here, it suffices to mention two influential factors, the ecclesial and socio-political factors, which contributed to the development of African Catholic theology.

**The Ecclesial and Theological Factors**

The process of renewal in Catholic theology started in the nineteenth century with the theological movement centered at the Catholic School of Tübingen in Germany and the *Nouvelle Theologie* studies in France.
Influenced by the Romantic and idealistic movements, Catholic theologians were able to interpret Scripture and tradition in the light of the historical-critical studies spearheaded by Protestant theologians in an effort to give a full and dynamic interpretation to the Christian revelation and church doctrines. It was these Catholic theologians of the Tubingen School and of the *Nouvelle Theologie* that set the stage for the new ecclesiology and theological methodology of the Second Vatican Council.

The theological paradigm shift that occurred at Vatican II was a result of the Catholic Church’s new self-understanding as articulated in *Lumen Gentium* and *Gaudium et Spes*. First, the council fathers set a new ecclesiology of the church by describing the church’s new reality as composed of the “people of God” (LG. 9) who belong to various cultural confessions and are scattered throughout the whole world. Under this new ecclesiology, the church is the very body of Christ, the sacrament of God’s presence and the mystery of communion between God and human beings and among people in the world. Second, the council fathers laid out new theological methodology in *Gaudium et Spes* (GS. 1-10) by emphasizing an inductive method in doing theology as opposed to the traditional deductive method. The council focused its attention on the human condition in the world and the sum total of the realities which confront the church. By choosing the human person as its starting point, *Gaudium et Spes* introduced a new theological anthropology in the Catholic Church’s attempt to understand divine-church relationship. By giving priority to the human person and their conditions, Vatican II elevated human history, cultures, experience, and lived conditions as genuine sources for Catholic theology, including African Catholic theology.

The other ecclesial and theological factors that influenced African Catholic theology were the theological initiatives of both Protestant and African Independent Churches (AICs). The Protestant theological imagination illuminated Catholic theologians by emphasizing the centrality of the Bible and history in theological construct. The African Independent Churches brought to the Catholic theological endeavors the flexibility of using metaphors and terms drawn from African traditional religions. For example, in their construction of contemporary African christology
Charles Nyamiti and Francis Kabasele employed the notion of “ancestor” to describe the “Jesus of Africa.” One should not underestimate the role of AICs and African traditional religions in shaping and redirecting African theology towards its maturation.

**Political and Social Factors**

While African nationalism responsible for decolonization and the creation of modern African national states has its roots in the nineteenth century, real winds of social and political change in Africa started after World War II. The years following the end of World War II saw the creation of many political movements that ushered in a new era of political freedom and African Nationalism. Although the thrust of this paper is not to discuss the complex events that brought European rule to an end in Africa, a description of the socio-political situation in the 1950s and 1960s is necessary for a proper understanding of the changes in African Christianity brought about by African nationalism. It is important to note that African nationalism was a movement that embraced people from all sectors of society, including groups that were political, ideological, cultural, social, religious, and revolutionary in nature. The purpose of working together was to achieve political, economic, social, cultural, and religious freedom and independence from European colonial domination. In some ways, African nationalism did not only provide a cushion for the socio-political liberation of the African people but also the context for the attainment of Christian freedom.

When most African countries gained their political independence in the 1960s through 1970s, African political leaders sought to consolidate their grip on power by adopting various ideologies as “life-guiding system of beliefs, values and goals” for achieving their political style and action. As shades of the all-embracing ideology of African nationalism, the following ideologies: *ujamaa* of Dr. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, apartheid the racist ideology in South Africa, African socialism and scientific socialism (Marxist ideologies) in Angola and Mozambique, State capitalism in Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Botswana, negritude of Leopold Senghor of Senegal, humanism of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and dictatorships in Zaire, Nigeria, and most of the other sub-Saharan
countries, did not necessarily work for the good of Africa. Coupled with abject poverty, underdevelopment, diseases, civil wars, and ethnic conflicts, these ideologies provided a *locus theologicus* for African Catholic theology.

**The Nature and Content of African Catholic Theology**

The relationship between faith and reason has preoccupied Catholic theologians since the classical period of theology in antiquity. For many centuries, theologians have relied on reason and philosophical presuppositions in their study of divine-human dynamism to articulate the meaning of faith for the Christian communities. In the nineteenth-century changes occurred in Catholic theology that subsequently exerted tremendous impact on contemporary Catholic theologies, including African Catholic theology. The discovery of historical consciousness, the retrieval of human experience, and abandonment of classicist understanding of culture in favor of a pluralistic one signalled a major theological shift in the entire Catholic theological enterprise.

Whereas as the traditional classicist worldview maintains truth as normative and unchangeable for all generations and cultures, the historically conscious worldview holds that every theological expression of truth is historically, experientially, and culturally conditioned. The direct consequence of this theological mindset was a reversal of the Catholic theological method from the traditional deductive approach to an inductive approach that took the human condition into consideration as the point of departure in theology. The council fathers and Catholic theologians of Vatican II understood that if the church was to dialogue with the world, it had to take seriously people’s conditions and experiences as a genuine place for theological conversation. The nature, content, and criteria of African Catholic theology reflect the metamorphosis of Catholic theology in the twentieth century and beyond.


   Regardless of its affiliation, a theology that is called “African” intends to take into account “its African location, its culture, its
religion, and its problems of civilization.”

As noted earlier, African theology is contextual and ecumenical in its nature and bears witness to the richness and diversity of the African continent. In order to understand the nature and content of African Catholic theology, one needs to put into perspective the meaning of the three terms used, namely African, Catholic, and theology.

There has already been a controversy over the meaning of “African theology” in general, as to whether it means African Christian theology or African traditional theology, or a combination of both. Most African theologians and scholars, such as John Mbiti, Aylward Shorter, John Pobee, Kwesi Dickson, Harry Sawyerr, Desmond Tutu, Adrian Hastings, Charles Nyamiti, and Gwinyai Muzorewa, agree that by “African theology” they mean a critical reflection on the Bible and tradition in the context of African cultural, social, political, and religious experience. The word “African” in this case entails the *locus theologicus* or the place in which the theology is done. As a theology done in Africa, for Africans, and by Africans, it is a theology that is faithful to the African cosmology, epistemology, anthropology, and existential presuppositions from which its sources are drawn.

The terms “Catholic” and “theology” designate the Christian community and Christian activity that engage the African theologians as they pledge their personal faith to God in Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit. The theological activity is not only an act that grows out of the theologians’ personal act of faith, the *fides qua* (subjective faith), but also the affirmation of the whole church’s faith, the *fides quae* (objective faith). The *fides qua*, the faith by which theologians turn to God, and the *fides quae*, the faith of the people of God, comprise the foundation for their entire theological enterprise. That is why in its classical definition, Catholic theology is described as “*fides quaerens intellectum*,” that is “faith seeking understanding.”
As a faith activity, theology is done within the Christian community and it is concurrently an expression of the faith of the theologians and the community to which they belong. The Catholic tradition has long held that faith is an intellectual assent to divine revelation that also involves a full commitment of the heart. As this faith seeks understanding, it employs the use of intelligence and reason, of questioning and answering, and of critical interpretation or correlation of divine revelation and human lived experience, including culture. Since the process of understanding and reason, and the activity of faith have their own norms and criteria, any type of theology requires criteria of appropriateness or adequacy in order to achieve its goals.

The quest of an African theologian is to understand the Christian faith as propagated by the Catholic Church and try to articulate it for the African people. With the advent of the new theological methodology at Vatican II, the quest to articulate the Christian revelation according to African cultures, cosmology, and socio-political situation was made easier. When Catholic theologians are doing theology in Africa they try to balance between the “Catholic Tradition” and the African cultural sensibilities. The central starting point is this encounter between the Christian faith (Bible and tradition) and the African cultural heritage, including the socio-political condition in which the people of Africa live. That is why the initial theological trends that came out of Vatican II were of adaptation or inculturation and liberation. These two approaches indicate that African theology is a contextual and dialogical theology that deals with an encounter between a historically Western orientated Christianity and a culturally diverse African society.

Theology of adaptation or inculturation envisions a church that is truly Christian and truly Africa. Inculturation theology enables the message of Jesus Christ to penetrate the socio-cultural life of the people of Africa and form one coherent African Christianity. As John Paul II pointed out in *Redemptoris Missio*, “through inculturation the Church makes the Gospel incarnate in different
cultures and at the same time introduces peoples, together with their cultures”26 into the wider Christian community. The most conspicuous evidence of inculturation theology as an intellectual reception of Vatican II is seen in the inculturation of the liturgy in Africa. The second major trend in which African Catholic theology comes forth is liberation theology. Liberation theology, which includes Black theology in South Africa, feminist theology, and environmental theology, poses critical reflection on the relevance of Christianity in Africa.27 It seeks to apply the message of Jesus Christ in the struggle against all the oppressive conditions that lead to suffering and human impoverishment in Africa. Illuminated by Latin American liberation praxis and Catholic Social Teaching, African liberation theology is born out of a conscious decision to work for social, economic, and political emancipation of the African people.

Today, beyond inculturation and liberation theologies, theology in Africa has entered a reconstructive stage that engages all aspects of life in the continent.28 Under the new reconstructive paradigm of theology, African stories, parables, proverbs, myths, oral tradition, social context, and religious traditions comprise a genuine point of departure for theology. The maturity of African Catholic theology is shown in its capacity to blend into a synthetic whole, the African world-view with the espoused Western Christian culture.

2. The Criteria of Appropriateness or Adequacy
The criteria of adequacy lay out the main principal modes of analysis applicable to identifying African Catholic theology as a functional theology in service of the African church.29 The most important thing to note here is that African Catholic theology is a theology embedded in the church and born out of the church’s evangelical witness in Africa. The criteria of adequacy enable African theologians to be aware of the two sources of theology, the Christian Catholic tradition and the African cultural heritage, and engage the two sources in a critical correlation of each other. It is this critical correlation that produces a fundamentally meaningful appropriation
of the Christian faith in Africa. In this way, African Catholic theologians assist the bearers of the teaching office of the church, the Magisterium, in clarifying Christian revelation or the tenets of faith to the people of Africa.

The criterion of encounter is about the insertion of the Gospel and the Christian tradition in the center of world history, cultures, and human experiences. In his monumental work, *Theology and Identity: The Impact of Culture upon Christian Thought in the Second Century and in Modern Africa*, Kwame Bediako highlights the encounter between the Christian Gospel and the Greco-Roman culture as the encounter responsible for the creation of the Western Christian identity or civilization. In this work, Bediako establishes the validity or adequacy of the criterion of encounter by arguing that the Greco-Roman Christianity of the second century and later modern African Christianity were inevitable by-products of the encounter between the Christian Gospel and world cultures. In the same way that second century Christian self-definition was achieved through the integration of the Christian message with the Greco-Roman cultural and philosophical categories, so does modern African Christianity being realized through the process of inculturation.

The criterion of intelligibility demonstrates that African Catholic theology is an academic and scientific discipline that follows all the intellectual rigor of Catholic theological tradition. In the search for an appropriate articulation of the ultimate questions about God and humanity, African Catholic theologians make use of the available methodological tools to render intelligible Catholic doctrines and the entire Christian truth to the people of Africa. As an intellectual discipline in service of church and society, African Catholic theology should not be confused with Catholic Catechism or pastoral instructions. Its proper domain is a critical correlation, analysis and synthesis, and a discovery and understanding of the encounter between the Christian faith and African cultural matrix.
The third criterion of ideological critique enabled the Catholic Church through its social teaching to become a force for social political praxis in Africa. Today in Africa the political responsibility of the church is evident everywhere with its Christian imperative that acts as a counter-balance to ideologies of destruction. As Bishop Desmond Tutu puts it, African liberation theology in particular, “seeks to justify God and the ways of God to a downtrodden and perplexed people so that they can be inspired to do something about their lot.”

For example, liberation and Black theologies during the apartheid period were in part responsible for galvanizing Christians of all walks of life, whites and blacks, to dismantle apartheid and usher into South Africa a new era of reconciliation and peace. The late President of Tanzania, Dr. Julius Nyerere, who was a practicing Roman Catholic, eloquently spoke of the responsibility of the church to work for the eradication of poverty and exploitation in Africa.

The fourth criterion of dialogue in the Catholic Church was incorporated in *Lumen Gentium*, *Gaudium et Spes*, *Unitatis Redintegratio*, the Decree on Ecumenism, and *Nostra Aetate*, the Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions at Vatican II. Realizing the importance of Christian unity and interreligious dialogue, the council fathers declared ecumenical unity and interreligious dialogue as the way of the future for the Catholic Church. To underscore the church’s concern for ecumenical unity and interreligious relations, since the end of the council, there have appeared several church documents on ecumenism and interreligious dialogue.

As Martin Buber retorted, dialogue is not necessarily an activity or an attitude but fundamentally a way of being for the Christian community. It is what constitutes the dimension of personhood and sociality in human beings as distinguishable from other creatures in the world. Dialogue should not just be a kind of Roman Catholic cliché or a slogan, but a real way of living that reflects a trinitarian life. As a gift of the Holy Spirit, dialogue demands respect and
recognition of all people as the *imago Dei*, the likeness of God in the world. Apart from promoting serious dialogue between Christianity and Islam in African, African Catholic theology ought to facilitate reconciliation, harmony, and solidarity among the African peoples. Besides, in the globalized world, dialogue *ad intra* (within) and *ad extra* (without) is very important for a smooth running of world’s institutions, such as the Catholic Church.

The fourth criterion that needs to be highlighted under this category of the appropriateness of African Catholic theology is the “principle of stewardship.” In Catholic Social Teaching, the concept of stewardship is an ethical framework that often includes the ideas of subsidiarity, solidarity, common good, and accountability. This ethical framework springs from the very dignity of the human person as the image of God and from the sacredness of the earth as God’s creation. Stewardship entails responsible ownership and management of the human and natural resources as well as the spiritual and material resources which God has entrusted into the care of all the people in the world.

As Marilise Smurthwaite puts it succinctly, in her article “Governance and Catholic Social Teaching,” stewardship is the management of the resources which God has given to us to be shared for the benefit of all people. Good stewards are masters of their own lives, homes, countries, churches, organizations, environment, and the entire planet. In both private and public spheres, they exercise fairness, accountability, respect of all things, and equitable distribution of the things under their supervision. One of African Catholic theologians’ commitments is to be guardians of the Christian traditions and the African heritage in Africa and preserve them for future posterity.

**Expectations: Hopes and Challenges**

In the past forty decades, Catholic theology in Africa has advanced to a level of its flourishing maturation. As an intellectual reception of Vatican II, it has successfully laid down a theoretical foundation for the
inculturation of the liturgy and the formation of Small Christian Communities as the nucleus of the church in Africa. However, there is still work to be done and challenges to be met. One wonders how far African Catholic theology can remain faithful to its Catholic tradition and receptive to its African cultural milieu without falling into Roman phobia and syncretism. A look at theology as ministry in Africa may help to highlight the local and universal character of African Catholic theology and compliments its challenges and hopes.

1. Catholic Theology as Ministry in Africa

Writing on theology as the heart of Christian universities, Gavin D’Costa points out that the “Catholic university must serve the Church, so that it can serve society.” D’Costa’s statement underscores the ecclesial nature of Catholic theology that is rooted in the ministerial and pastoral dimensions of the church. As an intellectual ministry, African Catholic theology is a talk about God, humanity, and the world that is intended to be more than an academic exercise. It fulfills a pastoral prerogative designed for the Christian community and for the building of the people of God in Africa. African Catholic theology offers a critical interpretation of the Christian faith and African way of life as the people of Africa walk with Jesus Christ in communion with God and among themselves.

African Catholic theology primarily serves the church of Africa by laying out critical principles for freeing the Christian message from its western cultural accretions. Like any other local theology, it is constructed following three model approaches, the translation model, the adaptation or inculturation model, and the contextual model. In *Doing Theology at the Grassroots Level*, Bishop Patrick Kalilombe introduced the idea of the local Christian community as the primary theologian. As the believing Christian community lives and reflects upon the Scriptures, it becomes the prime author of African Catholic theology. Therefore, professional theologians’ task is to help the Christian community to articulate its faith in a manner consistent with the Catholic traditions and African cultural imagination, thus offering a dynamic balance between the local and the universal.
2. Hopes and Challenges
Today, African Catholic theology has a hermeneutical task for rendering intelligible the Catholic doctrines and traditions to the people of Africa. The challenge lies in how devoted Catholic theologians in both the academy and church are in their dedication to the life of theological research and scholarship. Since the intellectual defense and elaboration of Christianity and its relation to African cultures are entrusted to African Catholic theologians, the need to establish Catholic universities and colleges is much more urgent than ever before in Africa. The sign of hope for theological development seems to be evident in the recent sprouting of Catholic universities and colleges in Africa. These universities and colleges are of ecclesiastical and pastoral significance for Catholic theology to be rooted in both the Catholic and African spirits.

The challenge is that in these African centers of higher learning, theologians should not be impeded in their particular roles of bringing a dynamic interpolation or a synthesis between faith and reason, and between faith and African cultures. Central among their tasks are the critical articulation of faith in the African context and the preservation of strong theological ties between the local churches of Africa and the universal church. As Clemens Sedmak writes, “reappropriating the theological tradition means placing our own theology in a larger intellectual context” in order to ensure that our theology is not done in isolation, but in union with the long theological standing of the Catholic Church.\(^{41}\) In the final analysis, African Catholic theology should be done in fidelity to its founder, Jesus Christ, the source and animator of all theological enterprise.

Conclusion
In this short presentation, I have highlighted the historical precedence, nature, content, and challenges of African Catholic theology. It is important to realize that African Catholic theology is the fruit of the theological shift that started in Europe in the nineteenth century and culminated in the 1960s during the Second Vatican Council. The socio-political changes in the late 1950s and the early 1960s worked in favor of
the emergence of African Christian theology. In its functional nature in service of the Church and society, African Catholic theology is ecclesial, local, contextual, incarnational, dialogical, and ecumenical. It has the whole people of God as its primary theologians whose witness testifies to the saving and liberating praxis of Jesus Christ. In sum, we hope that Catholic theology in Africa will continue to illuminate African Christianity without being overly hindered by forces from within and from without.

NOTES


4 See Joseph Wilson Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-Century Church (Atlanta, GA: John Knox, 1983).


at the Void: The Retrieval of Experience (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).


8 Thomas O'Meara, Church and Culture: German Catholic Theology, 1800-1914, 33.


10 Ibid., 3.


15 See Maureen Sullivan, The Road to Vatican II: Key Changes in Theology (New York: Paulist, 2007), 84-117.


See Ormerod, *Introducing Contemporary Theologies*, 4-5.


Sedmak, *Doing Local Theology*, 53.

**Selected References:**


Is it possible to live the moral life within Capitalism?

MARILISE SMURTHWAITE

Introduction
This question clearly implies two others: What is meant by capitalism? and What constitutes not only a moral life, but the moral life? Before any answer can be given to the question of whether it is possible to live the moral life within capitalism, it is essential to answer the implied two questions first. To this end, let us begin by considering the broader of the two questions viz. what constitutes a moral life, and more specifically, the moral life. If this could be ascertained, capitalism could be defined and weighed against the criteria or prerequisites or characteristics of the moral life as a means of ascertaining how plausible it is to combine morals and ethics with profits and production.

The Moral Life – An Exploration

Subjectivism, emotivism, and relativism
What constitutes a moral life? There are many and varied approaches to answering this question. If Alasdair MacIntyre1 is to be believed, our contemporary answer is a purely subjective and emotive one - what is moral has nothing to do with objective and impersonal moral standards. Moral judgements are based on arbitrary will and preference, on the individual's isolated, subjective, sovereign decisions - sincerity not truth is the key. Along with MacIntyre and McCabe, let us reject a concept of the moral life based purely on the individual's arbitrary preferences and opinions. As McCabe2 points out:

It is not at all clear how an ethical judgement could be nothing but a personal view - I mean why would it count as an ethical judgement rather than simply as a cry of rage or delight?
Subjectivism, emotivism, and relativism would all seem to suggest that morality is personal, private and ever-changing - as such anyone at any time could claim to be living a moral life according to his/her own concept of such a life. The implication of such arbitrariness of judgement applied to any economic system, for example, capitalism, is that we could behave in more or less any fashion as regards capital, production, property, labour and so on and then claim our behaviour to be moral. Clearly, then, this cannot be the moral life of the human being.

**Duty Ethics**

However, there are other approaches to the moral life, viz. the deontological, exemplified by Kant, the teleological, exemplified by Utilitarianism, and the Aristotelian, all of which suggest somewhat differing definitions of the moral life. For Kant, ethics and morality are exemplified by what he calls the 'categorical imperative', which amounts to acting out of a sense of duty ('duty ethics') and avoiding anything one might want to do, or that might cause one happiness. The moral life would be one lived not out of inclination, but out of duty for duty's sake, where behaviour is consistent and rational. Moral judgements cannot be made on the basis of God or on the basis of the injunction of some external authority or on the basis of what will bring the person happiness. Rather, moral principles are viewed as 'categorical' and so show how a fully rational human being would act irrespective of preference. Such 'categorical imperatives' apply to all human beings and, ideally, rational human beings would act only in accordance with those principles which could become universal law.

The deontological approach to the moral life, would have some points in its favour if applied to capitalism, notably, that it aims to respect the rights of all, encourages consistency of action and provides for duty and obligation. However, there would be difficulties in assuming that humans ought to act perfectly rationally, (they don't), and there would be even greater difficulties with where we get the 'categorical imperatives' in the first place. The latter, in fact, give us a test for rejecting certain maxims, but do not tell us what to do. Furthermore, MacIntyre argues that the whole concept of 'duty', makes the individual sovereign. Does this not lead
one back to a certain subjective concept of duty? Finally, it has been suggested that Kantian 'duty' ends up in practice as meaning conformity to authority. In the case of capitalism, to do our duty in a broad moral sense, would sometimes include not conforming to authority - for example, in the case of unjust exploitation of workers by owners to ensure greater production and profits. Thus, the moral life, as posited in deontological ethics, would seem to be, at best, only a partial moral life, failing to take a holistic view of the human person. This would be the problem with the teleological approach of utilitarianism as well, only more so.

**Utilitarianism**

This approach posits that to live morally, is to judge an action by its consequences. The moral action is one which produces the greatest pleasure and happiness, and caters for 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number'. McCabe's view is that such an approach is related to "'hedonism', according to which it is reasonable for me always to do those things that will lead to my having a maximum of 'pleasure". Pleasure or happiness is seen as being the only goal of the human person and the only thing that really motivates us.

Such a single order moral theory is problematic. It is reductionist - a human person is far more complex than merely being motivated by pleasure only. Life is more complex than 'pleasure' and 'pleasure' is also a relative concept. However, the greatest problem that would arise should this concept of the moral life be applied to an economic system like capitalism is that only in a society where the norms of humane and decent behaviour are upheld, could such an approach be constructively applied. What happens where the society's greatest happiness is achieved by the eradication of, or the discrimination against a particular ethnic or cultural group? Applied to economics, this would mean that certain persons would not be employed or given just wages, given opportunities and so on. Such behaviour would, however, be classified as leading the moral life, because its consequences would be the 'greatest pleasure for the greatest number'. It seems doubtful that utilitarianism is broad enough to provide a framework for what it means to live a moral life, let alone the moral life.
Virtue ethics
It would seem that in answering the question 'What constitutes the moral life?', a more holistic approach towards human beings and their lives would be required. A number of current philosophers, including MacIntyre and McCabe, advocate Aristotelian ethics, otherwise referred to as 'virtue ethics', as the answer to our current subjectivist, relativist and individualistic orientation towards morality and the moral life. Perhaps this is partly because, for Aristotle, ethics dealt with the study of those conditions necessary for human well-being, while morality is bound up with bringing about human good. Aristotle's concept of the moral life is at once broader and more holistic, based as it is on human nature (distinguished from other forms of life by rationality). The purpose of a whole human life is to achieve its 'telos', namely, happiness, wellbeing, flourishing and the qualities of mind and character necessary for moral conduct. For Aristotle, human happiness will be achieved by using our reason to work out what the good life is and to live it. However, because humans are members of a group, this exercise is not an individualistic one.

A good life, a moral life is a whole life, lived exercising the virtues (i.e. excellences, stable dispositions, appropriate to our fulfilling our 'telos'). The moral and intellectual virtues are learnt and acquired: they are not innate to human nature. The practice of virtue is for its own sake, because we understand that this is good behaviour. The truly good life is one of moderation, where all virtues cooperate in a harmonious whole. We do not practice virtue so that we can be happy; rather being virtuous constitutes happiness. The latter is not, as in utilitarianism, a quantifiable entity.

For the Aristotelian, then, happiness is not an activity that can be isolated from the activity of living; to be happy is to live without hindrance the life that is becoming to a human being—

To live such a life, according to McCabe, a contemporary Aristotelian, would be a moral life. However, he would add that our purpose is to be good at being human not just alone, but interacting within our communities, and so becoming more and more who we are. He suggests,
that what is **good** is evident by the **goodness** of that which constitutes the action.

This Aristotelian view of the moral life influenced the great Catholic thinker, Thomas Aquinas, as well as the likes of MacIntyre and McCabe, and is evident in the Catholic approach to what constitutes the moral life. Of itself, Aristotle's theory is problematic, because of its being racist, sexist and elitist, none of which slurs would assist us to live the moral life within capitalism. So, for example, women would be excluded from participation in economic life on acceptable moral grounds!

However, that the approach is holistic, and has a concept of the person as a social being and of virtue which is not defined subjectively and also posits a purpose for the person’s life albeit without the understanding of human immortality, would, I feel, be a more plausible starting point for answering our question: What, then, constitutes the moral life?

**The Christian/Catholic concept of the moral life**

To answer the question fully and comprehensively, we need not only to look at the human person as a 'rational animal', but as a transcendent being, whose purpose in life goes beyond mere earthly existence. To this end, let us sketch briefly the Christian and Catholic concept of the human person, and, in the light of this understanding, posit what it means to lead the moral life.

For Christians, human persons are made in God's image and likeness. We are creative, we are able to be present to ourselves, and so we are self-aware and self-realising. We are transcendent. However, we are also unlike God, for we are finite - we are dependent on God for our existence and ultimate fulfillment, and we are dependent on others (e.g. for nurturing). We are thus limited and our freedom is limited, as is shown by our dependence.

Nevertheless, being made in the image and likeness of God is the source of human dignity and points to four areas of human relationships: our relationship with God, with others, with creation and with our finiteness.
Each human being therefore has immeasurable value and dignity for he/she is made in God's image:

Each human being is a person; that is, nature is endowed with intelligence and free will\(^5\).

However, while we are individuals, human persons are social beings by nature and are dependent on others for our development and for becoming fully who we are as persons. We are thus linked to others in community and are not only dependent on them, but are responsible for them and they for us. Whether intentionally or not, individuals always influence the community - this is a principle of human existence. Therefore each of us must obey the principle of solidarity which means we must take responsibility for others and be committed to the community.

Furthermore, humans are stewards of the earth - we must not only safeguard her resources, but develop her to be a fit place for the human being to live. Because, all humans are equal in dignity, all humans are equally entitled to share in the resources of the earth - this has considerable importance when applied to economic life. Taking note of this will therefore be a part of leading a moral life within any economic system.

The basis for all that the Church believes about the moral dimensions of economic life is its vision of the transcendent worth - the sacredness - of human beings. The dignity of the human person, realised in a community with others, is the criterion against which all aspects of economic life must be measured\(^6\)

Because humans are free and self-realising, they have a right to participation and to making decisions about their own lives. However, such decisions are not merely individualistic - they are to be taken in the light of being both an individual and of being connected to others in and by community. The moral life, therefore, consists in living with the above understanding of our own and others' value, dignity and mutual dependence and obligation as well as of our freedom and responsibility in terms of being made in God's image and likeness.
However, it would be erroneous to imply that the moral life is an entity in its own right, separated from what, in reality, most human persons spend considerable time doing. So it is that the Catholic Church has a body of social teaching to guide both Catholics and, in fact, all 'men of goodwill' in how to live the moral life in the context of social life in the community including economic life - this is relevant, as most adults spend most of their day working.

— Christian social teaching can be defined as the whole of our knowledge about the essence and order of human society and the resulting norms and tasks applicable to any given historical condition: it is acquired socio- philosophically from the essentially social nature of man and socio- theologically from the Christian order of salvation.

This teaching is grounded in certain principles of social order, which serve as a yardstick for evaluating any economic (or social) system. These are:

- The principle of solidarity - i.e. each individual has personal dignity and, at the same time, is a social being, mutually connected and obliged to others in the community.
- The principle of the common good - i.e. while individual dignity, development and personhood is to be respected, the common good of all human beings is more important than certain individual rights.
- The principle of subsidiarity - this presupposes the above two principles and is defined in Quadragesimo Anno as follows:

  Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so it is also an injustice, and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organisations can do.

It is on the basis of the dignity of the person and of this social teaching, that there seems sufficient breadth and depth in the concept of the human person and what it is to live the moral life. It is against this concept of the
person and these principles that capitalism as an economic system must tried and tested. Only then can we answer whether it is possible to live the moral life within capitalism.

**Capitalism**

**Introduction - the field of economics**

As capitalism is an economic system, it is important to clarify both the realm of economics and its purpose, as seen by Catholic social teaching. The field of economics deals with areas like work, property, production, capital, development, income, labour, wages and so on.

The purpose of economics is the service of men, their material needs and those of their moral, spiritual and religious life. Economics is to be carried out according to its own laws but within the limits of morality\(^{10}\).

In practice, what this implies, is that the human person must not be enslaved by or disempowered by the economic system concerned, that all persons have material needs which must be met, and that all are entitled to share in the resources of the earth. Goods, property, and resources should be used for the benefit of all and should not be wasted or used to benefit only small, elite groups.

However, while it is acknowledged that certain laws operate in an economic system, and that economics can be an autonomous activity, there is, nevertheless, a relationship between economics and ethics, given that economics is a human activity, and incorporates both personal and social dimensions. Hence, issues of morality will arise where economics touches on human lives. Thus there are "certain reference points which should inspire the Christian approach to economics"\(^{11}\). These include the following:

- "Man is the source, the focus and the end of all economic and social life."\(^{12}\)
- Economic activity should satisfy human needs - it is not an end in itself.
• Economic resources and goods are gifts from God and so should be used respectfully for the good of all.
• The dignity of each person must be observed in economic life.
• Victims of injustice are especially vulnerable and the Church is particularly aware of these persons.
• False economic criteria, such as those motivated by pure greed, for example, unlimited production, should be rejected.

These are useful touchstones for an evaluation of an economic or political system. If we live in accordance with values which stress the dignity of each human person, and with such principles as solidarity, the common good and subsidiarity, we must ask whether it is possible to live the moral life within capitalism.

**Capitalism - what is capitalism?**

**Opening remarks**

There is no simple answer to this question, largely because capitalism has, since it was conceived of by Adam Smith, been defined and practised in different ways, some of which have been more censured on moral grounds by the church than others. It is therefore necessary to look at the broad spirit of capitalism and at the form or institutional factors which characterise it, before distinguishing between different understandings of and practices of capitalism itself. In this distinction, we may find the answer to our question, for it is true to say that not all forms of capitalism are created morally equal.

**The spirit and characteristics of capitalism**

Firstly, there is no doubt that the motivating spirit of capitalism is that of gain and profit-making. Production is to be undertaken to this end, and the spirit is one of competition and of a free market in which the best would win. To win, you need to use what works - rationalisation is thus part of the capitalist spirit.

Secondly, it can be observed that capitalism is characterised by private ownership of property and of the means of production; labour is frequently
seen as a commodity to be bought and sold; there is very little role for
government and the entrepreneur controls the system. Capitalism is further
characterised by individual freedom (e.g. to compete), by the acceptance
of the market as the best means to achieve economic balance, and often, by
economic power being used to control social and political events. The
emphasis is on commutative justice, rather than on distributive justice.

The above could be seen as general features pertaining to capitalism\textsuperscript{13}. However, whether it is possible to live the moral life within capitalism,
depends very much on which variant of capitalism is being practised.
Hence it is necessary to examine the capitalist system and its variants.

**Classical Economic Liberalism**

What people loosely refer to as capitalism, began as the classical economic
liberalism of Adam Smith and was based on the idea that the economy had
a natural order, and, as long as there was no undue state interference, this
order, these economic laws, would automatically regulate the economy in
the interests of all. The economy, with its key factors of land, capital, and
labour would be run by men who had complete freedom - of being, of
property, of contract, of competition and so on.

The driving force in the economy was the self-interest of each individual,
who in pursuing his/her own interest, would unwittingly contribute to the
common good. Free competition would also ensure the common good, for
example, that prices remained fair and reasonable rather than becoming
overly high due to monopolies. This was the theory.

In practice, capitalism had the following features:

- the separation of capital and labour, such that those who owned the
capital made the decisions and were more powerful than those who
did not, and who had only their labour to offer - hence human labour
became a commodity to be bought and sold at the market price-
exploitation, poor wages etc. were thus features of the system.
- capital occupied the predominant position and was used by those
who owned it to their advantage:
Capital so employs the working or wage-earning classes as to divert business and economic activity entirely to its own arbitrary will and advantage - without any regard to the human dignity of the workers, the social character of economic life, social justice and the common good\textsuperscript{14}.

- striving for the permanent increase of capital, irrespective of what means one uses, as an end in itself
- economic rationalism, i.e. the use of all human or material production factors as economically and productively as possible, so as to increase production and profit as much as possible.
- ethical minimalism, i.e. ethics, other than with regard to the keeping of contracts and issues of ownership, was not accepted in this system, i.e. morality/ morals were seen as separate from the economic system.

This purely capitalistic economy, bent on the increase of capital regardless of the impact of the system on human beings gave rise to numerous negative consequences, for example, workers being exploited by owners, poor wages, appalling living conditions, the use of child labour and a polarised society divided into owners versus non-owners\textsuperscript{15}.

It was the exploitation of workers, their suffering and the unequal balance of power and wealth between owners and workers and the latter's vulnerability, which gave rise to the writing of \textit{Rerum Novarum}\textsuperscript{16} the first of the papal documents incorporating the Church's social teaching. It is in these documents that we find clear guidelines on the morality or not of capitalism and other economic and social systems.

\textbf{Capitalism as Classical liberalism, evaluated}

In \textit{Rerum Novarum} and in other documents which follow, it becomes clear that it would not be possible to live a moral life within the capitalist system (at its worst, Manchester- capitalism) or pure market economy, as it is sometimes called by some.

Why is this?
Firstly, capitalism in this form, violates the fundamental and equal dignity of the majority of persons, and so, the principle of solidarity, by advantaging some individuals at the expense of others and by encouraging selfishness, self-advantaged competition, greed and exploitation. Secondly, it negates the principle of subsidiarity - monopolies are formed to the disadvantage of smaller operators and those persons who are not able to compete in the market (the old, the sick, and other ‘market passives’) are not provided for. Thirdly, it violates the principle of the common good, substituting instead, the principle of the good of some (read: owners) at the expense of the good of the majority of others (read: workers). The few become richer, the majority, poorer. Finally, it violates the principle of justice. No system where wealth is so inequitably distributed, can accord with the principles of justice.

Thus the Church teaches that such a system, which is based on the assumption that capital is more important than the person, that a small minority can use this capital (which is actually partly part of the fruit of labour) to better themselves, while depriving others, and that people are polarised into opposing and antagonistic groups (labour and capital), is morally unacceptable.

Economic enterprise is generally an affair of collaboration - thus it is wicked and inhuman to arrange and organise it to the detriment of anybody involved. Yet it often happens even in our time that those who work are made slaves to their own work. No economic laws can justify this.17

Furthermore, while the Church has no problem with the ownership of property, such ownership is never unqualified and is always subordinate to the common good (i.e. the rights of the community). Similarly, while it is not wrong to make a profit from one's business, profit cannot be the only factor considered in running a business. Human and moral factors, such as just wages for all and worker participation are also important. It is also completely unacceptable to live a more and more materialistic life because one has made a great profit.
It is not wrong to want to live better, what is wrong is a style of life which is presumed to be better when it is directed at "having" rather than "being"—\textsuperscript{18}. One must give to and share with others if one has much materially. There is more to human life than freedom in the economic sense, or than in mere possession.

To live morally within a system, we must ensure that the system is at the service of the human person. The human person, not capital or profit must be at the centre of the system. Thus it was that John Paul II warned:

— it should be recognised that the error of early capitalism can be repeated wherever man is in a way treated on the same level as the whole complex of the material means of production, as an instrument and not in accordance with the true dignity of his work - that is to say where he is not treated as subject and maker, and for this very reason, as the true purpose of the whole production process\textsuperscript{19}.

In other words, to live morally within this system would mean to challenge the priority of capital over labour; it would mean to campaign for just wages, and humane working conditions; it would mean to try to alter the system such that work, which is seen as part of the person’s dignity, does not oppress or enslave him/her.

To live the moral life would also mean to work against one of the fundamental features of capitalism in this form; i.e. that workers and capital are separated into opposing groups as pointed out in \textit{Laborem Exercens}:

— capital cannot be separated from labour— a labour system can be right — and also morally legitimate, if in its very basis it \textit{overcomes the opposition between labour and capital}\textsuperscript{20}

Workers, without whom there would be no production and so no profit, should thus be allowed to participate in the business, rather than merely being subordinated.
The pure market economy then is morally unacceptable and, as Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger\textsuperscript{21} has pointed out, such an economic system is in fact 'deterministic in its core' This is morally unacceptable, if one believes that the human person is made in God's image and so is self-determining. Such determinism, as seen by Ratzinger\textsuperscript{22} centres around the fact that the person imagines him/herself to be free, while s/he is actually controlled by the laws of the market. Now, determinism, albeit of a more radical type, is a feature of Marxist economic systems, and it is a factor which counts greatly against them in Church teaching. In Ratzinger's opinion, any system of economics which would aim at ensuring the common good would have to be grounded in some ethical system, and not simply in economic or market laws.

A quick evaluation in terms of our earlier touchstone statements, would again confirm that we could not live the moral life within such a system: the human person is not its focus, economic activity does not satisfy human needs but favours the few and is an end in itself, resources are used to benefit the owners of capital, not the majority who are workers, the dignity of each person is not respected, (e.g. worker exploitation for greater profits) and many suffer as a result, while some others simply satisfy their baser needs.

**The Moral life and the social market economy**

Therefore, we must ask again, is there a variant of capitalism within which one could live a moral life? Some believe that the social market economy (rightly understood and not merely pure market economy by another name) would enable such living. Stegmann\textsuperscript{23} suggests that the neoliberal social market economy could, with some changes, be a capitalist system which would enable the best in capitalism to be retained as well as being compatible with living the moral life.

**What is a social market economy?**
The so-called neoliberal fathers understood this as an economic system which combined the principles of market freedom and social justice. Competition was to be practised and production to be increased through
efficiency, within a so-called framework and legal regulations. Equally as important as competition, was the meeting of outlined social objectives (just wages, production to meet consumer needs, increased productivity which could ensure benefits for all rather than just being a materialistic end in itself).

In practice, what this meant was that, unlike in classical economic liberalism and the notorious Manchester - capitalism, absolute freedom in the marketplace which allows monopolies and abuse, was to be disallowed. Instead, the state should establish a legal framework which prevents the possibility of this type of abuse of free market principles, and it must also ensure that the so-called 'market-passives' (e.g. the old, the sick etc.) are cared for. This would also take account of the fact that many human needs are not catered for by the market, and so a humane economic order cannot rest only on the free market and pure competition. Furthermore, neither the economy nor the market, nor competition, are to be seen as ends in themselves, but should serve human needs.

To what extent would this system take into account human dignity and such principles as solidarity, subsidiarity and the common good?

It would seem that, while absolute competition and absolute freedom are unacceptable as 'the guiding principle of economic life',

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a free market economy where competition is controlled could, according to Church teaching, serve humankind's needs better than, for example, the totally state - controlled system of Marxist states or the pure market economy.

Certainly the mechanisms of the market secure advantages: they help to utilize resources better; they promote the exchange of products; above all they give central place to the person's desires and preferences.

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This quotation suggests that both the principle of solidarity and of subsidiarity would be realised in such an economy. The resources of the earth must be used for all - to waste these is against the principles of solidarity and the common good. Choice and participation in the economy,
upholds the principle of subsidiarity - a principle which is completely ignored in collectivist systems.

However, what Stegmann\textsuperscript{26} points out quite forcefully is that in order for a Social Market Economy to be truly effective and moral, it is essential to ensure that the social and economic dimensions of the policy have equal weight. Therefore, it is not good enough to ensure good production, profit and so on and only afterwards attend to social targets. These must be an integral part of economic structure and policy at the start. The state thus has the duty to draft such a macro-economic policy so that there is a humane production process and positive social results, such as ecological preservation, just wages and job creation.

**Living the Moral life within Capitalism**

Such a view is made especially clear in *Centesimus Annus*\textsuperscript{27}, where Pope John Paul II answers the question as to which economic model third world countries should adopt in their search for 'economic and civil progress'.

The answer is obviously complex. If by "capitalism" is meant an economic system which recognises the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the human sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a "business economy", "market Economy" or simply "free economy". But if by "capitalism is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong, juridical framework which places it a the service of human freedom in its totality and sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious, then the reply is certainly negative.

Oliver Williams\textsuperscript{28} refers to the vision of *Centesimus Annus* as offering a" new communitarian democratic capitalism that is a humane and ethical alternative to the present state of affairs". This vision incorporates not merely commutative justice, but also distributive and social justice. It incorporates moderate state intervention alongside the freedom to compete
and to produce efficiently, and while some criticise it as too idealistic and noble, it is centered on the following features of Catholic Social Teaching:

- Rights are not absolute, but must be viewed in the context of their role in promoting human dignity in community (e.g. the right to a just wage, would take precedence over the employer's right to bargain for the lowest wages; the right of participation by workers, etc.) Laws should ensure just working conditions and just minimum wages. The right to property is not absolute, and the wealthier must share with others, for example, through effective taxation.

- While the function of the market in society is important, it is limited. It must facilitate the development of people, but it cannot be an end in itself. Wealth cannot be produced for its own sake, blinding people to what is truly of value. Consumerism, a crassly materialistic lifestyle, lived while many others go short of basic necessities is completely unacceptable morally.

- The state has an important, but limited function. It is not all-powerful, but must influence the economy towards the common good.

- Participating in the market economy can facilitate the building of a person's character and his/her practice of virtue. However, such participation is not the highly individualistic concept found in economic liberalism.

In addition, we must always balance rights with duties and in a capitalist economy, we are duty-bound to have regard to the need of the poor and work to enable others to be employed, to generate their own income, so as to support themselves. Mere almsgiving, while virtuous, would seem insufficient to discharge our moral obligations to our fellow human beings in a capitalist economy. Furthermore, it fails to take account of what is made abundantly clear in Laborem Exercens, namely, that work is an integral part of human dignity, is a right of every human being and is the way we, as human persons makes our world, actualise our potential, and contributes to our fellows. Each human person has a right to work for a just wage in humane conditions and must be facilitated to do so. Justice means that capital must serve labour and that the person not only works,
but participates meaningfully in decision making and in the fruits of his/her work. In other words there is co-determination, responsibility and co-ownership.

It is important to note that in Gregory Baum's commentary on *Laborem Exercens*, we read that:

> Because the whole earth has become the hunting ground for the multinational corporations the social reforms associated with neo-capitalism are being undermined and at a point of being lost—today—capital serves labour less and less. For this reason, the encyclical argues, we must expect a new ‘burst of solidarity' (n.8) and organised action among these groups and peoples who are oppressed by the existing order.

Therefore, we need to amend our existing economic order to cater for the well-being of all peoples on our earth, including those in so-called third world underdeveloped nations. Capital must be used for all people, not people for capital. Technology, too, must be used in the service of the human person to improve his/her quality of life, and not to obstruct or enslave it.

Johnson suggests that capitalism has done a better job than communism in both the generation of and the distribution of wealth. However, the task now would be to eliminate its weaknesses by agreeing on certain standards to be met (easy, he says!) and dealing with whatever conflicts would arise. Such a task could prove to be morally good and facilitate living the moral life within capitalism, especially as the standards he suggests we meet include conservation of resources, just distribution of goods, increased production and protection of human dignity. Difficult areas would include ownership of property (not an inalienable right), freedom to compete (not unlimited, e.g. no monopolies) and a limited state role (e.g. for healthcare). However, some of his practical suggestions, like conserving resources by consuming less (especially in the USA), assisting with responsible development especially in underdeveloped countries (i.e. not just for profit from cheap labour), making responsible moral decisions about which economic infrastructures to be involved in and ensuring that work is
fulfilling and just for the person, (e.g. just wages, participation), show clearly how through specific actions it is possible to live a moral life within capitalism of this kind.

The SACBC\textsuperscript{32}, likewise, have pointed to the inequitable economic system in our own country, and have stressed that moral principles should underlie economic life, while economic choices and institutions must serve the common good and promote human dignity and support. It is people who operate an economic system and it is people who perpetuate a status quo of injustice, where some live in abject poverty, while others have an excess; where many are unemployed, where discrimination exists (e.g. against women) and where greed and materialistic values abound.

Hence, each person must contribute by means of his/her choices and decision-making in economic and in social areas, to the change of unjust economic structures and institutions. We cannot abdicate our moral responsibilities by claiming we are too insignificant to make a difference. In our actions and choices we must be committed to others and to their needs, not just to our own. We must seek to empower the poor and marginalised, we should use resources for the good of all and share what we have (time, talent, money) and ensure that all economic decisions are people-centered.

However, this is the theory. In any economic system, no matter how ideally constructed it may be in theory, in practice, unless each human being wants to and has the will to work in accordance with such moral principles as solidarity, subsidiarity the common good and justice, no moral life is possible. For as human persons we have a free choice and it is too easy to abdicate our moral responsibilities within any system, as long as we, ourselves, feel comfortable. Living the moral life within capitalism amounts to having the will to work within the system for change to those aspects of the system which humans have devised which do not work to further human dignity and which go against moral principle.

Action, not talk is called for. Sins of omission are as wrong as those of commission and they are very easily committed within a capitalist system.
To live the moral life within capitalism is possible if we choose to do so and follow the choice with commitment and action to ensure that the dignity of self and others, the rights and benefits of all, are respected and upheld in practice. This we must do according to our talents, wherever we find ourselves serving in the community.

**Conclusion**

On the basis of our past record as human beings performing in the economic sector, we might say that while it is possible to live the moral life within capitalism, it is not probable unless each person wants to do so enough and chooses accordingly. Only then will the dignity of man and woman, workers, working together creatively with others to establish God's kingdom, be truly realised. This is Pope John Paul's Message on the issue of development and justice for all: to develop the poor and to enable them to take part in and be part of economic prosperity they need to be provided with realistic opportunities. Creating such conditions calls for a concerted effort to promote development, an effort which also involves sacrificing the positions of income and of power enjoyed by the more developed economies. This may mean making important changes in established lifestyles—

This call to nobility, generosity and self-sacrifice is essential if we are to live the moral life within capitalism, either nationally or globally. To live the moral life is to become ever more sensitive to the other and his/her needs, to understand that morality is not a punishment to do what will deprive me, but to do what, as a human being I deeply desire and want to do, so that I may become truly myself while contributing to the same process in others and they to me. To live the moral life is to be truly free, but it takes effort and application, especially in a capitalist economy, where it is all too easy to become blinded to true values by concern for our own advantage and comfort.

*Note: This article is an edited version of work done towards an MPhil degree in Applied Ethics in 2000.*
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NOTES


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From "Cost Factor" to "Co-Entrepreneur"

Christian Social Teaching, Social Market Economy and the Changing Role of the Worker in Modern Economy *

FRANZ JOSEF STEGMANN

In 1868, Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), the close friend of Karl Marx (1818-1883), described the relationship employer - employee as follows: "The capitalist employs his worker. In a certain time the worker has delivered as much work as corresponds to his weekly wage. Assuming that the weekly wage corresponds to three working days, the worker, who started on Monday, has replaced the entire value of the paid wage on Wednesday evening… The capitalist, however, has bought his weekly work, therefore the employee has to work also the three last weekdays".¹ Work, labour is only a commodity; the worker is just a cost factor that should be kept as small as possible!

Little less than 100 years after Friedrich Engels, in 1965, the Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church declared in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes - Church in the Modern World: "In economic enterprises it is persons who work together, that is free and independent human beings created in the image of God. Therefore the active participation of everyone in the running of an enterprise should be promoted. This participation should take into account each person's function, whether it be one of ownership, management, or labour" and "the necessary unity of operations" (Art. 68). In other words, all those involved in the enterprise, owners, management and workers, are persons, free, independent, self responsible humans; the enterprise is a 'community' of producing human beings, not only a technical-economic production machine.

¹ This reference is not visible in the image.
In seven steps the following explanation traces the changing role of the worker from a mere cost factor in the pure capitalistic economic system to a co-entrepreneur in modern economy. The two quotations above briefly describe the change; the two keywords "Cost Factor" and "Co-Entrepreneur" mark its benchmark figures. The explanation deliberately focuses on the development in Germany, which may be helpful beyond its borders, and turns the attention to the contributions, which Christian Social Teaching and the Catholic Social Movement made to this development.

**Pure Market Economy or Capitalism: Labour - a "Commodity" Worker – just a "Cost Factor"**

Let Friedrich Engels get a chance to speak once more: Despite the fact that the weekly wage of a worker corresponds only to three working days, the worker is not allowed to stop working on Wednesday evening. "The capitalist has bought his weekly work and the employee has still to work the three last weekdays too" – for nothing, in favour of the capitalist. So Engels summarizes vividly the Marxist wage theory, which describes the relation employer–employee in the early time and peak of capitalism. In his main work "Das Kapital" ("The Capital") Karl Marx did not invent the descriptions of the terrible conditions of the workers in the 19th century England; they are based on official reports of Royal Investigation Commissions. The owner of the means of production buys the work of the paid worker as a commodity and pays just as much wage as the worker needs to maintain his capacity for work and to keep his species alive. The wage consists – according to Marx – in the costs for the "reproduction" of the commodity "human capacity for work", in the costs for raising and maintaining the workers who are needed by the economy at any one time: work, labour – a commodity, worker – just a cost factor, nothing else.

Marx described the situation of the workers in England. At the same time a Catholic Bishop in Germany, Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler (1811-1877), drew a similar conclusion. Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz, was the pioneer of Germany's Social Catholicism and its most influential figure in the 19th century. In 1864 he published his book "Die Arbeiterfrage und das Christentum" ("The Worker Question and Christianity"), which attained many editions. Ketteler's analysis reached the following conclusion: The
physical existence of the worker depends on his wage; "in our time this wage is determined by the subsistence level, by what is vitally necessary in the strictest sense"; for the "wage is a commodity; every day its price is determined by supply and demand; the line which it is varying around is the minimal living income; whenever the demand (for labour, for workers) is greater than the supply, the wage rises over this axis; whenever the supply (of labour, of workers) is greater than the demand, the wage drops under this line"\(^2\). This fact went down in history as the so-called "Iron Wage Law".

The rational economic principle, which is essential for modern economy, forms the background of this fact. This principle demands, "to expend as little means as possible for a wanted result or to get out as much as possible of available means"\(^3\): minimum possible input – maximum possible output. Due to the 'shortage of available means' and the great demand, this principle is basically right and made important contributions to the enormous increase in performance of modern economy. **But the mechanical and reckless application of the rational principle to the labour market and the working people also made labour a mere commodity and the worker only a cost factor.** The efforts of completely utilizing the workers' capacity for work caused inhumane working conditions. Because the work capacity was the only 'commodity' of the worker, he was forced to sell it at any cost. Being without material resources, admittedly the worker was always the weaker one in the competition struggle.

The difference between Bishop Ketteler and Karl Marx consists only in three words. Ketteler limited the so-called "Iron Wage Law" to his time ("in our time"). Marx, in contrast, declared it as an unchanging and unchangeable law and understood it as a prognosis of the future, which will proceed according to **natural law necessity**. History, however, did not confirm his prediction – not least because people such as Ketteler and Marx gave decisive incentives to awaken the conscience and to sharpen responsibility for the workers. But the "Iron Wage Law" was in force in Early and High Capitalism; and it will be in force in each economic
system, which sees labour as a mere commodity and treats workers only as a cost factor.

It may surprise us that even Adam Smith (1723-1790), the well-known founder of Classical Economic Liberalism and modern economics, saw this initial disadvantage. In a stirring passage of his main publication *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Smith wrote in 1776. With regard to the struggle between 'factory bosses' – he called them "masters" - and their "workmen", it is clear, who "will have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their term… In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer… They could generally live a year or two (or more) years upon the stocks, which they have already acquired. Many workmen, however, could not even subsist a week… without employment".

**Christian Social Teaching and Worker Co-Determination (until World War II)**

The described problematic relations between the 'factory bosses' and their 'subjects', between management and labour, and the legal status of the workforce in enterprises are as old as the industrialization itself. They can be traced to the first decades of the 19th century. Thirteen years before Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published their famous Communist Manifesto in 1848, Franz von Baader (1765-1841) dealt with the issue of worker co-determination. Baader was an entrepreneur (manufacturer of glass), university professor and the most important social critic in the early Catholic Social Movement. As early as in 1835 he claimed "the right" of the emerging work force "to elect and send representatives to the bodies of estates". The "bodies of estates" were a kind of parliament of groups in the then society, which were powerful at that time. There the representatives of the workers should look after their interests. Baader's proposal was not realized, but what was crucial for the history of co-determination was the fact that Baader declared the representation of the employees in the "bodies of estates" to be "the right" of the workers. Baader claimed this right as early as at the very beginning of the industrialization process in Central Europe and – I repeat – years before Marx and Engels published their "Communist Manifesto".
In the middle of the century the just mentioned Bishop Ketteler made every effort to establish so-called "production associations". By "production associations" he understood co-operatives, which would eliminate the separation of capital and labour and stop the 'proletarianization'. Each member of such a production co-operative would be "entrepreneur as well as worker". As "worker" he would be paid the ordinary "wage as an employee". As "entrepreneur he would receive his share in the enterprise's profit". At the same time he would be involved in the economic decision-making and "running of the enterprise". This proposal referred clearly to the workers' participation as "entrepreneurs" in the "running of the enterprise" and therefore also to co-determination. Even if Ketteler did not succeed, he introduced the idea of worker participation into the public discussion – as early as in the middle of the 19th century.

These efforts stand for many similar ones. They show that the problem of the tension-laden relationship between management and labour, the right of the employees to a say in the enterprise, and consequently the issue of an enterprise constitution including both sides, capital and labour - that is the issue of co-determination -, are as old as the industrialization process. The problem however how to organize the co-operation within the production association, remained unsolved. Presumably this was a main reason for the failure of the idea.

The successor to Bishop Ketteler as the leading figure in Social Catholicism was Franz Hitze (1851-1921). Hitze, a Catholic priest and a close supporter of the emerging Christian Trade Unions, acted for many years as the senior spokesman on social affairs for the "Zentrum" ("Centre Party") in the national parliament. Since 1893 Hitze held the first chair of Christian Social Teaching at a German university in Münster. In the eighteen hundred and eighties, Hitze and his friend, the entrepreneur Franz Brandts (1834-1914), established one of the first so-called "Arbeiter-Ausschüsse" ("Worker Committees") in Brandts' textile business. These "Worker Committees" can be called the predecessors of the "Factory Committees". According to the "Law on Regulations Governing Industrial
Relations" of 1952, today such a "Factory Committee", called "Betriebsrat", exists in every German company. The "Worker Committee" was involved in discussing personnel and social matters; and "also the employer committed himself to its decisions". So the "Worker Committee" granted the employees "a share of the rule", as a contemporary voice said.

During the First World War, the so-called "Hilfsdienstgesetz" ("Law on Help Service") of 1916 enacted the legal introduction of "Worker Committees". The employers had demanded to cancel the free choice of the working place and the right of the free labour contract in order to increase the production capacity for weapons. The introduction of "Worker Committees" by law was the equivalent for the cancellation. So what the Social Catholicism had fought for during a number of decades turned into a reality under the pressure of the war economy.

After the First World War, the development made a crucial step from co-determination concerning social and personnel issues to participation in economic decision-making. The constitution of the new German republic laid down the principle that the employees "play an equal part with the employers in the entire economic development" (Art.165). The "Betriebsrätegesetz" ("Law on Factory Committee") of 1920 made the concrete step from social to economic co-determination. It provided for the full co-determination in personnel and social affairs and an initial participation in economic decision-making: for the first time, the "Factory Committee" had to send two representatives of the workforce, enjoying equal rights, on the supervisory board of directors, the key deciding body of the enterprise. Representatives of the Catholic Social Movement were decisively involved in making the so-called “Co-Determination Article” of the constitution; and the Minister of Labour Heinrich Brauns (1869-1939) formed the “Law on Factory Committee”. Brauns was a Catholic priest and a leading member of the Catholic Social Movement. By this law he put into effect an old demand of this movement.

In 1921 Matthias Erzberger (1875-1921) presented a more progressive model of an enterprise constitution. He was a member of the Catholic
Social Movement, became Finance Minister after the war and carried out the great finance reform in 1919-1920 within only 9 months, a unique statesmanlike achievement. Erzberger proposed that the workforce of each enterprise with more than 20 employees should found a "Werksgenossenschaft" ("Work's Association"). By profit sharing and increasing the enterprise's capital, until 50% of the total capital assets should become its property. After that the half of the net earnings should be distributed to both the previous shareholders and the new "Work's Association". In this way the workers too would get "a share in running the enterprise" as well as in ownership and earnings. So this concept was the first enterprise model that provided for an equal co-determination of the employees based on equal co-ownership. (In August 1921, rightwing radicals assassinated Erzberger, who had headed the German cease-fire commission after the war. So they stopped the discussion of his proposal before it had started.)

In 1933 Adolf Hitler and his National Socialists seized power in Germany. Only one year later they cancelled the existing co-determination regulations and replaced them by what they called "Führer–Gefolgschafts Prinzip" ("Follow-the-Leader Principle"); it gave the "Betriebsführer" ("Leader of the Enterprise"), the top management, the sole authority to make decisions on the enterprise including the affairs of the workforce. They were called "Betriebsgefolgschaft" ("followers of the enterprise"), who have to follow the leader, as the German expression "Gefolgschaft" says.

**Concept and Forms of Co-Determination**

Before we deal with the subject "Social Market Economy" and "Workers as Co-Entrepreneurs" in this economic system, I give a general survey of the concept of worker participation in economic decision-making. Whenever there is talk of co-determination, one must distinguish between three aspects or levels.

- The first distinction refers to the issues that are objectives of the participation in decision-making. There is co-determination in social issues, for example, enactment or change of the factory order, administration of social services provided by the enterprise, regulation of
holiday periods. Another co-determination concerns personnel matters such as employment, transfer or dismissal of employees, regulations of further education in the company. There is, finally, a co-determination in real economic issues, for example, the taking up or ending of a particular production, the amount and kind of investments, the establishment of new production sites. The mentioned "Law on Factory Committees" of 1920 introduced co-determination in social and personnel affairs. After World War II a number of laws established the participation in economic decision-making.

- A second distinction refers to the intensity and degree of co-determination. One must distinguish between mere information of the workforce and a non-binding, advisory discussion on the one hand, and a real participation in decision-making on the other, where the vote of the employees must flow into the decision. This real co-determination takes place in different stages, according to the number of workers' representatives in the decision-making body. For example, the repeatedly mentioned "Law on Factory Committees" of 1920 provided for two representatives of the employees on the supervisory board of directors; according to the "Law on Regulations Governing Industrial Relations" of 1952, a third of the members of the supervisory board of directors must be representatives of the workers; the "Law on Worker Participation in Coal and Steel Industry" of 1951 demands a fifty-fifty representation of owners and workers on the supervisory board of directors and an "Arbeitsdirektor" ("Worker Director"), who represents the workforce on the board of the executive directors.

- Finally, we must distinguish different levels of participation in decision-making: the co-determination regarding the workplace (Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz), its shape and conditions, by which each individual worker is affected; the crucial co-determination concerning the already mentioned social, personnel and economic issues of the enterprise (betriebliche Mitbestimmung), such as the introduction and administration of social services in the business, the employment, transfer and dismissal of employees, the taking up and ending of productions, the kind and size of investments; the co-determination "on a higher level" (überbetriebliche Mitbestimmung), as the Second Vatican Council says, outside the enterprise itself, where "decisions concerning
economic and social conditions, on which the future of the workers and their children depends, are rather often made" (*Gaudium et Spes*, Art. 68). This "higher level" includes, for example, Chambers of Commerce where local economic participants meet to promote industry and commerce.

In this context a few words on the difference between the 'supervisory board of directors' ('Aufsichtsrat') and 'board of executive directors' ('Vorstand'), which have been just mentioned! In German-speaking countries, two different bodies head a company: The board of executive directors is responsible for running the company, for the everyday and routine decisions. The supervisory board of directors draws up the company's policy in general, appoints and dismisses the executive directors and is therefore the body that decides in the end.

**Social Market Economy – What is it? (after World War Two)**

Most of what the Social Catholicism had elaborated in the 19th century and after the First World War aimed at those ideas, which were called *Social Market Economy*. After World War Two they gained increasing acceptance in Central Europe in one or another way. **Social Market Economy is an economic system combining "the principle of freedom in the market with the principle of social justice"**. Economists and politicians, who had opposed the National Socialists and their centrally planned and controlled economy (such as Alfred Müller-Armack, Walter Eucken, Ludwig Erhard – to name just a few), worked out the concept. Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economic Affairs for many years, translated it into practical policy and became known as 'Father of the German Economic Miracle'. The concept is based on the conviction that competition is "an indispensable tool for organizing modern mass societies", but that this competition "only works if a clear framework and legal regulations safeguard it". **The central core of Social Market Economy is "competition based on performance", on achievement of output and efficiency"**10 ("Leistungswettbewerb"). This means: a private-enterprise economy, competition of achievement instead of a centrally planned and controlled economy.
Real competition, however, does not automatically result from the free play of market forces – as history and modern economics teach. Therefore state policy has the responsibility to enable, establish, safeguard and promote competition and to create "the legal framework for every economic activity, business, trade and industry"\textsuperscript{11}. "The state has to establish competition" – demands Norbert Walter, chief economist of Deutsche Bank, the biggest bank in Germany. "Competition does not happen by itself"\textsuperscript{12}. At the same time the state must "prevent restrictions of competition" and "control monopolies and cartels". Anti-monopoly laws have to ensure that monopolies are not being created and, if they are unavoidable, that they are controlled by the state "in order to make competition work most effectively to the consumers' benefit"\textsuperscript{13}. Ludwig Erhard and his co-fighters for Social Market Economy managed that as early as in 1957 the national parliament passed a monopoly law and established a monopoly commission - against heavy opposition from industry and commerce. The commission has to control takeovers and prevent monopolies as far as possible. In the meantime the European Union took on parts of its responsibilities.

The growing globalisation and in particular the most recent serious crisis of the international finance system confirm the necessity and urgency of a global framework. Until today the world economy lacks such a global framework that would correspond to the domestic or national framework. Powerful economic participants, banks, transnational companies act more and more outside any framework. The framework, however, is essential not only for the concept of Social Market Economy, for well working national economies, but also – as the world economy and people all over the world painfully experience at the moment - for a well working global economy. "We must not accept that capital markets replace the primacy of politics"\textsuperscript{14}, warns Horst Köhler, the German Federal President and former Director General of the International Monetary Fund. And the President of the Weltwirtschaftsarchiv (World Economic Archive), one of the leading German economic research institutes, demands "to fix basic conditions of the globalized economy on a global level, to fix global rules for global economic activities"\textsuperscript{15}. Voices like these and the experience of the present
global financial crisis show that these insights seem to become common knowledge.

A second essential of Social Market Economy is of equal importance: the social alignment and social objectives that need to be met. The German 'fathers' of the concept saw the social elements on four levels:

- The alignment of industry and commerce with the needs and wishes of the consumers (by the play of supply and demand) and not with a central state authority as existed in Germany's state controlled economy during the war.
- An income distribution tied to individual performance and achievements and in this way "just income distribution".¹⁶
- Constant improvement in economic efficiency due to the pressure of competition.
- Based on the rising productivity, the increasing ability of the state to complement competition by compensating for socially negative results of the market process and to facilitate necessary changes in economic structures.

The 'fathers' of the Social Market Economy realized that economic competition alone is insufficient to form a humane economic order. "Many things are indispensable to the market, but of greatest importance for human needs", emphasized the economist Alexander Rüstow, one of these 'fathers'. People who are not able to compete, who are not yet or who are no longer able to compete "cannot be abandoned to the market". These "market passives", as Rüstow called them, are unable "to take care of themselves in a manner required by the market, because they are ill, they are weak, they are young, they are old and so on... One must do something for them, if one wants to be responsible and humane". The community, the state has to establish a so-called 'social security net' in order to take care of these "market passives". - State intervention is also required to facilitate those changes in the economic structure, which "are beyond the ability of the individual people affected". Such changes "cannot be allowed to regulate themselves – at some time or another".¹⁷
Oswald von Nell-Breuning SJ, a highly respected social scientist and theologian, author of the draft of the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* of 1931 and aide of a number of German post war governments, summarized these considerations: Social Market Economy demands "a socially satisfactory economic process" and "its socially just results". "Socially just results", for example, refer to the question 'who benefits from the market'. An abundance of wealth alone is not a desirable aim, if this wealth is unjustly distributed. It is the task of Social Market Economy "to direct the allocation of the national product to different groups of people in such a way that the distribution of income and fortune is satisfactory". – "A socially satisfactory economic process", for instance, includes the humanisation of the production process so that workers are not already crushed under the wheels of the production process. It also integrates ecological targets, which become increasingly important. This social dimension has to be included in economic activity from the very beginning and as equal in weight. Not at least the "socially satisfactory economic process" includes, as the already-mentioned German constitution of 1919 demanded, that "employees and employers play an equal part in the entire economic development" (Art. 165) – in other words, economic co-determination.

**Economic Co-Determination: Workers as "Co-Entrepreneurs" in Social Market Economy**

In 1945 World War Two ended with Adolf Hitler's suicide and the destruction of the Nazi reign of terror. But the defeat of Germany saw also its industry destroyed and its economy ruined. At the beginning of the economic reconstruction, very soon the debate about economic determination, which the National Socialists had cancelled, started again. It played a dominant role at the Bochum convention of the Catholic laity in 1949. Each second year German Catholics meet at a big gathering, called "Katholikentag" ("Catholics' Day"). Cardinal Frings, the then Archbishop of Cologne and chairman of the German Bishops' Conference, had convened a commission of Catholic employers and employees in order to prepare this biannual convention. Among other things, the committee dealt with the demand for economic co-determination and firmly declared, "that
involvement in decision-making is *highly appropriate*. Therefore, "the employees are entitled to bring into force this demand"\(^\text{19}\).

In 1949 the Catholics' Day took place in Bochum, the centre of the Ruhr-Region, which is the most industrialized region in Germany. After intensive discussions, the convention passed the following resolution: "The Catholic employees and employers agree that the right of worker participation in decision-making on social, personnel and economic affairs is a natural law, based on God's order, to which the co-responsibility corresponds. We demand to fix it by law"\(^\text{20}\). This declaration of the Bochum Catholics' Day, which was passed by employees and employers, has decisively influenced the regulation of worker participation in Germany.

Only two years later, in 1951, the Bundestag, the national parliament, passed the "Law on Worker Participation in Coal and Steel Industry", the so-called 'Montan Co-Determination'. In each company with more than 1000 employees, this law provides for an equal fifty-fifty representation of the owners and the workforce on the supervisory board of directors, which is the top body (and an additional neutral member, who belongs neither to the capital side nor to the labour side), as well as an "*Arbeitsdirektor*" ("Worker Director") as one of the executive directors. The appointment of the worker director, who is in charge of the personnel department, needs the agreement of the workforce. At this point the above-mentioned difference between the board of executive directors and the board of supervisory directors is evidenced. (The executive directors are responsible for the heading of the company, the everyday and routine decisions; the board of supervisory directors determines the policy of the company in general, appoints and controls the executive directors and is the last deciding body.)

In the *remaining part of industry and commerce*, the "Law on Worker Participation" of 1976 demands also an equal representation of the shareholders and the workforce on the supervisory board of directors in companies of more than 2000 employees. In a stalemate the chairman of the supervisory board makes the decision, whose appointment needs the
agreement of the shareholders – therefore co-determination just under parity. Up to now experience shows that in practice such a stalemate almost never occurs. The pressure to reach an agreement in the interest of the enterprise is very great. **In companies with less than 2000 employees**, the laws on "Regulations Governing Industrial Relations" of 1952 and 1972 demand that **one third of the supervisory board of directors are representatives of the employees**. In 1979 the Federal Constitutional Court, the supreme German court, upheld the conformity of the co-determination laws with the constitution. The court stated that the authority of the state to intervene is the more far-reaching "the more the particular property is in a social context and has social functions". So far a survey of the main laws that regulate worker co-determination in Germany today!

### Social Teaching of the Catholic Church and Co-Determination or "Active Participation" of Workers "in the Running of an Enterprise" (Vatican II)

In 1891 Pope Leo XIII published the first so-called Social Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. He did not deal with the issue of worker participation in economic decision-making. The understanding of the right of ownership and the contract of employment excluded any worker co-determination in those days. But the Pope demanded that capital and labour should maintain a 'balance of power', an "aequilibritas", as the Latin term reads, and work together "in harmony and agreement" (No. 15).

In 1931, forty years after *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Pius XI published the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*. He stated that the "economic system in which different people provide the capital and labour jointly needed for production… is not to be condemned" and that "the wage contract is not essentially unjust" (No. 100, 101, 64). So the Encyclical said **Yes** to market economy. *Quadragesimo Anno* condemned, however, the capitalistic class society, in which "capital so employs the working or wage-earning classes as to divert business and economic activity entirely to its own arbitrary will and advantage without any regard to the human dignity of the workers, the social character of economic life, social justice and the common good" (No. 101). "In the present state of human society", the
Encyclical therefore "deemed it advisable that the wage contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership… thus the workers become sharers in the ownership or management, or else participate in some way in the profits" (No. 65). The close connection, in which Pius XI put ownership and management, suggests that he understood by "sharers in the management" a co-determination of the workforce based on co-ownership: the employees become "sharers in the ownership" by investing parts of their income in the enterprise; the present and the 'new' shareholders own, manage and determine the enterprise together. 

The Encyclical *Mater et Magistra* of 1961 and the Second Vatican Council continued the Social Teaching of the Church. *Mater et Magistra* was the first pastoral letter to deal explicitly with the co-determination issue and introduced new aspects into the discussion. Its author, Pope John XXIII, regarded "as justifiable the desire of employees to be partners in enterprises wherein they work…. The manner and degree of such a partnership" cannot be precisely decided, "but it is of utmost importance… that the employees should have an active part in the affairs of the enterprise wherein they work " (No. 91). The Encyclical therefore continues "that the greater amount of responsibility desired today by workers in enterprises, not merely accords with the nature of man, but also is in conformity with historical developments in the economic, social, and political fields" (No. 93). - The basis of these statements is the Pope's preference for labour. "Men engaged in productive activity" should also "have an opportunity to assume responsibility" (No. 82). Labour "proceeds directly from the human person, and hence is to be thought more of than wealth in external goods... These latter, by their very nature, must be regarded as instruments" (No. 107).

The Second Vatican Council took up this thought of *Mater et Magistra*. The Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, published in 1965, states that "human labour… is superior to the other elements of economic life. For the latter have only the nature of tools… labour comes immediately from the person", who "stamps the things of nature with his seal and subdues them to his will" (Art. 67, 1-2). After this statement of principle on the
value of human labour, *Gaudium et Spes* turns directly to worker co-determination: "In economic enterprises it is persons who work together, free and independent human beings, created in the image of God. **Therefore the active participation of everyone in the running of an enterprise should be promoted.** This participation should take into account each person's function, whether it be the one of ownership, hiring, management, or labour. It should provide for the necessary unity of operations" (Art. 68, 1).

The statements of *Mater et Magistra* as well as those of the Vatican Council have been intensively discussed. Many experts were and are convinced that the laws on worker co-determination in Germany correspond completely with the statements of the Council. Other pundits say that the German co-determination goes beyond those statements and contradicts them. In my view, the following seems to be clear and indisputable:

- The Church's Social Teaching sees the **enterprise** to be not only an economic-technical machinery producing goods, but a **community of persons**, of "free and independent human beings created to the image of God", or – as Pope John Paul II emphasized in the Encyclical *Centesimus Annus* of 1991 – a business is not only "a 'society of capital goods'; it is also a 'society of persons', in which people participate" (No. 43, 2). The employers, therefore, must not put the workers and the economic equipment on the **same** level and should not see them as a cost factor **only**.

- Management, owners and workers **together** achieve the success of the enterprise. The active participation of everyone in the running of the enterprise should be promoted – according to one's functions and without damaging the unity of operations. In this sense the **Council sees the workers as co-entrepreneurs**. Therefore an enterprise constitution is needed that bases the management on two legs: "the leg of the technical means of production and the leg of labour". The **management**, in charge of the workers and the capital invested in the enterprise, **should get their decision-making authority from** "both constitutive factors of the enterprise, capital and labour."23.
• The Council did not determine how this worker co-determination should be put into practice, in which forms and to what extent. The concrete realization, "**the legal and technical solutions in detail are beyond the knowledge and beyond the authority of a Council**"²⁴. They are beyond the knowledge and competence of theology and beyond of the Church. That is neither their job nor their responsibility. The Council said 'Yes' to the principle – not more but not less either. The implementation in detail remains the task of the expert knowledge of the employees and employers, the economists and political scientists, and above all – in a democratic state - the responsibility of the parliament elected by the people.

**Final Remarks of Principle**

Critics sometimes raise the objection that the right of ownership and co-determination of the workforce exclude each other. The right of ownership entitles one to have something at one's free disposal; co-determination of those who are not owners limits or even eliminates this disposal. Against such arguments, the contra-thesis says that the owner has the right to have one's property at one's disposal; but it does not entitle one to force fellow people to be available at one's disposal. "The owner has to negotiate the conditions"²⁵. The right of ownership entitles to have things at one's disposal, but not persons.

A second objection states that co-determination endangers or even eliminates any qualified management, which especially today is so important. Only owners, who are really liable for their property, who carry the risk of losing it, are able "to exert properly the function of an entrepreneur"²⁶ and to carry entrepreneurial responsibility. One may ask against this thesis, whether the risk of losing the job or of suffering other disadvantages, whenever the enterprise comes into difficulties, is not a real risk too for those who are not owners – a risk that can also be the base of entrepreneurial responsibility as is the liability based on property? "In principle the entire workforce has to help carry the risk that is inherent in each entrepreneurial decision"²⁷. But the representatives of the workers on decision-making bodies should be as well qualified for their job as possible. With regard to this point the objection is right and assigns
therefore particular responsibility to modern trade unions. – In this context one should not overlook that most members of the management, responsible for the running of a company, are not its owners themselves. They too are employees – even if employees with high salaries. As a rule, those managers do a good job and show that they are able to carry entrepreneurial responsibility in spite of not being the owners.

Something similar goes for the objection that co-determination endangers the unity of the enterprise management and makes it incapable of acting. But co-determination does not mean a 'parliamentarization' of the company in the sense that every day each individual employee can interfere in entrepreneurial decisions to be made. The running of the company remains the task of the top management. But representatives of the owners and of the workforce should be part of it. The management should get their decision-making "authority from capital and labour together, which both are the constitutive factors of the enterprise, and should consequently be responsible to both"28.

The statement of Vatican Two that "persons, independent human beings, created in the image of God", work in enterprises, shows the crucial reason for co-determination. This fact forbids using the workers only as part of the economic machinery and as an unavoidable cost factor, and is the basis of partnership with equal rights. A company is not only a technical apparatus and capital investment; it is, above all, a social entity, in which human beings are at work. Therefore it is not only the responsibility of the management to make as big a profit as possible for the shareholders; the management has also to care for the interests of the employees (and not least for the common good). Capital and labour together accomplish the achievements of the enterprise. This task demands an enterprise constitution, which bases the top management and their leadership authority "upon both constitutive factors of the enterprise, capital and labour"29.
Conclusion
Co-determination, which understands and treats employees as co-entrepreneurs, made an important contribution to Germany's economic recovery after World War Two as well as to its social standards and social stability to this day. Without worker participation in economic decision-making the deep transformation process of the post-war period would have created enormous social problems. For example, half a century ago more than 600 000 miners had worked in the coal industry of the Ruhr-Region. Today their number is less than 30 000 and is still decreasing. This change in structure massively transformed the entire region. In my view, it is due to the co-determination that the huge change did not cause extreme social tensions. Serious decisions, for example to close coalmines and to replace them by other branches of industry, had to be made by the representatives of capital and labour. These decisions had to take into account the interests of both sides and they had to be made years ahead. Today the region is a centre of recycling and service industries.

Jürgen Schrempp, the former chief executive director of Mercedes Benz, one of the biggest car companies, and not a close friend of trade unions, sings the praises of the German worker participation in economic decision-making: "It slows down the speed with which decisions are taken, but it makes them, at the same time, stronger and more endurable, more sustainable, and it creates an atmosphere of consent and partnership". In this sense Schrempp sees the workers as co-entrepreneurs. So does Heinrich von Pierer, former chief executive director of Siemens, the biggest German company, and "speaks of the advantages of co-determination". The chief executive officer of Deutz, a big tractor company, calls the German "model of social partnership highly helpful". Very few strikes in Germany are a consequence, "peace-dividend of co-determination". A former chief executive director of the supervisory board of Adam Opel AG, a subsidiary company of the US carmaker General Motors, underlines that he "does not know an enterprise that fosters co-determination and is not successful in the marker place". And just recently a senior member of the Federal Constitutional Court, the supreme German court, emphasized that participation of the workforce in economic decision-making is "part of the national culture"; it should,
however, be complemented by "promoting their co-ownership in enterprises"\textsuperscript{34}. The future will show whether co-determination can gain general acceptance in the European Union.

Of course, worker participation in economic decision-making could not and cannot prevent every problem of the country. Take, for example, the problems caused by the costs of Germany's re-unification! Since 1990 about 90 billion EURO per year are transferred from the Western part to the former communist German Democratic Republic to reconstruct its ruined economy. Up to now the sum amounts to € 1 250 billion, and these payments will still be necessary for years. So the wonderful political re-unification showed itself to be a big economic burden. - Then take serious demographic problems caused by the reverse population pyramid! The same number of working people - or even a decreasing number – has to bear the costs for an increasing elderly population. Therefore the government tries their utmost to improve the economic situation of young families in order to have the number of children increased from the present low. – One must not overlook problems caused by the globalization process. Because of high wages, companies transfer factories to Eastern Europe and Asia, where the wage level is lower and the work force is not less well qualified. These facts are some reasons for Germany's unemployment rate, fluctuating between 7 and 11 per cent. But despite these problems, economic and social standards are still remarkable high.

Recently more and more experts and politicians criticize the so-called 'social net' for being too tight-knit. It tempts people, not infrequently, to prefer being unemployed to employed. Unemployment benefit and salaries from jobs on the side can possibly mount up to a higher income than being employed, because legal employment is burdened by all kinds of taxes and social contributions. A rigid, inflexible labour market and many bureaucratic regulations are to be added. The described factors are main causes of Germany's economic problems in recent years. In the meantime the economy, as research institutes say, seems to have gone to rock bottom and to boom again. But that is a different issue.
Looking at the past, worker participation in economic decision-making made a considerable contribution to the reconstruction of German industry in the post-war period and to the present social standards of the country. As an essential part of Social Market Economy, it prevented excessive tensions between management and labour. It created – to quote former Mercedes boss Jürgen Schrempp (once again) – "an atmosphere of consent and partnership" between capital and labour, and it corresponds to the dignity of human beings, who are created in the image of God and enjoy the ability of self-determination. Co-determination has proved to be worthwhile.

Appendix: Co-Ownership of the Employees of the Means of Production - "Investment Wage" ("Investivlohn")

As early as in 1931 the Social Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno had spoken of a co-determination of workers based on co-ownership (see No. 65). In 1949, at the beginning of the reconstruction of Germany's economy after World War Two, the Christian Democratic Union CDU, which was to become the ruling party, demanded to extend the existing schemes of ownership-sharing of workers "to more enterprises and to develop new forms". Members of the Federal Constitutional Court recommend complementing worker co-determination by worker co-ownership of the enterprises; and Horst Köhler, President of the Federal Republic, demands "a more extensive co-ownership of workers". These voices are just a few examples of the ongoing discussion about 'co-ownership'.

The background is the understanding of the right of ownership. When they give reasons for the right of ownership, both Christian Social Teaching and Social Market Economy start from the point that "the goods of the earth are assigned to all humankind" and that, therefore, "every human being must have the chance to share in the use of these goods". This so-called "universal destination of goods", as the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church calls it, is founded on the will of God, the creator, and "is a permanent impulse to check every existing property order again and again, whether it meets this requirement or not".
In this context, the unequal distribution of property - in particular the unequal distribution of ownership of the production means - is an extremely explosive subject. It offends against the primary "universal destination of goods" if only a minority owns them and the majority is excluded. Whatever industry and commerce produce, the growth of economic value, depends on co-operation of capital, management and labour. Therefore the growing economic value should become the property not only of the owners of capital, but should be shared between them and the workers.

Most representatives of Christian Social Teaching and Social Market Economy are convinced that the introduction of "investment wages" is the right and most successful way to let wage-earners share in the means of production. Co-ownership of the means of production can become a reality only if parts of the earned income "are not being consumed but invested in means of production". That part of the gross national product, which consists in means of production, can – according to their nature – become only income of those income earners who are willing to get income in the form of means of production. The growing of the work force into co-ownership of the means of production demands therefore "to let an increasing part of the national income come to the wage-earners so that they invest it"\(^{39}\). With regard to worker co-determination this fact means: **Co-Determination based on Co-Ownership** (of means of production). Proposals recommend shares in companies, wherein the employees work, as well as so-called investment trusts. Investment trusts spread the job and capital risk in case of bankruptcy of an enterprise and are preferable in this respect. On the other hand, shares in the company, wherein the employees work, intensify job motivation and commitment of the employees, because they share success and failure of the enterprise.

In Germany today some two million employees hold shares in their companies. This partnership capital amounts to about 13 billion Euro\(^{40}\). Since 1961 the national parliament has enacted a number of schemes and laws to enable a better sharing of the workers in the means of production. These laws make asset-creating contributions of employers to savings schemes of employees free of tax and social welfare contributions. 'Asset-
creating' means that the respective parts of the wages are invested again (and not consumed). In 1966 the first asset creating wage agreement between trade unions and employers came into force. Later on some more wage agreements followed. But in spite of that, until now the "investment wage" could not get sufficient and general acceptance – because of reasons management and trade unions are responsible for. Employers are afraid that they are no longer the only 'master in the house' of their business, if employees are also co-owners. Trade unions fear that their influence on the workers would weaken, because the new co-owners could become more concerned about the interests of their respective company, which now, to a greater extent, would be also their interests.

More recently the debate on investment wages has started again. A senior member of the Federal Constitutional Court recommends, as above-mentioned, complementing worker co-determination by worker co-ownership of the enterprises\(^41\), and no less a person than Federal President Horst Köhler demands "a more extensive co-ownership of workers"\(^42\). At the moment the two ruling parties, the Christian Democratic Union CDU and the Social Democratic Party SPD develop new schemes of co-ownership. A main reason for that is the fact that for years capital income has been considerably more increasing than earned income and wages. All over the world demand for capital is much higher than demand for work, which can be met by an immense reservoir of millions, who are unemployed. The globalization process massively intensifies this trend. So the gap between capital income and wages becomes bigger and bigger. The medium-left wing Social Democrats propose one nationwide fund "Deutschlandfonds", in which the employees are supposed to invest parts of their wages and hold shares. The medium-right wing Christian Democrats favour the promotion of existing investment trusts. To combine both proposals, economists recommend "investment trusts aligned with industrial branches". By investing in their respective branches these investment funds "would stimulate the interest of the employees in the enterprises wherein they work" and, at the same time, "spread and minimize the capital risk"\(^43\) in case of bankruptcy of enterprises. The future will disclose whether this new debate on investment wages and the current efforts of the political parties have been successful or not.
This article was submitted and accepted for publication in 2007 but since the 2007 issue of St Augustine papers was delayed, the author added some references and comments related to events in 2008.

NOTES
1 Friedrich Engels (1868), Das Kapital von Marx, in: Herbert Pönicke (without year), Die sozialen Theorien im 19. Jahrhundert in Deutschland, Paderborn, 33
2 Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler (1864), Die Arbeiterfrage und das Christentum, in: Texte zur katholischen Soziallehre II (1976), edited by the Bundesverband der Katholischen Arbeitnehmer-Bewegung (KAB) Deutschlands, Kevelaer, 116-217, 125, 127
5 Franz von Baader (1835), Über das dermalige Missverhältnis der Vermögenslosen oder Proletairs zu den Vermögen besitzenden Klassen der Sozietät in Betreff ihres Auskommens, sowohl in materieller wie in intellektueller Hinsicht, aus dem Standpunkt des Rechts betrachtet, in: Texte zur katholischen Soziallehre II, 43-53,47-49 (see note 2)
6 Ketteler, Die Arbeiterfrage, 202 (see note 2)
7 Arbeiterwohl (1881), Vol.1, 101
8 Max Seering (1890), Arbeiter-Ausschüsse in der deutschen Industrie. Gutachten, Berichte, Statuten, Leipzig, 2
9 Matthias Erzberger (1921), Christlicher Solidarismus als Welprinzip, M.Gladbach, 26
13 Müller-Armack, Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 391 (see note 10)
It seems also reasonable that the Encyclical regards "sharers in the management" and co-determination as possible without co-ownership: the one side invests the capital, the other side does the work; both sides manage and determine the enterprise together. In this way Oswald von Nell-Breuning commented on the issue (see Liederick de Witte (1964), Kirche - Kapital - Arbeit, Limburg, 142-143). On behalf of his order, Jesuit Father von Nell-Breuning, doyen of Christian Social Teaching, had worked out the draft. The text of the Encyclical itself is not quite clear. I prefer the first interpretation.

Oswald von Nell-Breuning (1969), Mitbestimmung - wer mit wem? Freiburg, 179-180


Oswald von Nell-Breuning (1968), Heisse Eisen in der Gesellschaftspolitik, in: Echo der Zeit, no. 31, 1 August


Eduard Gaugler (1968), Die Auswirkungen der Mitbestimmung auf die unternehmerischen Entscheidungen, in: Anton Rauscher (Ed.), Mitbestimmung, Köln, 80-112, 95

von Nell-Breuning, Mitbestimmung, 67 (see note 18)

Ibidem, 179-180 (see note 18)

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