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**OTHER VOICES**

Citation of Br Jude Pieterse and Mr Paddy Kearney

*Douglas Irvine*

About St Augustine College of South Africa

Call for Papers

Author Guideline
To Heidi Pasques (1963–2017),

a lover of peace and social justice
and a distinguished graduate of St Augustine College

*** Heidi Pasques on the right
EDITOR’S NOTE

The five peer-reviewed articles included in this volume (by Tanya Graham, Gerald A. Moore, Wilna J. Wardle, Heidi Pasques and Robert Matikiti), alongside the five book reviews and the citation, cover the two issues for the year 2017. The authors who contributed to Vol. 18 of *St Augustine Papers* responded to the call for papers in which we invited academics representing various disciplines of knowledge to comment on global issues.

Graham sets the scene for reflections on what affects us as a world community as she aptly navigates between the global and the local, as well as the historical and the contemporary, aspects of knowledge production. Her discussion on the implications of South Africa’s position in relation to a global knowledge-based economy for academic publications is a pointed example of how contextually-rooted academic voices may contribute to uncovering the global perpetuation of social injustice.

As he examines the challenges and opportunities for the UN-Mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar, Moore observes that the crisis of UN legitimacy in Myanmar and elsewhere has provoked the need for reflexivity within the UN system itself. In the light of this problem, which the UN can ill-afford to ignore, the impending mission appears as a “potentially transformative interlocutor” in the much needed debate about UN role and legitimacy.

Wardle’s article offers an interpretation of non-violent conflict management/transformation as a *way of life*, whereby a global paradigm shift is required on every level of society in order for peace to be sought universally as a sine qua non condition of a state of individual and collective wellness and wholeness. In the second part of the article, which looks at case studies, the primary focus is on Gulalai Ismail of Pakistan and the transformation from violent jihad to non-violent peace-building. Brief accounts of non-violent conflict transformation in Kenya and the policing crisis in the USA, complement the discussion.
With the article authored by Pasques, the focus shifts to our own, South African context. Using Social Identity Theory as a theoretical framework, she probes the role of violence in the construction of ethnic-social identity, focusing on the case of South African War (1889-1902) and its impact on post-war Afrikaner identity. Pasques asserts that the reconstruction of a very narrow ethnic social identity by the Afrikaners can be accounted for by their own experience of structural violence which resulted in the group’s attempt to restore its independence, address its inferior position (vis-à-vis the English), create pride in its history and language and, most importantly, ensure their ethnic survival in the midst of what was considered as a hostile indigenous population. The post-war Afrikaner identity marked by such a “ghetto mentality” has become, as the author argues, one of the contributing factors that led to the structural violence inflicted on Black South Africans during apartheid.

I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that this volume is dedicated to the memory of Heidi Pasques who was a lover of peace and social justice and a distinguished graduate of St Augustine College, and whose tragic death in 2017 deeply saddened all of us who had known her. As the author was unable to complete the minor revisions of her article suggested by the reviewer, this has been done by the editor of the volume. I am delighted that her work could be published in our Journal as a small reflection of her lasting legacy.

The final contribution takes us to the current times and focuses on the recent events that took place across the border. Matikiti seeks to answer the question whether Calvinist churches approved of the Zimbabwean coup d’état? He maintains that despite Calvin’s general insistence on the obedience due to civil authority (in the light of the divine origins of the state’s power), he provided a loophole for active resistance to the most tyrannical political authorities, including a violent revolution. Thus Calvinist churches in Zimbabwe – the author argues – could utilise the exceptions provided by Calvin to justify and support the removal of Mugabe, a “wicked ruler,” from power.

The peer-reviewed articles are followed by five book reviews. All the books discussed in this section deal, in one way or another, with issues relevant to the
global-local dynamics of contemporary culture(s): international reconciliation, whiteness, globalisation and sustainable development, the legacy of the missionary movement, as well as the resistance to exploitation and discrimination at the hands of the “global empire.”

This volume also introduces a new section which will become a permanent feature of *St Augustine Papers*. “Other voices” will be a space dedicated to non-academic perspectives, views, comments and reflections on the questions that are of relevance, particularly, to the South African readership. Each volume will include one such voice, carefully selected by the editorial committee and related to its general theme. These texts will not require peer-review and may differ in format from academic articles (op-eds, essays, reports, stories, poetry, and the like are welcome), but they must be no longer than 5000 words. There will not be a separate call for papers for this section: potential authors are welcome to send their proposals to the editor at any time at j.urbaniak@staugustine.ac.za. Our hope is that this new addition to the Journal will contribute to deepening its contextual grounding, enriching its diversity and thus further increasing its appeal.

The “Other voices” section is inaugurated in this volume with the citation on Br Jude Pieterse and Mr Paddy Kearney, which was delivered by Professor Douglas Irvine at the Graduation Ceremony at St Augustine College on 5th May 2017. I hope that our readers will find the story of these two exceptional men both inspiring and thought-provoking. Their ethos and spirituality are rooted in Marist tradition and each, in his unique way, has contributed to the fostering of social justice and the common good in South Africa during the last few decades.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

PROF TANYA GRAHAM is a counselling psychologist and an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand. She is primarily involved in the professional training of psychologists in community and therapeutic practice, and also lectures in research methods. Her research interests lie in the field of community psychology and public health, and the psychosocial support and advocacy needs of marginalised communities. She has published in the areas of community psychology theory, practice, training and knowledge production; as well as the psychosocial and developmental issues affecting children and youth in post-apartheid South Africa.

GERALD A. MOORE is a student at the University of Cape Town (UCT). He completed his BA Honours in Peace Studies at St Augustine College of South Africa in 2016. His Honours research project addresses the challenges and opportunities for a legitimate truth commission to promote reconciliation in South Sudan. In 2017, he started a Master’s of Philosophy in Justice and Transformation at the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town. His mini-dissertation hone in on the political dimension of human rights fact-finding in the context of Myanmar / Burma. Gerald’s research interests include transitional justice, human rights and peacebuilding.

WILNA J. WARDLE is a Clinical Neuropsychologist in private practice in Pretoria, with 20 years of experience in the field of psychotherapy and neuropsychological assessment and treatment. She holds a BA (Psychology
and Criminology) and a BA Honours and MA (Psychology) from the University of South Africa as well as a BA Honours in Peace Studies from St Augustine College. Her interests and fields of expertise include trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder; abuse (psychological, spiritual, physical); conflict management and mediation; overcoming adversity and living with chronic conditions; human and social development and wellness, with particular interest in peaceful, non-violent approaches.

HEIDI PASQUES (†2017) was a co-CEO and Board Vice-Chair of Jewels of Hope, an organisation that originated in 2004 as a support group to eleven children from child-headed households who made jewellery to support themselves. In the context of an increasing orphan crisis due to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, with thousands of parentless children facing desperate life situations every day, the model has been extended over the years, through partnerships (mainly with Christian churches and organisations), to other locations in Southern Africa. Deeply committed to making a meaningful contribution to social transformation in the region, Heidi kept investing in her own education and improving her inter-cultural skills in the diverse South African society. This passion led her to enrol in a two-year BA Honours programme in Peace Studies at St Augustine College in 2014. When her life tragically ended in September 2017, she was also busy working on her Master thesis at the University of the Witwatersrand. She believed that all people, regardless of their culture or ethnicity, are deeply connected in their humanity. This awareness of togetherness and mutual responsibility, which Heidi lived out through her various social engagements as well as her own studies and research, will remain her most lasting legacy.

DR ROBERT MATIKITI is a lecturer in Systematic Theology at Christ College of Zimbabwe. He previously taught Political Theology and African Theology at Masvingo State University and University of Zimbabwe for many years. He is the author of a number of articles and two books, recently published, namely Christian Faith and Cultural Justice as well as Theology and Violence: Church at Devil’s Throne in Zimbabwe (both published by LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing in 2017).
Historical and Contemporary Debates in Knowledge Production: Considerations for the Intellectual Role

TANYA GRAHAM

ABSTRACT

In an age of rapid globalisation, burgeoning information technology and the birth of a knowledge economy, the exploration of the dynamics of knowledge production on a global scale, is a pressing imperative. This article examines historical and contemporary debates in knowledge production globally and in South Africa. The article (a) situates a theoretical discussion of current global issues in knowledge production related to publishing journal articles; (b) considers the different theoretical positions on the role of the intellectual in relation to class structure and (c) applies a critical-emancipatory perspective to understanding the nature of power and knowledge in the academic sphere. Specifically, the contributions of theorists such as Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are considered. The article discusses the implications of South Africa’s position in relation to a global knowledge-based economy for academic publications, and argues that the study of knowledge production is an important arena for uncovering the global perpetuation of social injustice.

INTRODUCTION

Does it matter what we write as academics? What influences what and how we write? And what role does academic writing play in contemporary society? In recent years, critical social theory has increasingly cast its gaze
on investigating the types of knowledge being produced on a global scale, the processes of producing and consuming knowledge, and the functions that this knowledge serves in different societies. Knowledge production is significantly affected by the global knowledge economy and the rapidly developing age of information. In turn, this has influenced a range of social institutions, which have traditionally been responsible for scientific knowledge production, including the academy. The burgeoning global knowledge economy, situated alongside widespread social discontent and economic upheaval, creates unique conditions for critical reflection on processes of knowledge production in academia. This is particularly important in light of the unequal economic and political power of different regions, and the implications thereof (Moahi 2007:1).

This article explores knowledge production from a critical-emancipatory theoretical lens in order to stimulate critical reflection on academic knowledge making practices. This perspective is especially relevant in countries like South Africa that have long-standing histories of colonialism and oppression. Of particular interest is the identification of patterns of power, dominance and marginalisation in knowledge production, within and across different contexts, highlighting global and local issues, within and beyond South Africa. As such, the notions of social power embedded within knowledge production and power asymmetry are paramount to this focus. Here, this positioning of knowledge production in South Africa against an international backdrop of scholarship is necessary to highlight global manifestations of dominance and marginality.

The article holds that the study of published work is a crucial source for uncovering a variety of tensions and inequalities that emerge from the social-political, institutional, and disciplinary context in which this knowledge is produced. The article specifically engages with academic journal articles as a knowledge product related to the global distribution of power. The power relations that are manifested in publications convey the dominant ideologies of the prevailing social order, including those that uphold the interests of global capital in a knowledge economy, the ideals
of advanced post-industrial democracy, the objectives and methods of the scientific enterprise, and the legitimation of structures of oppression. Journals represent a forum for reflecting on scholarship in a field and stimulating the further production of knowledge. As key outputs of a knowledge economy, journals provide a forum where the politics of knowledge production are played out.

The article begins by situating a discussion of the social role of the intellectual enterprise in relation to the prevailing socio-economic order. It elaborates briefly on theoretical contributions by Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Mannheim, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and others, to our understandings of the intellectual role and academic knowledge production. It moves on to provide an exposition of contemporary debates related to the global knowledge economy and the changes in the way in which knowledge is being produced, and situates South Africa within this context.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND THE INTELLECTUAL ROLE

There are varied historical traditions in the conceptualisation of the role of the intellectual and the function of knowledge in relation to society. Theoretical perspectives about the role of intellectuals in societies can be grouped within three traditions – as: “class-bound,” “class-less,” and a “class-in-themselves” (Kurzman & Owens 2002:63).

The Class-bound Perspective

In classical Marxist theory, social relations are quintessentially defined by social class positions and each group’s relationship to the means of production (Hodges 1963:49). However, placing the intelligentsia within the classical Marxist understanding of the class structure has been a notoriously problematic issue due to the contradictory description of the intelligentsia in Marx’s accounts (Hodges 1963:49-50). Intellectuals are a
complex group for Marxists to theorise: They sell their labour like the “proletariat” class, and they may be similarly exploited in a capitalist economy; but they also resemble the “bourgeoisie” due to their higher social status and income (Hodges 1963:49-50). Classical Marxism distinguishes the intelligentsia from the proletariat as part of the ideological class that serves the interests of the bourgeoisie. However, contemporary Marxist thought suggests that even if intellectuals initially fall within the social class of the bourgeoisie, they will ultimately become subsumed into the proletariat with the gradual advancement of capitalism (Brym 2015:278).

Antonio Gramsci elaborated on the social position and function of the intellectual as being class-bound (Kurzman & Owens 2002:66). Gramsci (1971:135) held that their class or group of origin binds the intellectual, and that each social class produces its own subset of intellectuals. Gramsci (1971:135) distinguishes between the “traditional” and the “organic” intellectuals. The traditional intellectual is a functionary that preserves the status quo through the production of conservative intellectual knowledge, which ultimately acts as a barrier to progressive social transformation (Gramsci 1971:143). Thus, Gramsci (1971:136-37) argues that intellectual work is a cultural product evident across time that offers equally valuable insight into the state of economic production as the labour practices of the working classes. Gramsci (1971:134-35) contrasts these traditional intellectuals with organic intellectuals, which grow organically from within each social group. Organic intellectuals that are part of the ruling class are most responsible for preserving the political interests of the dominant hegemonic order. However, organic intellectuals may also emerge from the subordinate classes, where they fulfil an intellectual function within popular grassroots organisations and activist groups (Gramsci 1971:147).

In attempting to remedy the neglect of understanding the relationship between social movements and science, other scholars have added to this conceptualisation of intellectuals within a class-bound tradition. Similarly, Eyerman and Jamieson (1991:98-9) differentiate between “established”
and “movement” intellectuals. The latter are associated with social movements and the generation of new knowledge through the mechanisms of “cognitive praxis” (Eyerman & Jamieson 1991:55). Here, cognitive praxis is used to conceptualise the forms of knowledge creation that occur within the context of some social movements (Jamieson 2006:47). Though not a role in all social movements, the movement intellectual has a discernible identity as initiators in processes of knowledge “hybridisation,” which result in new forms of disciplines and practices (Jamieson 2006:47). Barker and Cox (2002:1) combine the influences of these scholars by referring to them as “academic” and “movement” intellectuals. They argue that these distinctions hold relevance for understanding their guiding goals and tasks, the groups they are accountable to and accredited by, and the types of knowledge they produce (Barker & Cox 2002:2).

Barker and Cox (2002:2) maintain that traditional academic intellectuals produce static, explanatory research that is validated by the academy, whereas movement intellectuals produce dynamic knowledge that inspires and is validated by social movements. In this line, Eyerman and Jamieson (1991:56), argue that social movements arise at specific historical junctures, and if this occurs in the midst of an auspicious set of social and political conditions, it may generate the potential for new knowledge that could disrupt traditional forms of knowledge. Thus, movement intellectuals play a key role in the communication and embodiment of particular ideas in the convergence of political opportunities and social problems. Whilst this view of the importance of intellectuals within a class-bound framework has been significant to the evolution of social theory, critiques of this approach to understanding the intellectual role centre on its neglect of the ideological heterogeneity among intellectuals (Brym 2015:278). This raises the possibility of there being different types of intellectuals in a specific discipline that are aligned to different ideological agendas.
The Class-less Perspective

Theorists such as Karl Mannheim maintained that intellectuals are essentially detached from a class position (Kurzman & Owens 2002:67). Mannheim’s work upheld the view that the intellectual’s capacity for agency and self-reflexivity serves as the means through which they were able to transcend their class (Tamdgidi 2002:123), and that they were therefore fundamentally “class-less” (Brym 2015:278; Kurzman & Owens 2002:67). While, Mannheim did not view intellectuals themselves as bound to a class structure but held that their shared education served to suppress the influence of class (Brym 2015:278). Mannheim’s theory distinguished between intellectual thought that is “ideological” (supportive of the bourgeoisie or politically conservative) and intellectual thought that is “socially utopian” (such as the socialist, communist or liberal-humanitarian traditions) (Tamdgidi 2002:123). Mannheim believed intellectuals had the capacity to understand opposing social positions and hence view the social and political order in its totality (Kurzman & Owens 2002:67).

The Class-in-Themselves Perspective

A third approach attempts to reconcile the problems of class-bound and class-less approaches (Brym 2015:279). In this approach, the intellectual is autonomous and serves a role in elaborating on the symbolic system of all social groups, rather than themselves being representatives of social groups, and includes the work of Pierre Bourdieu (Kurzman & Owens 2002:68). For Bourdieu (1986:15), the social world is structured into unique constellations of dominant and dominated classes in specific fields according to the distribution of different forms of capital. Dominant classes are those that hold capital, but are polarised between those with economic and those with cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986:16). The tension between economic and cultural forms of capital within the dominant class is particularly evident in universities. In contrast to many other social spheres, academia relies predominantly on the use of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986:17). Bourdieu (1990:145) describes intellectuals as constituting “a dominated fraction of the
dominant class,” due to their relative distance from economic power, and use of cultural capital over economic capital. Bourdieu viewed intellectuals as a self-preoccupied class, with idiosyncratic interests (Kurzman & Owens 2002:78). Despite this, the intellectual could still fulfil a role in social transformation through the activities of public engagement (Wacquant 2006:28). For example, the public intellectual role could be adopted through activities such as public lectures available through the internet, social commentary in the media and television / radio broadcast and podcasts. For Bourdieu, the intellectual’s existence attests to the autonomy of the intellectual field from the economic sphere, yet also positions the intellectual as dedicated to serving collective, public interests (Wacquant 2006:28).

Highlighting the contested nature of the conceptualisation of the role of intellectuals in critical theory, Kurzman and Owens (2002:81) suggest that intellectuals inhabit a site of tension between the ideological positions of elitism and egalitarianism. These authors believe that the materiality in which intellectual life is rooted may be foregrounded through comparative empirical research across geographical and temporal contexts (Kurzman & Owens 2002:81). These insights suggest the value of an analysis of published work within a specific discipline, and especially interrogating the patterns of knowledge production and the ways in which power imbalances and social inequalities can be detected in knowledge production. However, it also raises the question of the extent to which publications uphold the values and views of the dominant classes, exclude other forms of knowledge, and the extent to which it has the potential to support a social transformation agenda. In addition, understanding the contested role of the intellectual foregrounds the importance of including a contextually and temporally comparative dimension to the study of published work, and its relevance to the understanding of knowledge production more widely. In this line, Kurzman and Owens (2002:82) maintain the importance not only of studying notions of what intellectuals should be, but of studying intellectual practice as well. This is where an investigation of academic practice within the domain of knowledge production becomes especially significant.
The Academic Field

Bourdieu (1990:157) sought to describe the properties and hierarchical structures of the intellectual field broadly as a social entity that functions in a relatively autonomous manner. Within this domain, Bourdieu identifies the intellectual field as comprised of sub-fields, among which is the academic field (Bourdieu (1990:157-59; Wacquant 2006:227). In Bourdieu’s theory social actions arise from the interrelationship between the academic habitus and the academic field – concepts which represent his reformulation of dualisms such as agency and structural determinism, objectivity and subjectivity, as being inseparable and dialectical (Wacquant 2006:21). The habitus are the largely unconscious mental structures of social phenomena that exist internally in social agents within a particular social arena. They represent the shared generative dispositions of possibilities and constraints that exist within actors in a social space (Wacquant 2006:23-4). The mental structures of the habitus are both conditioned by the social structures of the past and made malleable by exposure to changing social conditions (Wacquant 2006:21). The social structure of a particular field is reproduced in the convergence of the internalised possibilities and constraints of the habitus and the external possibilities and constraints in a field; and likewise contested when there are ruptures between the habitus and field (Wacquant 2006:24).

Bourdieu further maintained that individuals within each field develop their own doxa – an unquestioned set of commonly held beliefs and opinions that would serve to unite them and would also direct their practices (Wacquant 2006:24). The doxa are the assumptions held about a field, its values and principles, and its views about the social world. However, the forms of scholarly knowledge are also located with the academic field, which itself has its own structure and forms of practice.

Bourdieu’s (1988:13) conception of the academic field denotes the rivalries that exist between counterparts in the same arena who all engage in a common search for the truth about the social world. Like all fields, the academic field for Bourdieu (1988:11), is “the locus of a struggle to
determine the conditions and criteria of legitimate membership and legitimate hierarchy.” This perspective suggests that the mechanisms of policing in the academic field are constituted by the endorsed criteria for establishing academic credentials, recognition and progression, as well as the nature of academic work. This would manifest in the approval and disapproval of specific types of theory development and research, and the use of publication as a route to gain academic status and credentials, rather than as a vehicle to serve community interests. For Bourdieu (1986:16; 1988:36) the primary form of capital at play in the academic field is cultural capital. In academia, the individuals are constituted into groups by different criteria, and they compete for cultural capital. Thus, the opposing principles of competition and collusion co-exist within this field. If scholars invest in and abide by the established criteria for academic credentials and the sanctioned order of progression and succession serves to increase their potential gain of an institutionalised form of cultural capital within this field which represents “the struggle of each against all” (Bourdieu 1988:87). The exercise of academic power requires the exploitation of the opportunities offered by the field, in ways that show investment in the game, credence to more advanced players, but also function by limiting the pool of potential competitors (Bourdieu 1988:98). The accumulation of cultural capital within the academe requires the expenditure of one’s own time in various academic activities, which means that age becomes an important signifier of the academic order and of academic authority. Bourdieu (1988:98) therefore refers to this field as having power relations that function within a “time-economy,” whereby academics gain power and accumulate cultural capital by investing their time through the production of intellectual instruments like books or lectures, or participating in political forms of public engagement that reinforce this order.

Bourdieu’s concept of field is a structured space of positions that comprise a “force field” and a “field of struggles” aimed at maintaining power relations (Bourdieu 1990:143). Thus, the academic field also is a site where social agents and institutions seek to maintain or challenge the
hierarchical distribution of cultural capital (Wacquant 2006:223). In the scientific intellectual arena, this cultural capital is manifested through the ranking of institutions, disciplines, theories, methods, topics and journals. This perpetual struggle for dominance culminates in fields having a mutable and temporal quality. Thus, “all fields are historical constellations that arise, grow, change shape, and sometimes wane or perish, over time” (Wacquant 2006:223). Each discipline within a field operates according to its own logic, within which each sub-field is nested. Here, it is worthwhile to consider how each discipline as a historical constellation of theories, methods and topics is represented in the scientifically endorsed articles that appear in journals as currency that is subject to the power relations, both housed within a particular discipline, and in the academic field. Each publication represents a site for potential symbolic domination by the intellectual classes within the intellectual field.

**Disciplinary Knowledge and Power**

Also relevant to the conceptualisation of knowledge production are considerations about how power operates in academic disciplines and how disciplines are constituted through knowledge. Disciplines are bodies of knowledge demarcated by subject matter, intellectual traditions and methods (Repko 2012:4). While there has traditionally been a significant amount of dispute and contestation about the preferred theories and methods between disciplines of social enquiry, more recently, there has been a substantially greater focus on interdisciplinarity (Repko 2012:ix). Thus, these contemporary shifts have been noted as ways of maintaining the boundaries of disciplines, but also in destabilising the disciplines and allowing inter-disciplinary knowledge to emerge.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977:80) maintains that disciplinary power is captured in the emergence of the disciplines as the regimes created through the regulation of human bodies and behaviours. Foucault (1982:793) views power as a productive network that permeates throughout the entire social formation, including the structure of academia, in this case.
Disciplinary power operates through “homogenous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way,” and manufactures both the mechanisms for its perpetuation and the mechanisms of resistance (Foucault 1977:80). Foucault’s (1982:752) coupling of power / knowledge illustrates that knowledge is part of the mechanism of power relations: “the exercise of power creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information…the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.” This is relevant if one considers how power is constituted within disciplinary boundaries and how these boundaries are contested.

For Foucault (1982:791), institutions, laws and ideologies based in a particular context are the structures or mechanisms through which power is exercised (Foucault 1982:791). It is therefore crucial to consider contextual dimensions of knowledge production in each discipline. Constructing a “history of the present” is simply the excavation of a battleground of power relations, and to this end Foucault privileged the question “What are we today?” (Foucault 1988 quoted in May & Powell 2008:200). And this question implies that we need to consider the current state of disciplines through their representation in knowledge production. Thus, this article argues for the importance of grappling with aspects of this question through examining what the status of discipline is today in terms of its preferred topics, theories and methods. Foucault’s analysis of how power operates fundamentally challenges the traditional Marxist notion of power as a commodity and rather describes “an endlessly repeated play of domination” (Hindess 1998:60). An objective reality for Foucault was non-existent, and the use of any method of analysis is simply one reading of reality that is made possible by the relations of power it evokes (Foucault 1982:795). This assertion is relevant to the current debates about knowledge production as it invokes the importance of subjectivity in research. However, Foucault’s views of power are somewhat contentious in terms of their implications for disciplines that are more socially orientated. These critiques are of vital importance in a country such as South Africa in which social justice-oriented work is
critical. However, Foucault does suggest that it may be a worthwhile pursuit to strive for the absence of any forms of domination (Hindess 1998:53). In the pursuit of this ideal, power relations are present but in the absence of domination, these power relations are unstable and reversible (Hindess 1998:60-1). This suggests that wherever entrenched forms of knowledge are present, there are power imbalances and hence, social injustice. This relates to current debates about the need for the decolonisation of knowledge at academic institutions in South Africa.

**The Author Function**

Authorship and its role are important considerations in the realm of knowledge production. Foucault (1986:101) contends that an author of a text can be distinguished from its writer – a distinction that is brought to bear by the existence of a set of discourses that are endowed in an “author function.” The author function is linked to an “institutional system that encompasses, determines, and articulates the universe of discourses” that exist within writing (Foucault 1986:113). It does not refer purely to an individual, but gives rise to a set of positions that may be adopted by different types of individuals (Foucault 1986:113). Thus, the production of a set of discourses in textual, authored form is an act of power that draws on multiple power relations from an institutional and social context. The author function is a principle of presenting “a certain unity in writing” in which incompatible elements are tied together and resolved within an order that disguises their contradictory aspects (Foucault 1986:111). Such authors are termed the “founders of discursivity,” and they produce more than a specific text, but create a theory, tradition or discipline, which extend beyond the text (Foucault 1986:114). Foucault (1986:114) argues that these authors were unique in that they produced the possibilities and the rules for the formation and divergences of other texts. The author function is critical in the generation of acceptable forms of knowledge. Thus, each field has its founding discursive authors that prescribe both the dominant concepts, as well as the ways in which these concepts may be
resisted. The author function manifests in the dominant epistemological frameworks, some of which still refer to their discursive founders, while others simply adopt the central tenets of approaches endorsed by these founders. The author function is one mechanism in which the boundaries of a discipline are created and maintained over time. Thus, Foucault draws our attention to the role of the author function as a means of establishing the continuity of trajectories of published work.

**Reflexivity and Knowledge**

Bourdieu (1988:xi), describes the academic as “the supreme classifier of classifiers,” and his/her endeavour to study the mechanisms of academia represents an attempt to “trap [the academic] in the net of his own classifications.” This suggests that the academic study of academia immediately creates and imposes its own limits in its conceptualisation of the social world. However, it is also Bourdieu’s contention that social science can be used to resolve the self-same problem that it itself has generated. For this reason, reflexivity is a necessary part of empirical work (Wacquant 2006:11). Thus, Bourdieu therefore theorised about the possibility of an “activist science” that considered the intersection of social positions related to power, class, gender, ethnicity, nationality and culture (Wacquant 2006:215). Contrary to the claims in both positivist and critical theory that the assumptions of these approaches are irreconcilable, Bourdieu maintained that the scientific and social engagement endeavours of the scientist were not antithetical but complementary; the former is the necessary condition for the latter (Wacquant 2006:13). Moreover, Bourdieu (2004:4) argued “Casting an ironic gaze on the social world, a gaze which unveils, unmasks, brings to light what it hidden, it cannot avoid casting this gaze on itself.” However, Bourdieu (2004:4) argues that reflexivity should not simply turn itself to the scholar as an object to discredit this knowledge, but rather serve to do so in order “to check and strengthen it.” This work supports the notion of using science for the purposes of maintaining an agenda of critical engagement and social
change. Bourdieu (2004:94) holds that this reflexivity in scholarly work should extend beyond reflection on the identity attributes of the academic to include the reflexive analysis about the location of the scholar within the intellectual field, the concepts and methods of the particular area of study, and the wider scholastic universe. Bourdieu’s idea about the role of reflexivity and knowledge production relates to the wider social importance and function of the intellectual role.

CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

The Knowledge Economy

This article now turns to a closer investigation of the contemporary local and global context of knowledge production. Against the backdrop of substantial global and local change, contemporary knowledge production in South Africa is intricately tied to the continued growth and more prominent global presence of a knowledge economy. Over the past few decades, knowledge innovation and technological change have become the primary global indicators of progress and wealth in leading economies (Blankley & Booyens 2010:1). The term “knowledge-based economy” (KBE) was coined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1996:3). The KBE, also termed the “knowledge economy,” refers to the overall economic structure that is emerging globally (Houghton & Sheehan 2000:2), in which complex sequences that link the processes of knowledge generation, knowledge production, and knowledge circulation are evident (Houghton & Sheehan 2000:14). Within a knowledge economy, a country’s system of science is viewed as being of greater significance within the economic structure as the core propeller of its growth (OECD 1996:21). In the science system of a knowledge economy, knowledge products, like journal articles, literally manifest a form of economic investment and currency. Knowledge is therefore the primary resource of a knowledge economy (Houghton & Sheehan 2000:1), and is the key force that is driving economic growth (OECD 1996:3). While the use of knowledge is a fundamental component of all economies
(OECD 1996:9), the tremendous growth in knowledge intensity along with the globalisation of economic systems has amplified the economic value of knowledge in a knowledge economy (Houghton & Sheehan 2000:1). For Leydesdorff (2012:1), the notion of a knowledge economy is a highly popular concept, but knowledge has always been a crucial part of social formations across historical periods. Moreover, it is problematic to place something as mutable as knowledge at the heart of an economy (Leydesdorff 2012:1-2). Notwithstanding such debates, in the knowledge economy, the science system of a country, which primarily operates through universities and government funded research institutions, is required to balance its roles of knowledge production (in the form of research) and knowledge transmission (in the form of education and training), as well as manage the transfer of knowledge to the economic and social domains, where this knowledge may be utilised and exploited (OECD 1996:25). Some scholars have argued that the knowledge economy does not represent a change in the value of knowledge within society, but rather as a shift in forms of knowledge codification (Leydesdorff 2012:2).

**Knowledge Economy Pillars and Indicators**

The World Bank Institute’s Knowledge for Development Programme has developed a four-pillar framework that represents the critical requisites for participation in this global system (Chen & Dahlman 2006:5; World Bank 2017:1). These are: 1) *Education and training*, which refers to the need to establish a skilled and educated population to create knowledge; 2) *Information infrastructure*, which refers to communication infrastructure, such as radio and internet technologies; 3) *An economic incentive & institutional regime*, which relates to whether the economic environment is conducive to entrepreneurship and information exchange; and 4) *An effective innovation system*, which includes a network of research institutes that can tap into and translate global knowledge for local conditions (Chen & Dahlman 2006:5; World Bank 2017:1).
Several measures for the growth of a knowledge economy have been established in the form of Knowledge Economy Indicators (KEIs). Patents and publications are some of the scientific and technological indicators used to quantify the outputs of research and development innovation (Blankley & Booyens 2010:1). Publications in scientific journals are the KEIs used to represent the outputs of academic research and measure the rate and potency of knowledge production (Department of Science and Technology [DST] 2008:29). In this system, journals are defined as “peer-reviewed periodical publications devoted to disseminating original research and new developments within specific disciplines, sub-disciplines or field of study” (Academy of Science of South Africa [ASSAF] 2010:7). In addition to journal publications, other types of indicators have also become crucial in the knowledge economy. For instance, journal article citations are frequently used as proxies of the utility and dissemination of knowledge, as are measures of the rate of accessing publications. Postgraduate qualification, and in particular, the rate of PhD completion, is one of the pivotal markers used to benchmark growth in world-class research expertise (DST 2008:28-29). Such indicators represent some of the human capital measures that are used to establish the rate of return on investments in education and training, and the production of knowledge workers (OECD 1996:11).

**The Triple Helix Model**

Within the context of a burgeoning k-economy, significant changes are afoot regarding the institutional role of the university, the ways in which scientific knowledge is produced, and its societal function (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000:109). At the institutional level, some scholars have argued that an alliance has emerged between the university, industry and the bureaucracy, which has called the traditional role of the university into question (Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhardt, & Terra 2000:313-14). This new set of relationships between the university, industry and government, referred to as the “triple helix” (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000:109), have been brought about by complex structural shifts in the economies of
industrialised countries within the post-industrial era. Using the triple helix model of university-industry-government relations, the functions of a knowledge economy are translated into the generation of economic wealth, knowledge-innovation, and social and political control (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000:110).

These developments have led to fundamental changes in its role referred to as “Mode 2” (Gibbons et al. 1994; Scott 1995). Gibbons et al. (1994) and Scott (1995) earmarked the occurrence of a shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2 knowledge production set against the backdrop of changes in the international political and economic landscape and their effects on the spheres of education and training (quoted in Kraak 2001:10). Gibbons et al. (1994) and Scott (1995) contended that the social forces of globalisation and democratisation underpinned the shift to Mode 2 knowledge production, and altered the structure and function of academic institutions (quoted in Kraak 2001:10). Academic institutions have become less insular and this has opened up a new mode of knowledge production premised on transdisciplinary problem-solving (Kraak 2001:9).

**Mode 1 and Mode 2 Knowledge Production**

Within Gibbons et al.’s (1994) thesis, Mode 1 knowledge production is defined as knowledge produced within traditional, hierarchically organised scientific disciplines in an academic institution (quoted in Kraak 2001:19). In this system, the academic leadership function as a custodian of academic rule that regulates advances in both academic knowledge and academic standing. The diffusion of knowledge through academic journals often involves the culmination of an intricate process of selecting editors, associate editors, consulting editors and reviewers, the formation of committees, and the generation of editorial and manuscript review criteria, as stages which govern the solicitation, scrutiny, endorsement and selection of knowledge (Eichorn & van den Bos 1985:1309). Within Mode 1, research at universities and government laboratories are the primary producers of new knowledge (OECD 1996:22).
In contrast, Mode 2 knowledge production is non-hierarchical, heterogeneous and emerges from practice, not within academia. It is trans-disciplinary and problem-solving and application oriented (Kraak 2001:9). The boundaries of disciplines in Mode 2 knowledge production are permeable, and permit the formation of hybrid knowledge structures (Kraak 2001:13). This type of knowledge production therefore includes the participatory collaboration of diverse actors in addressing specific localised problems. Mode 2 knowledge production is more responsive and attuned to the realities of society and the practical needs of the economy (Kraak 2001:9). It also permits the participation of a more diverse student constituency in higher education, including groups marginalised by race, class and gender (Kraak 2001:15).

Whilst changes in knowledge production are afoot, the precise contours of these changes remain somewhat contested (Smith 2003). Some authors suggest that a third mode of knowledge production may be apparent (Mode 1.5) (e.g. Huff 2000 quoted in Onyancha & Maluleka 2010:315), though it is generally established that knowledge production occurs in Mode 1 and Mode 2 forms (Onyancha & Maluleka 2010:315).

From the debates about democratisation and globalisation, and its effects on academia and the emergence of a knowledge economy, it is vital to acknowledge the positionality of a country in relation to Euro-centric power relations. The age of information has profoundly different implications on the development of societies throughout the world, and the location from which knowledge is produced, consumed and exchanged. This includes the ethical implications and dynamics of transferring knowledge between the North and South (Jazeel & McFarlane 2010:109-10), and the types of relationships that emerge between knowledge production and identity in different regions (constituted through the social lenses of nationality, race, gender, class, and the like) (Anyidoho 2008:34). Onyancha and Maluleka (2011:315) examined the levels of co-authorship and the citations of research articles in citation indexes to assess knowledge co-production and its impact in selected sub-Saharan African countries. The study found minimal collaborative research among sub-Saharan African countries, but
noted that collaborations between sub-Saharan African and foreign countries were more common. In addition, the scientific impact of international collaboration was higher than that of continental collaboration (Onyancha & Maluleka 2011:315). Thus, the development of a knowledge economy in different societies has been uneven. However, this type of collaboration may be beneficial for African scholars, but also suggests the potential for indigenous knowledge to be appropriated by international k-economies. Moahi (2007:3) highlights the positive benefits of the knowledge economy for showcasing the indigenous knowledge (IK) of majority world countries¹ like South Africa, Brazil and India, but simultaneously cautioned that it may also lead indigenous knowledge systems being eroded if these are not adequately protected by governments through laws that prevent their misappropriation (Moahi 2007:1). Globalisation and the knowledge economy have exposed the potential value of IK to the global interests of capital, but whilst this promotes its value, globalisation has also negated IK by disregarding it as unscientific unless it is validated using the technological methods of Western civilisation (Moahi 2007:4).

Knowledge Production in South Africa

For academics in South Africa, knowledge has predominantly developed within disciplines, which have been represented by academic departments and faculties, or various branches of research and recognised forms of specialisation within them (Winberg 2006:160). However, discipline-specific forms of academic knowledge are increasingly being challenged by “real world” dilemmas in South Africa (Winberg 2006:160). The idea of transdisciplinary forms of knowledge has thus been advocated as a solution to generating knowledge that is better suited to the country’s needs (Kraak 2001:20).

Despite the opportunities presented by technological advancement for the global exchange of knowledge, the capacity for generating knowledge and contributing to knowledge innovation in African countries is low, due to a
historical legacy of underdeveloped research infrastructure, human resource constraints in the education sector, a paucity of research funding and poor skill development (Blankley & Booyens 2010:1). South Africa admits only a small proportion of its population to higher education, especially at postgraduate level (Fisher & Scott 2011:2). From 1999-2009, the US was ranked first in ISI citations in all fields, and country comparisons of the number of publications and citations placed South Africa well behind other developing countries (Blankley & Booyens 2010:3). From 1990 to 2004, South Africa’s output of scientific articles averaged approximately 7 000 a year, despite increased research funding. From 1999-2003, South Africa produced only 0.05 PhDs per 1 000 people, a figure that not only fell well below that of leading knowledge economies, but also fared poorly in comparison to other developing countries (DST 2008:28). This flagged a need in the country for the creation of “knowledge workers” through building “a human capital pipeline” which converts postgraduate students into doctoral scholars, as well as streamlining its flow to generate greater efficiency and productivity in the knowledge production system (DST 2008:29). However, more recent statistics are more promising and show an increase in knowledge outputs, especially in journal articles. The number of journal articles published in the country reached just over 13 135 and in 2015 reached almost 13 976 (DHET 2017:13). This represented a 6.4% growth, through this was lower than from 2013 to 2014 (DHET 2017:11).

The most critical of the areas of development for a knowledge economy is the requisite investment in human resources that is required in higher education to address the persistent shortage of skills in the country (Fisher & Scott 2011:1). This is a particularly fraught area in South Africa, with its severely strained education sector and high levels of inequality in education access, poor educational infrastructure and limited human resource capacity (Fisher & Scott 2011:1-2). The dangers of the knowledge economy for majority world countries like South Africa are that it may be easily left behind or fall out of knowledge-based economic activity, thereby further increasing the gulf between richer and poorer nations, but also between a nation’s citizens (Kefela 2010:165).
In 2008, the DST (2008:1-34) announced its 10-year strategic plan, directed towards establishing the conditions necessary for the transformation of the knowledge sector towards a knowledge economy, in which knowledge production and distribution would yield economic benefits for the country. This strategic plan included a system of policies and economic development strategies that revolved around knowledge innovation and exploitation, the development of human capital, as well as robust organisational structures able to withstand global competition and market forces, and provide the necessary infrastructure to bridge the divide between research outcomes and their translation into economic wealth (DST 2008:1-34). The global shift towards a knowledge economy has added new institutional pressures to academic life. This has been popularly captured by the “publish or perish” dictum, and South African scholars of all disciplines have increasingly been co-opted into producing the recognised outputs to align with the goal of becoming a knowledge economy. The imagery of a human production line is palpable in the country’s vision for research and technology development, bringing the academic and scholarly work in much closer proximity to and direct relationship with the mode of economic production. This has relevance for the nature of the relationship between government and universities (Mthembu 2009:4), as well as the type of work that is published and the global and local social interests it upholds.

These developments in knowledge production should cause academics to question their social role and social accountability. In addition, it is necessary for academics to think carefully about knowledge they produce as forms of power embedded within a matrix of power relations and to question whether knowledge produced potentially represents a form of social action towards justice to challenge entrenched power relations or simply a recapitulation of the status quo. Here, it would be worthwhile to consider potential practices of institutional, disciplinary and scientific reflexivity in the South African context, especially in the context of current efforts to decolonise higher education.
CONCLUSION

This article highlights that knowledge production is situated within a complex configuration of social, global and institutional power relations. This article explores current global processes of knowledge production and how these impact on knowledge production in South Africa. The article examines theories that offer insight into the value of studying knowledge production and its impacts. This discussion considers the social, economic and institutional aspects of this knowledge and the social role that intellectual knowledge may serve. These ideas alert us to the imperative to note forms of dominance and marginality in knowledge production, to observe how social power manifests through knowledge, and to consider their function and implications for the intellectual role in South Africa.

NOTES

1 A term used in preference to the largely inaccurate and out-of-date terms like “developing countries,” “third world” and the “South.”

REFERENCES


What are the Challenges and Opportunities for the UN-Mandated Fact-Finding Mission to Myanmar?

GERALD A. MOORE

ABSTRACT

On 9 October 2016, a militant group of Rohingya men stormed police stations in northern Rakhine State (nRS), one of the poorest states in Myanmar, ransacking and killing nine police officers and wounding another five. In response, the Myanmar police and military sought out and attacked Rohingya groups, targeting and killing many innocent civilians. On 24 March 2017, the European Union, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries, sponsored a resolution (A/HRC/34/L.8/Rev.1) that mandates an international fact-finding mission to establish facts on violations, especially in Rakhine State. In this article, I argue that the promise (and peril) of the impending international fact-finding mission resides, firstly, in its ability to contribute to the promotion of “accountability”; secondly, it constitutes a potentially transformative challenge to Myanmar’s national discourse regarding “the Rohingya issue”; and thirdly, the mission represents a politically significant escalation in international urgency regarding the resolution of “the Rohingya issue.”

INTRODUCTION

On 9 October 2016, a militant group of Rohingya men, armed with machetes, stormed police stations in northern Rakhine State (nRS), one of the poorest states in Myanmar/Burma, ransacking and killing nine police
officers and wounding another five. In response, police and military sought out and attacked Rohingya groups, targeting and killing many innocent civilians. In the wake of these events, there was a general outcry by the international community, taking to task the Government of Myanmar (GoM) for its brutality and “calculated policy of terror” (OHCHR 2017a:42). While some commentators have argued that this sequence of events has brought “a new dimension to the conflict between the Rohingya and the Buddhist majority” (Singh & Jani 2016), others stressed the need to read the events of – and following – 9 October 2016 against the long-standing pattern of violations and abuses; systematic and systemic discrimination; and policies of exclusion and marginalisation against the Rohingya that have been in place for decades in nRS (OHCHR 2017a:42).

On 24 March 2017, the European Union, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries, sponsored a resolution (A/HRC/34/L.8/Rev.1) that mandates an international fact-finding mission to establish facts on violations, especially in Rakhine State. There is a broad spectrum of views concerning the implications of this impending international fact-finding body. On the one hand, some have argued that the fact-finding mission could help Myanmar “down the path of democracy” (Htun & Giannini 2017). Others, by contrast, have suggested that the mission is an exercise in realpolitik (Gholamzadeh 2017).

In this article, I assess the challenges and opportunities for the impending UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar. Couched in the broader debate on the “crisis of confidence” in the United Nations in Myanmar, I argue that the promise (and peril) of the impending international fact-finding mission resides, first, in its ability to contribute to the promotion of “accountability”; secondly, it constitutes a potentially transformative challenge to Myanmar’s national discourse regarding “the Rohingya issue”; and thirdly, the mission represents a politically significant escalation in international urgency regarding the resolution of “the Rohingya issue.”
This essay is divided into four parts. In part two, I examine the United Nations peace building role in Myanmar. In part three, I assess the challenges and the opportunities for the UN fact-finding mission in Myanmar. Part one has three subsections, which are: (a) Accountability; (b) Third Party Intervention and (c) An internationally co-ordinated solution to “the Rohingya issue.” In part four, I present a summary of my findings.

THE UNITED NATIONS’ PEACEBUILDING ROLE IN MYANMAR

Defining the United Nations’ Peace Building Role in Myanmar: A Crisis of Legitimacy?

The UN is faced with a possible crisis of legitimacy in Myanmar. There is a perception that the UN and other international nongovernmental organisations lack impartiality, neutrality and independence. In February 2014, the government expelled the international nongovernmental organisation Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) from Rakhine state, accusing their staff with bias toward the Rohingya, and depriving up to one million Muslims of the only medical care they had access to. In March 2014, the offices of the United Nations and in excess of a dozen other nongovernmental organisations in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state, were damaged and looted by armed crowds, “displacing more than 300 humanitarian workers and hampering health services for hundreds of thousands of vulnerable and displaced Rohingyas” (Brooten 2015:135). Also among the key detractors of UN efforts in Myanmar are Rohingya activists themselves.

In Rohingyaas fall victim to UN’s corporate-dominated agenda (2017), Shahid Bolsen, chief strategist of a campaign, which “seeks justice for Rohingyas,” argues that there is “a clash” between the authentic humanitarian goals of the UN and its ever more “corporate-dominated agendas”; the stress on development investment as a solution to Myanmar’s problems has predictably crippled the UN’s will to take “meaningful action” to stop the human rights abuses being perpetrated by the regime due to the fear that doing so would endanger “potential
business contracts and investment projects being sought by multinational corporations” (Gholamzadeh 2017). There are a number of reasons why such indictments of the UN in Myanmar ought to be approached with caution. First, it brushes over the important (and courageous) work that the UN has been doing in Myanmar too easily. Secondly, it is – by definition – very difficult to accurately characterise the relationship between the United Nations and Myanmar:

the UN is a political organisation consisting of several organs, bodies, and agencies that deal with different matters; exercise varying levels of authority and prerogatives; fulfil different or subordinate functions; operate with somewhat different methods; and – with the exception of the UN organs and bodies, the UN agencies, and treaty-bodies- have their own budgets (Bassiouni 2001:35).

Thirdly, it is difficult to distinguish whether the controversies primarily reflect a tension in the nature of the United Nations’ peculiar engagement with Myanmar or, more broadly, a tension within the discourse of “humanitarianism” itself. At a conference on UN Day 2016, Lok-Dessallien articulated a vision of UN work in Myanmar that fits cosily within a “problem-solving” paradigm of the social world: “[w]ith our hearts and minds fixed on our Vision and our feet firmly planted in the realities on the ground, we strive to be principled pragmatists” (Dessallien 2016). Fourthly, the Rohinyga movement has its own characteristic features that, it bears pointing out, have to be critically engaged.

While each of these conceptual frames of reference require some interrogation, it is significant that controversies surrounding UN engagement in Myanmar have, with notable recurrence, even rippled through the UN system itself. In an article entitled The Failed UN Mission in Myanmar, The Irrawaddy, analysing, inter alia, the premature cessation of Renata Lok-Dessallien’s tenure as UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, highlights that “[r]eliable sources reported that Lok-Dessallien had been criticised [, among other things,] for not doing enough regarding human rights abuses in Myanmar.” The BBC highlights that
a wider criticism of Ms Lok-Dessallien and her team [was], namely that their priority was building development programmes and a strong relationship with the Burmese government – not advocating that the rights of oppressed minorities, like the Rohingya, should be respected (Fisher 2017).

It is into this context, which will be critically examined more fully in the next section, which the impending international UN-mandated fact-finding mission enters. While the mandating of this international fact-finding mission has been interpreted as a mere continuation of the above discourse, this tendency has also to be approached with a degree of circumspection. What new dynamic, if any, does the international human rights fact-finding mission introduce by way of the UN’s engagement with the Union of Myanmar? This concern features centrally in the question that is at hand, namely: What are the challenges and the opportunities for the UN fact-finding mission in Myanmar? Any worthy attempt at answering this question, however, has to be couched in a basic understanding of the multi-layered and multifaceted nature of the conflict in Myanmar.

Political “Transition” in Myanmar: The “Silences” of International Discourse?

Through the prism of a matrix of political, religious, gender, ethnic, racial, class, structural and security considerations, Myanmar’s conflict has local, national and transnational causes and consequences. More than any other, it is the “Rohingya issue” that alerts us to the interwoven nature of violence in Myanmar. The events of 9 October are most illustrative in this regard. The Diplomat unpacks this particular burst of conflict: It started when a “militant group” of “Rohingya men,” carrying “machetes, stormed police stations, ransacking and killing nine police offices and wounding another five” and, “[i]n response,” the “police and military” searched for and attacked “Rohingya groups, targeting and killing many innocent
civilians” (Quinley 2016). The events of – and following – 9 October 2016 give rise to a series of pertinent questions.

What caused the attack by the “Rohingya men” on the police station? In *Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism, and Communal Violence in Myanmar*, Matthew J. Walton and Susan Hayward (2015:1) highlight that the political transition in Buddhist-majority Myanmar (also known as Burma) that started in 2011 has been complicated by frequent outbreaks of “violence between religious communities.” They also stress the secessionist aspects of the Buddhist-Muslim sectarian conflict: “For decades, many ethnic groups in Myanmar have been fighting for various degrees of autonomy from a central government that is seen to represent the ethnic Burman group” (Walton & Hayward 2015:5). The vulnerable Rakhine-Muslims, in particular, have been suffering from the state-sanctioned persecution (Chen 2016:394).

The flash report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 3 February 2017, entitled “Interviews with Rohingya fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016,” states that the Rohingya are subject to travel bans “between, and often within, townships” (OHCHR 2017a:6). The processes to secure travel are “onerous and time-consuming,” and falling foul of the requirements can result in “arrest and prosecution” (OHCHR 2017a:6). A curfew has been imposed on nRS since the outbreak of violence in June 2012, which has been extended following the events of 9 October 2016 (OHCHR 2017a:6). While “the attackers” may – or may not – have had political motives, this does not preclude how, potentially, the secessionist aspects of the Buddhist-Muslim sectarian conflict in the Rakhine state – in the very least perceptually – impacted upon how events materially played out on the ground on 9 October 2016. Which prompts the question: Why doesn’t the flash report expound on the motives or the identity of the so-called attackers?5 This takes us to the next pertinent question.

How did the military and police “respond” to the attack and why did the military and police “respond” in the manner that they did? The “response”
of the military not only reveals the political, religious and ethnic character of violence in Myanmar, but the gender dynamics that underpin the events of – and following – 9 October 2016. One of the OHCHR four-member team’s interviewees, a 54 year old inhabitant of Laung Don explained:

After rounding-up villagers, the army and Rakhine civilians separated 14 girls, who were beautiful and healthy. These girls were left naked for three hours. We were asked to look at them. The soldiers were playing with the girls’ sexual organs and mocking them. I could not tolerate this situation (OHCHR 2017a:28).

However, what the flash report does not allude to are potential military-economic interests that inform the persecution of the Rohingya. In an article entitled “Myanmar’s Rohingya conflict ‘more economic than religious’,” analyst Siegfried Wolf (2015) argues that the Rakhine community “as a whole” feels “culturally discriminated, economically exploited, and politically” marginalised by the GoM, “which is dominated by ethnic Burmese.” In this specific context, the Rohingyas are viewed by the Rakhine people as “additional competitors” for resources and “a threat to their own identity, which is the main cause of tension in the state and has led to numerous armed conflicts between the groups” (Wolf 2015). This brings into intense relief several further questions: Why is the flash report “silent” about the economic underpinnings of “displacement”? Why focus only on the violations against the Rohingya and not the Rakhine? Are international discourses partly to blame for the worsening humanitarian crisis?

This raises a complex question. Who is responsible for the worsening humanitarian crisis?6 Without focusing on the national and transnational political and economic forces at play in the crisis, it will undoubtedly continue unabated. According to Jasminder Singh & Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani (2017), this sequence of events has brought “a new dimension to the conflict between the Rohingya and the Buddhist majority”: “Managing the relations between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, especially along the country’s western frontier will be a key factor in containing extremism and radical activism.” This prompts the question: Why doesn’t the flash report comment on the transnational factors at play in the crisis?
Are the above “silences” symptomatic of the systematic and selective “depoliticisation” of this humanitarian crisis? If this is the case, significant questions confront the impending UN fact-finding mission, not least because the flash report is one of the key documents that informed the drafting of the resolution that gives effect to the impending fact-finding mission (Human Rights Council 2017:1).

THE CHALLENGES AND THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UN FACT-FINDING MISSION IN MYANMAR

Accountability

The impending UN-mandated fact-finding mission could contribute to the promotion of accountability. The UN discourse offers a necessary alternative narrative to the GoM’s position that it had caused no casualties: “Myanmar has denied that atrocities took place during the counter-insurgency operations, but has prevented any outside scrutiny by sealing off the conflict zone in northern Rakhine State” (Perria 2017). Draft resolution A/HRC/34/L.8/Rev.1 gives effect to an independent fact-finding mission to be appointed by the President of the Human Rights Council to establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanmar, in particular Rakhine state, including but not limited to arbitrary detention, torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings, enforced disappearance, forced displacement and unlawful destruction of property, with a view to full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims (Human Rights Council 2017: no.11).

Be that as it may, the attitude of the GoM towards the impending fact-finding mission presents a key challenge to accountability and to the work of the international fact-finding mission more broadly.

Regarding the establishment of the international fact-finding mission, Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that it “would do more to inflame, rather than resolve the issues at this time,” continuing that “it is
also not in accord with the situation on ground and the national circumstances” (Myanmar President Office 2017). In *The Political Dimension of International Human Rights Fact-Finding*, Steven R. Ratner (2013:70) argues that while much of “the backlash against human rights fact-finding is significant” and can and should be resolved by the fact-finding bodies themselves by means of “rigorous methodologies and a careful statement and application of the standard of proof,” the actual aversion to and origin of complaints about fact-finding bodies is “fundamentally political – an aversion by state and some non-state actors to accountability itself.” The international community has called on the GoM to cooperate with the UN fact-finding mission.

The EU’s top diplomat Federica Mogherini, at a news conference with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of Myanmar’s elected, civilian government, said that “the fact-finding mission is focusing on establishing the truth about the past” (quoted in Reuters 2017). Asked about the move, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said: “We are dissociating ourselves from the resolution because we do not think the resolution is in keeping with what is actually happening on the ground” (quoted in Reuters 2017). Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that she would only assent to the recommendations from a “separate advisory commission” headed by former UN chief Kofi Annan, adding that any other input would “divide” communities (Reuters 2017). Human rights literature typically casts the primary contention at play as those who care about human rights and those whose sole interest it is to maintain power, a rejection of the mission being an abrogation of the GoM’s stated-commitment to accountability and democracy.⁷

However, there is some merit to this argument. There are other noteworthy ethical and political dilemmas that are at play that relate to the peculiar character of political transition in Myanmar.⁸ It is, therefore, necessary to problematise the human rights fact-finding, accountability and peace-building nexus. Even if Aung San Suu Kyi consented to the UN mission, “there would be little she could do to facilitate it” (Perria 2017). The elected, civilian administration she heads has “a tenuous relationship” with the military, “which enforced absolute rule over Myanmar for almost half
a century before enacting reforms in 2011” (Perria 2017). While the reforms enabled political freedom, Aung San Suu Kyi has no power and restricted influence over the military, while the “[t]he Human Rights Council has no legal powers of enforcement and is in no position to punish Myanmar if it fails to cooperate” (Perria 2017). Granted there is opposition from the target, in this case the GoM, to an international fact-finding body, there are alternate avenues.9

“What, then,” to quote Ratner (2013:70), “can the United Nations do if both the directly affected state and other key states oppose the creation of a fact-finding body?” While, legally-speaking, the answer is “almost certainly yes” Ratner (2013:70) cautions that, “politically, the issue is far more tricky.” Ratner highlights that if the state opposes the notion of a fact-finding body from the outset, the characteristic response of supporters of such bodies in this scenario is to “galvanise other states and get the Human Rights Council or the Security Council to create a commission anyway” (Ratner 2013:70). As Stephan J. Rapp points out:

The UNHRC consists of 47 member-states elected for three years terms by the UN General Assembly. By tradition, its members prefer to operate by consensus, but when consensus is not possible, mandates for official inquiries can be approved when a majority of members vote yes, and [unlike the UNSC] none have the power of veto (quoted in D’Allessandra 2017: supra note 30).

It was the Human Rights Council that mandated the imminent fact-finding mission to Myanmar and the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights has since officially appointed the members of the fact-finding body (OHCHR 2017b). Ratner (2013:70) continues that the result of the process is substantial outside support for the fact-finding body from UN member states, and can accrue to “access to their intelligence as well as budgetary support.”

Ratner (2013:70) counterpoints this observation with the insight that those advantages contend with the disadvantages of “lack of access to territory of the state that is the target of the enquiry,” so that the fact-finding body
frequently is unable to visit “the sites of atrocities or speak to key witnesses” (Ratner 2013:70). This has been a concern raised by the Human Rights Council, and also by international organisations and local NGOs (HRW 2017). “It is the hope that the mission will be facilitated by the government of Myanmar through unfettered access to the affected areas,” said Rolando Gomez, a spokesman for the Human Rights Council (quoted in Perria 2017). Sara Perria (2017) continues that

Should the government and military deny access, the UN mission is expected to begin detailed investigations among the tens of thousands of Rohingya who fled across the border into Bangladesh after Myanmar’s military launched counter-insurgency operations late last year.

However, Ratner (2013:70) asserts that “[t]his limitation can also lead to accusations by the target state that the panel is taking testimony from only one side of a conflict.”

Sara Perria argues that even though rights advocates had hoped that the Human Rights Council would rather approve “a weightier Commission of Enquiry,” which would have had a more extensive mandate, the international community could pressure Myanmar to cooperate with “the weaker fact-finding mission, but there is no evidence of any serious attempts so far” (Perria 2017). Myanmar’s two powerful neighbours, China and India, have distanced themselves from the resolution. Indonesia, while supporting the consensus and outspoken about the crisis facing the Rohingya, believes that “the international community should ensure that Myanmar had the opportunity and space to address those challenges and conclude the ongoing national processes” (OHCHR 2017c). Moreover, while European countries are maintaining that Myanmar cooperates, their tone is “hardly threatening – public statements stress the need to promote the country’s ‘democratic transition’” (Perria 2017). Despite what could evolve into a diplomatic stand-off between the UN and Myanmar (if it continues to push back), analysts say that the fact-finding mission can still serve a purpose.
Charles Petrie, a former UN resident coordinator in Myanmar, recognised that the odds of investigators gaining access were “pretty slim” (quoted in Perria 2017). It could, however, enhance the prospects of Myanmar’s government implementing the recommendations proposed by the advisory commission on Rakhine:

The Geneva resolution should be seen in the context of Annan’s interim report released on 16 March, Petrie said, describing them as “closely linked”... “So, right now, the best-case scenario is that they will focus on one [Annan] to try and defuse the other [Geneva],” said Petrie (Perria 2017).

According to Irene Pietropaoli, a Yangon-based human rights consultant, “You are still going to have a United Nations report establishing what happened, which will become useful in political and advocacy terms” (quoted in Perria 2017). Apart from its deterrent effect, Pietropaoli highlights that the report’s “detailed findings, recommendations, and possible identification of offenders” could lay the groundwork for future action (quoted in Perria 2017).

**Third-Party Intervention**

Couched as it is in a broader critique of the GoM regarding “the Rohingya issue,” the impending fact-finding mission also constitutes a potentially transformative challenge to the national discourse from at least three perspectives. First, it could provide an alternate narrative to the Myanmar government’s position that it had caused no civilian casualties and, thus, create a new focal point for discussion. Second, it challenges the implicit ethnic or racial hierarchy that underpins the “citizenship crisis” in Myanmar in favour of democratic citizenship. Third, the means by which it advocates change is especially through amending discriminatory legislation. There is a significant resonance between Ian Holliday (2014) and United Nations in their respective framings of “the Rohingya issue,” both of which express concern at the tendency to focus largely on the question of whether Rohingya are an indigenous or national minority, urging instead for attention to be directed towards how best to build equal rights for this group.
It bears recognition that the very usage of the term “Rohingya” in reference to an identity group is a politically-charged subject that has been subjected to much academic scrutiny. In *Rohingya: The Name, The Movement, The Quest for Identity*, Rakhine expert Jacques P. Leider (2014:24) argues that, at first blush, the Rohingya identity is “uncontroversial, obvious and easy to defend,” but, at closer inspection, it is just as easy to challenge because it is “diffuse and historically opaque.” By restricting the debate on the Rohingyas to “the legal and humanitarian aspects,” editorialists the world over, according to Leider (2014:24), have adopted “an easy approach towards a complicate[d] issue.” This narrow approach is not acceptable in the “national context” of Myanmar, “where issues like ethnicity, history and cultural identity are key ingredients of legitimacy” (Leider 2014:24). From this perspective, the impending fact-finding mission invites scrutiny. Federica D’Alessandra (2017:69) highlights that “[w]hen the genesis of a process is indeed politicised, its outcome is equally viable to criticism (including at the hands of those who were on the receiving end of scrutiny).”

In recognising the legitimacy claims of the “Rohingya,” however, the use of the “Rohingya” identity has to be situated within the context of wider calls by the international community for reform in Myanmar. A call for the review of the 1982 Citizenship Law features centrally within the draft resolution (A/HRC/34/1.8/Rev.1) that gives effect to the international fact-finding mission, imploring

the Government of Myanmar to continue efforts to eliminate statelessness and the systematic and institutionalised discrimination against members of ethnic and religious minorities, including the root causes of discrimination, in particular relating to the Rohingya minority, by, inter alia, reviewing the 1982 Citizenship Law, which has led to the deprivation of human rights, by allowing equal access to full citizenship through a transparent, voluntary and accessible procedure and to all civil and political rights, by allowing self-identification, by amending or repealing all discriminatory legislation and policies (Human Rights Council 2017: no. 5).
Apart from the fact that Nick Cheesman (2017:476) would dispute whether this project is truly “emancipatory,” it stands to question: Is this a fair summation of the persistence of the “citizenship crisis” that is so often used synonymously with “the Rohingya issue”? Does the call to read the events of – and following – 9 October 2016 “against the long-standing pattern” of state persecution obscure other equally relevant factors which could be contributing to the intractability of “the Rohingya issue”?

By way of departure, it is worth recognising that the secessionist aspects to the Buddhist-Muslim Conflict in Rakhine State paint a much more complex picture of the persistence of “the Rohingya issue” (Ware 2015). Anthony Ware (2015) argues that “[t]o ignore the recourse to armed separatist struggle over territory, self-determination and sheer survival by both sides, is to miss key dynamics of the conflict.” It stands to question: What are the factors underlying these “key dynamics”? How could the impending international fact-finding body challenge not only Myanmar’s national discourse, but also dominant international human rights discourses, even if to do so would fly in the face – to quote Lisa Brooten (2015:143) – of the dominant international “constructions of victims, savages and especially saviours”?

Schissler, Walton & Phyu Thi (2015) argue that anyone who is interested in reducing conflict and championing peace and reconciliation in Myanmar would do well to begin by “listening carefully to the ways people discuss violence in everyday life.” First, this approach reinforces the significance of supporting local civil society efforts to “counter narratives of threat and self-defense” (Schissler et al. 2015). Secondly, listening highlights the ways that discourse, including international discourse, about violence in Myanmar, can contribute to the outbreak of violence (Schissler et al. 2015). Lastly, listening is indispensable as “an ethical matter” and as a means to de-escalating “a growing sense in Myanmar that the fears and perceptions of Buddhists are being ignored” (Schissler et al. 2015). This cautionary tale is especially relevant to the task ahead for the international fact-finding mission. Apart from the need
of the appropriate technical methods and the support of key actors, Ratner (2013:72) stresses that

the ultimate lesson to be learned from our experience is that credibility of a fact-finding process is...[also] about...a mandate attuned to the circumstances, an awareness of the multiple audiences who will read the report, and an appreciation of the long-term goals of the process – truth and justice for the victims, some form of national reconciliation, and renewed focus on structures to prevent the recurrence of atrocities.

An Internationally Co-Ordinated Solution to “The Rohingya Issue”

The recently-mandated international fact-finding mission represents a politically significant escalation in international urgency regarding the resolution of “the Rohingya issue.” However, there is also reason to believe that an international solution to “the Rohingya issue” can be an impediment to a resolution of the crisis. It has been argued that the international discourse of human rights is deployed by powerful states and regional blocs represented within the United Nations as a tool of regional or global power interests. Drawing on critical human rights scholarship, this is an argument that is advanced by Lisa Brooten (2015) in relation to Myanmar in her article entitled Blind Spots in Human Rights Coverage: Framing Violence Against Rohingya in Myanmar/Burma. Arguing that “the dominant definition and prioritising of human rights tends to reinforce this status quo rather than challenge it” (Brooten 2015:133), a critical reading of the genesis of the newly mandated UN fact finding mission essentially scrutinises the fact that the Human Rights Council’s draft resolution, that gave effect to the fact-finding mission, was mandated primarily by EU countries, with the support of the US and the United Kingdom.

In Hard Choices on Myanmar still lie ahead for the EU, Clara Portela (2013:36) argues that Myanmar’s “emergence from decades of military rule presents the West with a dilemma.” While, on the one hand, Europe and the United States are “keen to reward its transition to democratic rule” and to ensure that they gain an “economic toehold in a country with such
immense natural resources,” there are still serious concerns about Myanmar’s human rights situation, “in particular the treatment of ethnic minorities such as the Muslim Rohingyas.” “Conditions for workers in Burmese mines, building sites and factories, including the use of forced labour,” Portela (2013:36) emphasises, “remain a real worry.” “What the EU now needs to do to be relevant by all the political and societal forces in Maynmar[,]” Portela continues, “is to help them address their most pressing problems – and to be seen to be doing so.” The OHCHR’s characterisation of “the Rohingya issue” could, however, court controversy by obscuring its economic underpinnings and various vested interests.  

The world’s coverage of the events of 9 October, including the United Nations, has focused entirely on the religious / ethnic dimension, characterising them as religious persecution. However, in an article entitled *Is Rohingya persecution caused by business interests rather than religion?* Robert S. Lind Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, Saskia Sassen (2017), suggests: “We must ask whether the sharpened persecution of the Rohingya (and other minority groups) might be partly generated by military economic interests, rather than mostly religious / ethnic issues”:

The treatment of the Rohingya is sometimes described as a crime against humanity. But we need to interrogate its sources. If we bring in some of the larger trends affecting modest rural communities, two major facts stand out. One is the far larger numbers of Buddhist smallholders who have also been expelled from their land in the last few years. And the other is the fact that large-scale timber extraction, mining, and water projects are replacing the expelled.

In her article, Brooten(2014:143) argues that the prevalence of “old Orientalist tropes” leaves unexamined “the transnational political and economic forces” that contribute to the dire human rights situation confronting the Rohingya, “and problematically marginalises those working on the ground to resist the violence and change the situation.” Brooten’s criticism is integral to a much broader critique of international human rights discourse on Third World Countries.
In *Nuancing Human Rights Discourse and Practice: Perspectives from Myanmar*, Amy Marie Argenal (2016:ii), by means of “a participatory action project with human rights activists in Myanmar,” studies the “inherent power imbalances in international human rights work by highlighting voices often left out of the human rights discourse.” Through a post-colonial and Third World feminist lens, traditional human rights discourse invites scrutiny from three perspectives (Argenal 2016:50). This first critique is “the notion of how the West privileges civil and political rights,” to the relative neglect of “social, economic and cultural rights” (Argenal 2016:117; 116). The second critique is that international human rights discourse assumes a lack of “local agency” on the part of local actors as opposed to human rights being a “way of life” (Argenal 2016:118). The third critique entails “how human rights work can reinforce a [inequitable] global power structure” (Argenal 2016:89). However, are these structural barriers to the impending fact-finding mission insurmountable?

According to Obiora C. Okafor (2014), who addresses these concerns in his critical appraisal of international human rights discourses, they have implications for international human rights fact finding. For example, human rights practice should, ideally, “be more careful about its susceptibility to deployment and manipulation by global power to achieve ends, which are in many cases significantly different from its intent” (Okafor 2014:103-4). While there is a limited amount that practitioners can do, Okafor stresses that they “still need to be as reflexive as they can about this possibility, and seek to limit any such potential danger of capture in any way they can” (Okafor 2014:103-4). However, can the UN mission simultaneously be an interested party and a potentially transformative interlocutor? The impending international fact-finding mission has raised many questions on precisely these grounds.

The recently-appointed three member panel of the mission comprises lawyers Indira Jaising from India and Radhika Coomaraswamy from Sri Lanka, and Australian human rights advocate Christopher Dominic Sidoti (OHCHR 2017b). Sri Lankan political analyst and social commentator,
Shenali Waduge argues that the appointment of a three-member panel by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR) on May 30 to investigate alleged abuses by Myanmar military forces against the country’s Rohingya Muslim minority throws in relief a range of questions about its neutrality, “particularly as all the three members have questionable backgrounds as to their fitness to carry out an impartial enquiry” (Waduge 2017). Waduge (2017) argues that the appointments suggest that their final report will be skewed towards human rights activism without recognising “the complex socio-economic and historical background to the conflict in Myanmar which is,” according to Waduge, “a predominantly immigration issue.” In an interview with Al Jazeera, Jaising remarked

minorities all over the world are facing persecution. The situation of the Rohingya community in Myanmar is especially deplorable because they face the risk of a genocide (quoted in Waduge 2017).

That said, while the above discussion is firmly ensconced within the realism of international politics, the overarching debate as to whether the international community is trying to defend or challenge the status quo is still open. Apart from the fact that the European Union, for example, has extended its arms embargo against Myanmar (SIPRI 2017), there is a sense that the crisis of UN legitimacy in Myanmar and elsewhere, a problem that the UN can ill-afford to ignore, has provoked the need for reflexivity within the UN system itself. As elsewhere, if the United Nations is to continue to enjoy some degree of legitimacy in Myanmar, it is possible that the United Nations can no longer just be seen to be addressing “the Rohingya issue.” In an Editorial by The Irrawaddy, it is argued:

If the UN cannot fix these existing issues and reposition itself to engage in Myanmar, there is a huge risk that it will become more and more irrelevant in the country, which needs outside assistance. Watching this saga play out, some have said it is time to “shake the coconut trees…” (The Irrawaddy 2017).

Based on recent events, perhaps there is cause for hope that “the debate about the meaning and practice of humanitarianism is not speaking on
behalf of those with contingent lives, but that privileges ‘them’” (Christie 2015:46). This is a debate in which the impending international fact-finding mission is not a mere “bystander,” but participates in the potentially conflicting roles of being an interested party and a potentially transformative interlocutor.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I assessed the challenges and opportunities for the impending UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar. Couching my argument in the broader debate on the “crisis of confidence” in the United Nations in Myanmar, I argued that the promise (and peril) of the impending international fact-finding mission resides in its ability to contribute to the promotion of accountability; it constitutes a potentially transformative challenge to Myanmar’s national discourse regarding “the Rohingya issue”; and the mission represents a politically significant escalation in international urgency regarding the resolution of “the Rohingya issue.”

First, based on the analysis, there are two challenges to the ability of the international fact-finding mission to promote accountability. The difficulties entailed by the attitude of the Government of Myanmar and, by extension, the potential lack of access to the sites of “atrocities” were explored. This limitation can also lead to accusations by the target state that the panel is taking testimony from only one side of a conflict. That said, there are other avenues to advancing accountability in the context of the fact-finding mission. These include the fact that it was the Human Rights Council that mandated the impending fact-finding mission to Myanmar. The result of this process is significant outside support for the fact-finding body from UN member states, which can translate into access to their intelligence as well as budgetary support. Moreover, the report does not only provide an alternate narrative to the Myanmar government’s position that it had caused no civilian casualties and, thus, a new focal
point for discussion, but the report will be useful in both political and advocacy terms.

Secondly, couched as it is in a *broader critique* of the GoM regarding “the Rohingya issue,” the impending fact-finding mission also constitutes a *potentially* transformative challenge to the national discourse in Myanmar. On this basis, however, the draft resolution equally invites scrutiny not only through its use of “Rohingya” identity, but in its framing of “the citizenship crisis.” The key insight was that when the genesis of a process is indeed politicised, its outcome is equally viable to criticism, including at the hands of those who are on the receiving end of scrutiny. Be that as it may, in recognising the legitimacy claims of the “Rohingya,” the use of the “Rohingya” identity has to be situated within the context of wider calls by the international community for reform in Myanmar. Moreover, it was highlighted that the fact-finding mission could provide a platform for challenging not only Myanmar’s national discourse, but also international human rights discourse. In this regard, Schissler, Walton & Phyu Thi’s (2015) observation concerning the importance of listening carefully to the ways people discuss violence in everyday life is significant.

Thirdly, the resolution represents a politically significant escalation in international urgency regarding the resolution of “the Rohingya issue.” Two politically-charged challenges to the effectiveness of the impending international fact-finding mission were explored. These include the allegations that the international discourse of human rights is deployed by powerful states and regional blocs represented within the United Nations as a tool of regional or global power interests and, more pointedly, how the three-member panel for the UN-mandated fact-finding mission has been constituted. Nevertheless, Okafor highlights the need for human rights practitioners to be careful about the susceptibility of their work to deployment and manipulation by global power to achieve ends, which are in many cases significantly different from its intent. While this discussion is firmly ensconced within the realism of international politics, the overarching debate as to whether the “international community” is trying to defend or challenge the status quo is still open. There is a sense that the
crisis of UN legitimacy in Myanmar and elsewhere, a problem that the UN can ill-afford to ignore, has provoked the need for reflexivity within the UN system itself. This is a debate in which the impending international fact-finding mission is not a mere “bystander,” but participates in the potentially conflicting roles of being an interested party and a potentially transformative interlocutor.

NOTES

1 In 2017, violence broke out on 25th August, when the Rohingya militants attacked police posts in northern Rakhine, killing 12 security personnel. According to reports, Rohingyas who have fled Myanmar since then claim that the military responded with a brutal campaign, burning villages and attacking civilians with the aim to drive them out. The most recent reports put the number of those who have fled to Bangladesh, due to the most recent cycle of violence, at 313,000. Aung San Suu Kyi, “Myanmar’s de facto leader, is facing increasing [international] criticism for failing to protect the Rohingya” (BBC 2017).

2 In A Vicious Circle Caused by Buddhist-Muslim Conflicts in Rakhine State, Kai Chen (2016:396) highlights that threats and attacks have made it “impossible for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to establish an office in Myanmar, which could be “crucial to ensure monitoring of and reporting on the human rights situation in the country.”

3 According to Ryerson Christie (2015:40): “There are two broad approaches to engagement with humanitarianism, which can be broken down according to Robert Cox’s (1981) delineation between problem-solving and critical theory, with the two standing in opposition to one another on the basis of their commitment to change.” Preferring critical engagement, Christie (2015:40) argues that “problem-solving is unable to bring about substantive change to the structures that might underpin the very issues we are trying to redress.”

4 According to Jacques P. Leider (2014:23), “[i]t is fair to say that the Rohingya movement, while it has gone through divisions and internal disputes, does not have a streamlined political agenda…While some militants may still dream of the creation of an independent Muslim state or local political autonomy, the recognition of claims to citizenship has become the foremost political goal since 1982.”

5 An notable omission in the flash report is that the attack on the three border guard posts resulted in the looting of “more than 50 guns and thousands of bullets” (Singh & Bin Jani 2017).

6 “Thousands of stateless Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar… face a humanitarian crisis since communal violence began in June 2012… More than 280 people have been killed, mostly Rohingyas, many in rickety boats at sea, more than 140,000 forced into temporary displacement camps; and another 40,000 into detention in isolated villages, all with few resources and significant health challenges” (Brooten 2015:132). It is a humanitarian situation that has undoubtedly worsened since the events of 9 October 2016.

7 In a Joint Letter to Governments on the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Burma, a group of human rights organisations highlight that “[t]he Fact-Finding Mission is in the interests of the government of Myanmar as well as the people of the country because it would demonstrate the government’s willingness to uphold the rule of law, work collaboratively with the international community to help establish the facts, identify perpetrators, and deter future crimes by all parties to the conflict” (Human Rights Watch 2017).

8 In Myanmar: Looking In and Facing Out, David Dapice (2017) highlights that “Myanmar is in the midst of a slow and complicated transition from military to democratic rule. The new constitution, essentially imposed by previous rulers, allows the military to veto significant changes in addition to controlling key ministries and their own budget. This leaves the newly elected government with tough choices. They have to settle decades-long ethnic conflicts without upsetting the military.”

9 “While the resolution sponsored on 24th March by the European Union at the UN Human Rights Council called for ‘ensuring accountability for the perpetrators and justice for victims’, Myanmar has no obligation to cooperate with the fact-finding mission and has strongly signalled that it won’t” (Perria 2017).

10 Disassociating itself from the consensus, China, for example, reiterated its position that “all countries [and parties] should engage in dialogue. The international community should look at the progress Myanmar had made in the field of
human rights and respect Myanmar’s sovereignty… The international community should avoid further complicating the matter” (OHCHR 2017c).

11 “In response to the political developments in Burma in April 2013 the EU lifted all sanctions against Burma, except for the arms embargo, which was extended until 30th April 2014. The arms embargo has since been extended annually. It is currently in force until 30th April 2018” (SIPRI 2017).

12 The Rohingya community is not an officially recognised ethnic group, with very few legal and political rights in Myanmar. They are of Bengali decent, some having migrated to Myanmar multiple generations ago, while some having migrated illegally more recently (Walton & Hayward 2015: endnote 7).

13 “Whereas in the prior law the person’s individual status was not contingent on group identity, in 1982 not only were they bound together but also a person’s status as a member of a national race, or not, preceded and partly determined their status as citizen” (Cheesman 2017:472).

14 According to Cheesman (2017:476), “self-identifying Rohingya have little choice but to give assurances that if included in the schema of national races they will be demonstrably good citizens by showing their commitment to the idea of taingyintha [i.e. national-races]. Because people in a tenuous position have more to gain from showing their commitment to a project for political domination than people who are secure in their membership, ironically they aim to show that given the chance they could be more vociferous defenders of the truth regime than anyone… [I]t is simply not possible to bypass the politics of national-race identity on the way to the question of citizenship” (Cheesman 2017:476).

15 Schissler et al. (2015) highlight that “[e]xplanations for violence that focus only on the events immediately precipitating a given incident obscure questions about how violence in mobilised, who is involved, and with what direct or indirect support… [W]riting and rhetoric about “Islamic terrorism” has real impacts in Myanmar… In the US,… sentiments and security rhetoric became an integral part of the 2004 elections, supporting political agendas while also demonising Muslim communities in the US and worldwide.”

16 Kirsten McConnachie (2015) highlights that, “[d]uring the decades of militarisation in Myanmar, millions of people left the country illegally in search of security they will be a better life elsewhere. The vast majority became undocumented migrant workers in Thailand, Malaysia and beyond.” According to Wolf (2015), “the negative impacts of illegal migration – particularly on the security side – have finally convinced the international community to act.”

17 In March 2014, the European Union (EU) and Myanmar began negotiating a bilateral investment programme agreement. Daniel Aguirre (2016), however, describes the “accountability void” in terms of adequate access to remedy for victims of business related human rights abuses: “[U]nder the current regulatory regime, it is unlikely criminal or civil litigation will hold powerful economic actors like corporations accountable. Yet it is into the regulatory void that investment has flowed since reforms began in 2008.”

18 The treatment of the Rohingya is sometimes described as a crime against humanity: “The attacks against the Rohingya population in the area (killings, enforced disappearances, torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary detention, deportation and forced transfer as a result of violence and persecution) seems to have been widespread as well as systematic, indicating the very likely commission of crimes against humanity (as the High Commissioner concluded already in June 2016)” (OHCHR 2017a:42).

19 “The human rights project is defined by the international governing body of the United Nations, the regional governing bodies such as the Organisation of American States, and large INGO and NGOs working in human rights work. This also includes both the legal standards and the mechanisms with which human rights work is based” (Argenal 2016:14).

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Peace and Non-Violent Conflict Transformation as a Way of Life

Focusing on Gulalai Ismail of Pakistan as a Case Study

ABSTRACT

In our imperfect world, with imperfect humans, where conflict and strife is inevitable as a result of diversity, competition for resources and struggles for justice, the quest for a peaceful way of life is continuing. Through the ages a culture of violence, often accompanied by armed/military responses to conflict and injustices, have become an accepted norm, leading to continued suffering and destruction. A global paradigm shift is required on every level of society. The violent and destructive power of dominant, systemic, military and other forms of control and injustices need to be transformed into more respectful relationships where fear, greed and despair can be transformed into compassion, hope and wholeness. The hope for survival lies in the potential of human minds and hearts to change directions from inventing war and weapons to inventing and creating sustainable peace through participation of individuals, families, communities and nations in non-violent conflict management/transformation. After presenting a case for peace and non-violent conflict transformation as a way of life, this article focuses on Gulalai Ismail of Pakistan, and the transformation from violent jihad to peace-building, as a case study.
INTRODUCTION

Peace is not a static state that can be pursued, attained and forever be held onto. Within the diverse and complex web of human relationships in society the potential for disagreements and conflicts is ever present.

Through the ages a culture of violence and armed/military responses to conflict and injustices has become an accepted norm. Considering the immense suffering and destruction caused by these violent approaches to conflict, the need to find alternatives becomes evident. Within Peace studies and other related fields, renewed attempts are made to encourage turning away from violence and destruction towards a more peaceful way of life that will foster healthier relationships within and between individuals, families, communities and nations, allowing for desired development and growth.

This paper will discuss the concept of peace; conflict as inevitable; and non-violent approaches to conflict management/transformation, focusing on a case study of transformation and peace-building by Gulalai Ismail in Pakistan as well as brief discussions of non-violent conflict transformation in Kenya and the policing crisis in the U.S.A.

PEACE DEFINED

Peace as a quality of existence has been pursued through the ages by many but due to its mostly abstract and intangible nature often remains elusive. The understanding of the concept of peace varies for different people/groups within different contexts. For some, peace is practically defined as the opposite or absence of conflict and war. This over simplistic understanding is however incomplete and does not take into account the many varying facets of the concept of peace (Ibeanu 2005:3-4).

Psychological/spiritual approaches often emphasise an inner peace where understanding and sufficient knowledge combined with the practice of discipline, can enable the individual or group to seek and maintain a sense of calm and harmony, even in the face of conflict and discord. Traditions
such as contemplative Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and others are often associated with this approach to *inner peace* facilitated by “knowing oneself” (McGinn 2006:163).

The classical Greek word for peace *eirene*, means to “join together that which has been disturbed, broken or separated.” A state of peace would mean to end separation and to restore harmony and well-being with freedom from turmoil, resulting in calmness and serenity (Anon. 2016).

Similarly, the Hebrew greeting of *shalom*, which is often simplistically translated to mean peace, holds a much more complex and nuanced meaning that includes wholeness and the “joining together of opposites” to bring completeness, peace, tranquillity, prosperity, harmony, rest and the absence of discord and agitation. This Hebrew definition of *peace* expressed as *shalom*, is never simply a wish for the absence of conflict or trouble but also includes a desire/wish for the highest good and well-being of man with tranquillity and soundness of mind, even during conflicts / difficulties (Anon. 2016; Zaslow 2004).

A current definition of *peace* as defined by the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, includes the following:

1. A state of inner content, tranquillity, quiet, serenity - with freedom from anxiety and disquieting or oppressive thoughts or emotions.

2. Freedom from disagreements and quarrels and harmonious interpersonal relationships.

3. Public security, order and lack of civil disturbance provided and maintained through law and customs.

4. Absence of war or a state of mutual agreement between or within governments, states or hostile parties.

The above definition of *peace* touches and permeates on many levels, including individual; interpersonal; community; national and international. It also includes both practical / behavioural and psychological / spiritual
dimensions of peace. The comprehensive description of the Greek and Hebrew concepts of eirene and shalom is not however explicitly included.

According to Confucius (Barash & Webel 2002:4) peace is a condition of “social harmony and equilibrium.” Other philosophers see peace as an instinctive human strive towards seeking happiness and avoiding pain. Plato linked peace to the need for justice and order in society, with three necessary functions namely security, production and political rule (Ibeanu 2005:6).

Structural-functional sociologists define peace as a condition within society where the needs of individuals and groups are sufficiently met by well-functioning structures, encouraging development and bringing harmony and an absence of conflict (Ibeanu 2005:6).

Sociologists such as Karl Marx focus on class structures within society and the way in which work, rewards and production is distributed. When one class exploits and suppresses another class, conditions such as inequality, social exclusion and poverty can undermine development and growth, posing a threat to peace. This threat is often subtle, resulting in structural violence (Ibeanu 2005:7).

Politically related definitions of peace emphasise order and justice, including values such as mutual respect, tolerance and negotiations in political rule and society. Citizens are encouraged to participate in a rational manner while accepting the dominant ideology. This can be problematic in cases where the dominant/privileged group suppresses any challenges to the status quo by oppressed groups, thus potentially maintaining a state of structural violence (Ibeanu 2005:8-9).

Although these different philosophical, sociological and politically related definitions can be useful, they lack the critical conceptualisation of peace as a dynamic, complex and multifaceted process which is constantly changing and evolving. Within the dynamic and constantly evolving process of life, the process of peace can be conceptualised as an attempt to find balance and harmony resulting in tranquillity and soundness of mind which is constantly challenged by opportunities and obstacles to develop
and grow. “Fighting, striving, and engaging in various forms of conflict and combat (especially when they are successful) are widely associated with vigour, energy, and other positive virtues” (Barash & Webel 2002:4). When obstacles and restraints are placed in the way of needed and desired improvements and development presented by the changing and evolving nature of life, it often brings with it conflict and strife, either within the individual or between different individuals, groups or nations. Conflict is therefore an inevitable part of life and development as the striving to change and grow manifests itself. Similarly, peace is not a static, permanent or completed state, either individually or collectively, but a dynamic process of constantly seeking harmony within the current interacting individual, social, economic and political conditions. It fluctuates between more or less peaceful, either promoting or hampering desired development (Barash & Webel 2002:14).

Within the field of Peace and Conflict studies, peace is often described as: “a process involving activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within specific societies and in the wider international community” (Ibeanu 2005:10). As conflict decreases, opportunities for development increase, and vice versa.

A distinction needs to be made between negative and positive peace. Negative peace refers to the mere absence of war/fighting and can often be considered a “forced peace.” Barash and Webel 2002: 6 explained: “The Pax (peace) of Roman times really indicated nothing more than the absence of overt interstate violence, typically a condition of non-resistance...... enforced by legal arrangements and the military might of Roman legions.” This can result in the suppression of weaker forces (groups) by a stronger force, leading to political and social repression by the dominant ruling party.

Positive peace, as advanced by Johan Galtung and others (Barash & Webel 2002:6-8), holds the ideal of not only the absence of violence but also the opportunity for “joining together” and for growth and development. As efforts are made towards eradicating exploitation, the wellbeing and
harmonious relationships within and between individuals, communities and nations are encouraged. **Positive peace** is more difficult to attain as it requires a shared vision, cooperation and justice from the participants which are often from diverse backgrounds. As new conflicts erupt, the need for reassessment and recreation of new levels of understanding, negotiations and agreements might present itself, disrupting the current peace. Within this continual creative process of establishing and maintaining positive peace, these conflicts and possible injustices need to be confronted in order to constantly re-establish harmonious and peaceful co-existence.

For the purposes of this paper the following definition of peace will be used: **Peace is a dynamic, complex and multifaceted process aimed at establishing balance and harmony that will bring tranquillity and soundness of mind to facilitate management/transformation of conflict and enable desired development and growth.** Within this state of balance and harmony, tolerance persists; understanding and knowledge of self and others can grow through open dialogue; respect and acceptance of differences can take place; and through “joining together,” development and the highest good and well-being of humanity can be pursued to contribute to a state of individual and collective wellness and wholeness.

**CONFLICT AS INEVITABLE**

The word Conflict originates from the Latin word *confligere* which means “striking together,” resulting from tension between two opposing and seemingly incompatible forces, causing disagreement and disharmony (King & Miller 2006:52).

On a psychological/individual level *conflict* can refer to a mental struggle resulting from tension and clashes between two or more opposing and seemingly irreconcilable feelings, needs, drives, and internal or external desires and duties (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary*).

On an interpersonal / relationship level *conflict* can refer to strong disagreements and disharmony in relationships as a result of real or
perceived differences in nature, needs, values or interests. This can be perceived as a potential threat to the maintenance and survival of the individual/group, manifesting in antagonism, quarrelling and other dramatic actions (McGowan et al. 2006:265).

On a national/international level conflict can manifest in similar ways when different internal or external groups disagree, struggle and clash around real or seemingly incompatible needs, values and interests leading to tension, competition and a “striking together” of the opposing forces (King & Miller 2006:53).

The diversity of human beings and societies brings with it the pervasiveness of regular disagreements, competition and conflict as differences emerge and give rise to perceived threats, clashes and disharmony. Conflict is considered a natural and normal manifestation within society that need not necessarily be considered totally negative. Faleti 2005: 36 states that “depending on how conflict is handled, it can be either constructive or destructive.” When conflict is managed in a destructive way, it can lead to escalation of the conflict; deepened divisions resulting in more rigid boundaries between parties; increased hatred encouraging destructive behaviour; and hindered development and progress. In a constructive approach towards conflict the opposite can occur by de-escalating the conflict; opening up boundaries for healthier interaction between parties; increasing tolerance and understanding; and encouraging development and progress.

In an attempt to better understand and approach conflict, various theories of conflict have emerged (Faleti 2005:35-57), including:

1. Structural, Economic and Systemic Theories proposed by theorists such as Marx and Galtung, focus mainly on external factors and the structure and organisation of societies as causes of conflict. Systemic factors including social, political and economic practices resulting in injustice, exploitation, poverty and prevention of meeting human needs for survival and development are considered the main causes of
conflict. Grievances over perceived injustices and existing difficulties lead to instability and conflict.

2. Realist, Biological and Frustration-Aggression Theories focus mainly on individual *internal* factors driven by the need for survival as causes of conflict. Explanations such as the innate selfishness of human nature with pursuits for personal interests / power are extended to include the innate biological survival instinct which reacts aggressively when provoked, frustrated or threatened. In the attempt to secure survival, frustration and the inability to fulfil human needs can result in conflict.

3. Human needs Theories propose very simply that conflict arises when basic human needs are denied or cannot be met, resulting in tension and conflict.

4. Physiological Theories include both human nature and environmental factors as causes of conflict. Aggression need not be the inevitable result of experienced tension and conflict, either *internal* or *external*, because humans have the ability to contain strong emotions, reflect and choose appropriate responses.

5. Psycho-Cultural and Relational Theories focus on conflict as induced through *socialisation*, *enculturation* and *relationships* between individuals and groups. History plays an important role with divisions often based on historical experiences and built on misunderstandings, negative stereotypes, discrimination and intolerance. Enemy images; past injustices and persecutions; perceived threats to the continued existence and identity of the group and related deep-seated conditions establish fear and defence against others. This often results in selective perceptions, rigid boundaries between “us” versus “them” and disrupted communications which serve to maintain and fuel conflict and disharmony.

Each of these theories provides valuable insights but also brings awareness of the complexity and multidimensional nature of *conflict*. Conflict can
manifest within the person on an individual level, between individuals and
groups as well as on a much larger scale within or between nations. Conflict
can be visible and active or lie dormant until provoked. A multitude of
causes can contribute to conflict including biological, psychological,
relational, social, economic, political, cultural, historical and systemic. A
comprehensive and multi-disciplinary approach is required when
considering management and transformation of conflict in the pursuit of a
more peaceful way of life (Faleti 2005:36-7; King & Miller 2006:52).

Conflict is inevitable in human interactions and needs to be managed and
transformed appropriately so as to avoid escalations that can erupt into
destructive violence and war. Individual and group needs, values and
interests are not necessarily compatible with other individuals and groups.
An individual or group may feel dissatisfied, angry or threatened by others,
resulting in competition and conflict that can escalate into violence if not

VIOLENCE

The nature of conflict and the tension brought about by disagreement
between opposing and seemingly incompatible forces (either internal or
external), can lead to violence. This tension often holds within it a
perceived threat to survival, culminating in fear and aggressive behaviour
as an attempt is made to “fight for survival” or for what is considered
“rightfully one’s own.”

According to Galtung (in Juma 2009:61-2) three different types of
violence can be distinguished, namely:

1. Physical violence resulting in actual, direct injury, either physical or
   psychological, including war, domestic abuse, corporal punishment,
   assault, rape and others.

2. Structural violence resulting from social, economic and political
   structures and organisation of society, harming and even destroying
   certain individuals and groups through oppression by a dominant
group. This subtle form of violence often works slowly through ways such as maintained poverty, hunger, poor health, degradation, limited control and legal rights and general erosion of viable means to sustain life or promote development.

3. Cultural violence where the belief of superiority of one cultural group is used to justify suppression of another group defined as “inferior,” often through use of structural and physical violence.

Violence as a response to conflict is complex and includes individual, familial, community and national components that can contribute. Violence occurs when injury is done to oneself or another, either directly or indirectly. It takes place within relationships and interaction between individuals, groups or nations, or between parts of oneself as an individual. Violence brings pain and tragedy to victims as well as victimisers. Although it is a common and often accepted response to conflict in a world filled with danger and threats, it is not necessarily reliable and has been proven to be rather ineffective in the long-term resolution and transformation of conflict.

Violence truly is: emotional, verbal or physical behaviour that dominates, diminishes or destroys ourselves and others. Violence crosses boundaries without permission. Violence disrupts authentic relationships... Violence may provide a “quick fix” but it is costly and potentially ineffective; it is unlikely to resolve the conflict to the satisfaction of each of the parties concerned (Juma 2009:64).

If conflict is an inevitable part of society and human interactions, how then can a way of life be forged where conflict is managed / transformed successfully by involved parties in such a way that violence and destruction is prevented?

**NON-VIOLENT CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION**

For centuries many believed that there were no alternatives to powerful violent and armed responses to conflict or injustice. It was accepted that
humans are by nature aggressive and that war is the result of an “instinctual” response motivated by fear and the need to protect and fight for survival and justice. This argument however compares human nature to that of animals, without taking into account the ability of the human person to rationally reflect, consider various options, make appropriate choices and act accordingly. It also does not include the ability specific to human nature to learn, change, grow and develop towards improved states of responding and being. With time and through the development of various scientific discoveries (including physiological, psycho-cultural, relational and humanistic approaches) it has become evident that the acceptance of war, violence and the use of arms and military defence as a way of life and survival has been conditioned through socialisation. Institutional enforcement of obedience, idealism, suggestibility and other ways of possession and use of superior powers have been encouraged to ensure a continuation of a culture of violence and warfare (Juma 2009:64-7).

Within this culture and mind-set, the use of power and forced submission often lead to other forms of violence such as structural violence and oppression of certain groups or nations by the more powerful, resulting in injustices and destructive suffering. The need to find constructive alternatives to violent and armed/military responses to protect existing systems or to challenge unjust systems developed and culminated into the concept of Active Non-violence of which Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King (junior) are examples (Stephan 2016:2).

Active Non-violence developed from theories proposed by Sharp and others such as philosopher Hannah Arendt (in Stephan 2016:1) stating that “power is fluid and ultimately grounded in the consent and cooperation of ordinary people, who can decide to restrict or withhold that support.” Through non-cooperation, public protests and interventions without the use of threat or injuring forces, attempts are made to bring social change and address injustice. Methods such as peaceful marches, stay-aways, consumer boycotts and sit-ins are used to bring about awareness, expose injustice and change power structures without the use of violence, bullets or bombs.
As application of these non-violent approaches expanded and continued, researchers and practitioners discovered that the generally accepted norm of reacting to conflict with intensified power, violence, war and attempts to win or control the conflict, hardly ever resulted in sustainable long-term results. Active non-violent approaches are often twice as successful as violent or armed struggles and are also associated with more peaceful and democratic societies (Stephan 2016:4).

Active non-violence does not mean passivity or acceptance and submission to situations or systems that are oppressive, unjust, punitive or destructive. It rather refers to “withdrawal of obedience” and non-cooperation in an attempt to undermine the power of oppressors and unjust systems. Rather than using counter power or force, people can “stand up to violence, tyranny, and dictatorship without spilling the blood of the target group or threatening lives” (King & Miller 2006:22).

Rosenberg developed “Non-Violent Communication” (NVC) as a valuable approach to use within relationships to encourage deeper understanding of our own as well as other’s needs, values, emotions and required actions. Deeper, more accurate and truthful observation and identification of these needs, values and feelings can contribute towards a compassionate understanding of ourselves and others and preventing conflicts. NVC holds the potential for improved relationships through respectful interactions, increased compassionate consideration and appropriate requests and actions, as opposed to misunderstandings, blaming, shaming, demanding, judging or dominating (The Center for Nonviolent Communication n.d.).

The above non-violent approaches for socio-political and individual/relational conflict transformation offer useful new possibilities but should be used cautiously. Inappropriate application through rigid and enforced rules can lead to judging, labelling and dominating yet again as subtler and more covert forms of violence are introduced. Examples include intimidation of those who can/will not participate in marches/stay-aways, or ostracising individuals who find it difficult to identify and express deeper needs, values and feelings.
There is a growing awareness that human minds and inventions create and sustain the idea that power, war and violence is needed to approach conflict and to defend, protect and secure survival. The truth of this dangerous and destructive way of life is now challenged intensely as it is becoming evident that the continuation of the development and use of nuclear, biochemical and other weapons along with violent approaches to conflict and perceived threats are threatening the future and all life on our planet (Barash & Webel 2002:26).

The hope for survival lies in the very same human minds to change direction from inventing war and weapons, to inventing peace. Based on our universal and basic human need for social relationships, bonding and love, this change can take place through the use of our “weapons of will,” (Stephan 2016:1), and in the modification of approaches, attitudes, behaviour and socialisation. As Juma (2009:67) states: “The same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each one of us.”

**TOWARDS A PEACEFUL WAY OF LIFE**

In our imperfect world, with imperfect humans and where conflict and strife is inevitable as a result of our diversity, competition for resources and struggle for justice, how can a more peaceful way of life be “invented”?

The challenge lies in careful consideration of our underlying mind-sets, attitudes, approaches and choices for actions and behaviour as we constantly turn away from destructive violence towards more constructive and peaceful approaches/behaviour. A paradigm shift is needed on every level of society: In individuals, families, communities and in and between nations. Dear (2016:1) states that “nonviolence requires nonviolence to ourselves, nonviolence towards all people, all creatures, and all creation.” A conversion of hearts, mind-sets (thought patterns) and approaches to socialisation, away from violence and towards love, is required. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King insisted that power lies in
nonviolence which is stronger than any amount of weapons used. Both Gandhi and King held that Jesus was the greatest example in history of active nonviolence through the use of the power of love which is neither passive nor weak (Dear 2016:10; Catholic Nonviolence Initiative 2016:2).

A peaceful way of life needs to be built on the foundations of a basic respect for all forms of life and for the dignity of every human person. Two important principles to be applied in the conversion of hearts and minds are:

1. Love for oneself and for others: where love refers to the Agape love defined by C.S. Lewis (2012:141-70) as a charitable love that unconditionally wishes the other well as opposed to wishing for harm or destruction. Agape love differs from other types of love such as affectionate, friendship or erotic love and is primarily a matter of will rather than emotion. Agape love is possible in all human relationships, even toward ones’ enemies, and essential to a peaceful way of life. It infers that we wish no harm on others even if we do not like or approve of what they say or do. If we love ourselves and others in this way, we will refrain from using violent destructive methods to transform conflicts.

2. Do no harm: as proposed by Hindu, Buddhist, Hippocratic oath and other traditions of Ahimsa which refers to respect for all living things, absence of violence from body, mind and spirit and not-hurting (Jacob 2012:30).

St Paul provides useful guidelines when referring to the various “fruits of the Spirit” (Gal 5:22-3 THB):

1. Love in the form of Agape love that respects all forms of life and wishes oneself and others well

2. Joy reflected in a cheerful disposition that appreciates the good amidst difficulties and adversities.
3. Peace experienced as tranquillity, harmony, right relationships and the absence of agitation and discord.

4. Longsuffering manifesting as patience and the ability to endure adversity and provocation without retaliation and losing self-control.

5. Kindness reflected in a love and willingness to help and to maintain relationships even when patience is tested.

6. Goodness lived out as “Love in Action,” with a kind and generous heart reflected in daily living and relationships with all others.

7. Faithfulness in steadfast relationships where we stay true to our promises and prove to be dependable, loyal, dedicated, stable and trustworthy.

8. Gentleness of which both Jesus and Gandhi are perfect role models in their practise of controlled strength, moderate and fair approaches and *gentle firmness*. Similar to the *Principle of Moderation* proposed by Aristotle (Garvey & Stangroom 2012:97) these two role models of non-violence emphasised the need for a balanced approach. Love and gentleness are basic human needs but in order to protect and be just, gentleness requires a balance by including *clear boundaries*, respect, discipline and consideration of all involved.

9. Self-control is vital for *peaceful living* but poses major challenges in non-violent approaches. Human emotions carry powerful energy which can be difficult to control. The word emotion means *to set in motion* and is part of the human innate protective mechanism to ensure survival. The built-in fight-or-flight response reacts with fear, anger and similar emotions to activate the motion to protect. When lack of self-control is combined with other factors such as trauma, social isolation or lack of personal responsibility (using externalised blame), the powerful energy of emotions can result in terrible suffering, violence and destruction. Lack of self-control is often blamed on the need for immediate gratification and lack of discipline. Although these factors can contribute, it is important to
realise that emotions are necessary parts of being human. Hayes (2016:1-6) discusses the importance of parenting and socialising in the development of healthy abilities to regulate strong impulses / emotions. Neuroscience have proved that, in order for the regulatory pathways in the human brain to develop adequately to allow for healthy self-control and mastering of emotions, consistent love and gentle firmness during childhood is vitally important. Healthy self-control makes it possible to stop, reflect, discern and choose appropriate behavioural responses rather than act impulsively when powerful emotions are experienced. This comes back to the two principles of love and no-harm.

Application of the above principles in daily life poses huge challenges. It implies that every individual, family, community and nation need to take personal ownership and responsibility to wish oneself and others well and to strive to abstain from hurting oneself and others.

Within and between families, communities and nations, healthy boundaries, balanced between firmness and openness, need to be encouraged. Firm enough to provide protection, order and accountability but also open enough to allow for interaction, dialogue, improved understanding, healthier relationships and the needed exchange of ideas, information and resources. Flexible and sustainable boundaries with a healthy flow of movement and exchange between “internal” and “external” are vitally important to foster growth and development (Heyns & Stefiszyn 2006:245).

Parents, teachers and leaders need to be aware of their responsibility to protect and appropriately socialise vulnerable children and others while allowing for the development of skills and the ability to reflect, dialogue, negotiate and transform conflicts in a non-autocratic and non-violent way. Freedom of expression tempered by respect and consideration for all as well as an awareness of the importance of carefully considered choices needs to be fostered in a loving and supportive environment. Within families, communities and nations, the needs and rights of every individual
need to be respected and met as far as possible, while at the same time expecting every individual to take responsibility and use their abilities to contribute (Lederach 1997:37-85).

Efforts and implementation of non-violent conflict transformation by individuals, families and communities who already walk this peaceful way of life hold the potential to ripple out into nations and globally. This is illustrated by the following case examples:

**A CASE EXAMPLE FROM PAKISTAN**

**Transformation from Violent Jihad to Non-Violent Peace-building**

Gulalai Ismail describes her own process of transformation in her TEDxTalk “Be a (non-violent) hero, not a martyr” emphasising the various influences, opportunities and contextual factors that can collide to influence the choices made by individuals to pursue either violence or peace (Ismail 2017).

Until the age of nine Gulalai grew up in the small village of Swabi, North-West Pakistan. She describes the village as “deeply remote, traditional and religious” and as providing a “perfect incubator for producing militant mind-sets.” Norms in the village taught that life is short and should be hated. That the “real life” is the “afterlife” and the sooner this “afterlife” starts, the better for the person, family or group. It also taught that all Muslims will go to heaven. Gulalai says she “considered herself very lucky being born in a Muslim family” (Ismail 2017).

Discrimination in the village was deeply ingrained and any alternative beliefs deemed “wrong.” Whereas in Islam *jihad* means “struggle,” this is taken to the extreme and distorted by political Islamists to carry a limited meaning. Within this limited meaning all Muslims are expected to take on the responsibility of their Muslim brotherhood by helping and defending other Muslims all over the world through violent *jihad* and war. Indoctrination and recruitment often takes place through the teachings of the local *Madrasah*. Thousands of young people are recruited,
indoctrinated and encouraged to fight. When the dead body of a family member killed during violent *jihad* is returned to the family, it brings with it cause for celebration and elevation of this family within the community. The deaths are cherished and the family considered “more holy” and the “whole family will go to Heaven – guaranteed!” (Ismail 2017).

Within this cultural / religious belief system, gender discrimination is enforced, dictating that boys and men are superior while girls need to know their place and be subservient. When a boy is born, the family celebrates and rejoices. When a girl is born, it is considered a shame, carrying sadness and disappointment.

Gulalai became more intensely aware of the shame of her existence at the age of eleven when her parents told her that she is now no longer a child but an adult. She was expected to wear a scarf and not leave the house anymore. From inside her house she observed the slogans outside on the walls of the village recruiting violent *jihadists*, encouraging young people to go to war. She experienced inner conflict between feeling her shame of being a girl, bestowed upon her by the cultural context within which she felt trapped, and the invitation to move outside to become part of something bigger, more “glamorous and exciting.” With violent *jihad* being open to both men and women it offered the possibilities of breaking through her “walls of shame” to be free, to belong and to become a martyr-hero through sacrificing her life in the name of violent *jihad*. This ideal became the driving force and motivation to give meaning to her restricted life until the age of sixteen (Ismail 2017).

A vitally important person however influenced Gulalai: Her loving and caring father, a peace-loving man who did not believe in violence, war or the distorted meaning of violent *jihad*. As a result of his strong convictions he was accused of being an infidel when Gulalai was nine years old. Fearing for his life the family had to flee from their village.

One day Gulalai’s father overheard his children talking and with shock realised that his own children had been indoctrinated. He took a firm resolve to “reverse the harm done” and set out on a mission to “plant
seedlings of hope and peace.” He invested all his resources into educating his children and to opening up their minds and hearts. He exposed them to the history and experiences of local non-violent heroes like Gandhi and others who stood-up for independence from colonisation, to individuals such as Nelson Mandela who taught reconciliation, and various examples of non-violent heroism. He introduced them to many alternative ways and beliefs such as liberalism, secularism and pluralism and arranged meetings with free-thinkers, politicians and activists with very different world views. He took many risks, exposing his children to the wide variety of possibilities to live life and to make a meaningful contribution without turning to violence or discriminatory practices (Ismail 2017).

One of these meetings made a deep impression on Gulalai: A meeting with the mother of a thirteen-year-old boy who was taught and indoctrinated by a local Madrasah. The boy disappeared, only for his body to be returned to his mother later with a message: “Congratulations! You are the mother of a martyr. You will go to heaven.” The personal devastation and sorrow of this mother affected Gulalaia so deeply that she experienced a transformation. From someone who was holding on to the indoctrinated group-ideal to become a violent jihadist, she now no longer “wanted to be that kid” or to “kill or be killed.” Her personal/individual identity surfaced as she witnessed this mothers’ pain and it dawned on her that “Jihad brings pain! Not glory.” She realised that the main difference between her and this boy was opportunity. He had the opportunity to go to war and fight for jihad, following the group-identity ideal. For Gulalai her father stood in the way of her opportunity to go and fight. Instead, he provided opportunities to gently direct his children into another direction to develop and strengthen their own personal/individual identities to encourage them to make different choices (Ismail 2017).

The efforts of Gulalai’s father paid off: It transformed Gulalia from a girl with an ideal to participate in violent jihad, to someone who wanted to prevent it. She no longer just wanted “freedom” for herself in a distorted way through pursuing group ideals, but wanted to work for individual “freedom, independence and decision making for all women” (Ismail 2017).
At the age of 16 Gulalai and her sister Saba co-founded the movement *Aware Girls* to challenge the cultural intolerances and extremism and to provide young girls and women with skills and support to stand up in non-violent ways for their rights to education and equal opportunities. This movement has grown into an “internationally renowned organisation that since 2002 has trained empowered and inspired hundreds of young people in Pakistan” (Ismail 2017).

While participating in a two-month residential leadership course for young adults, Gulalai not only learned about *hope, peace* and *human rights*, but had to “live it.” For the first time in her life she was living away from home amongst women and men from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The challenges experienced here taught her to face her greatest fears and to grow in strength and confidence, transforming her life once again (Ismail 2017).

In 2007 when the Taliban increased their activities and security deteriorated even more in Pakistan, Gulalai increasingly witnessed how young people were “killing and being killed.” Although she could relate and identify with their ideals and motivations, she was horrified to see her city known as the “city of flowers” turning into “the city of suicide bomb attacks.” She experienced a calling to fight this through a movement of counter-radicalisation and recruitment for *peace*. The *Youth Peace Network* was established with Gulalai recruiting young people to join her movement to help prevent other young people from becoming violent *jihadists* and to provide hope and opportunities for unlocking their potential through becoming involved in “building peaceful and prosperous communities.” This network has grown from 30 to more than 500 peer educators reaching out and recruiting young people for *peace-building* activities, reaching over 3000 young people every year. As a result, many lives have been saved and more than 10 000 young people’s lives have been impacted positively by preventing recruitment for destructive militant activities and encouraging activities towards building peaceful and prosperous communities (Ismail 2017).
Gulalai (Ismail 2017) emphasises 5 important Key factors that need to be addressed to counteract radicalisation and violent extremism:

1. Militants/extremists promote one unified worldview rejecting all other views as wrong. Within this peace-building movement, young people of different cultures, religions and ethnicities are brought together and given the opportunity to interact and to get to know and understand each other. They are encouraged to respect and celebrate the value and beauty of their differences.

2. Militants/extremists make young people vulnerable by cutting them off from their indigenous identities and isolating them. Peace-building reconnects individuals to their indigenous culture and history and encourages them to celebrate this.

3. Militants/extremists make young people feel valuable and worthy through inclusion, belonging and fighting for the common cause of violent jihad. In peace-building, young people are provided with opportunities for belonging and being part of the community through participation, making a difference and being celebrated for contributions which make them feel valuable and worthy.

4. Militants/extremists teach that the only glory is in war and the only type of hero is the martyr. In peace-building, non-violent heroism is promoted where glory and heroism is sought in goals higher than jihad, such as rebuilding communities, saving lives, living a peaceful way of life promoting peace, development and prosperity.

5. Militants/extremists focus on political, social and religious ideologies, indoctrinating young people into group thinking and group identities to the detriment of individual identities. Peace-building discovered the importance of engaging and focusing on people individually.

Gulalai emphasises the importance of individual and unique personal triggers that can collide with political and social circumstances as well as opportunities to result in the radicalisation of a person. Relationships are considered key to providing opportunities for different choices. Young
people are particularly vulnerable to the influences of their peers. Positive and peaceful interaction with each other with some role models and non-violent heroes provides inspiration within peer groups. Radicalisation does not occur in a vacuum but takes place when individual and socio-political circumstances collide within available opportunities.

Gulalai stresses the need to counteract the extended pursuit of extremist violence in the world through tearing “down the walls in our minds and offering a more hopeful vision – where everyone is valued and everyone is able to contribute” (Ismail 2017).

This approach to *peace-building* is working in Pakistan and can be extended to other parts and contexts in the world. Gulalai has become a non-violent hero, receiving many rewards acknowledging her valuable contribution towards challenging violent extremism as well as discriminatory gender practices against women (Davison 2017:1; Debenham 2017).

**Discussion**

The above case example highlights many of the aspects in the preceding discussion on the search towards living a *peaceful way of life*:

Gulalai and her peace-loving father and family, is prepared to make a mind-shift to challenge the on-going socio-political and cultural beliefs prominent in their community. This mainly happens when Gulalai reaches the age of 11 and experiences individual inner conflict and shame as a result of the cultural gender discriminations with accompanying repressive restrictions. Her intense inner conflict and desire for freedom pushes her towards a desperate need to solve this conflict, fuelling her ideal to join the violent jihadist movement where gender discriminations are minimised/eradicated.

This experience does not occur in a vacuum but is rooted in the cultural/religious norms developed during the extended socio-political history of Pakistan. The foundation for Pakistan was considered to be laid during the early medieval period (642-1219 AD) when the majority of the regional Hindu and Buddhist population was converted to Islam. This continued to
play an important role in the rule of Muslim empires in the region. As European influences increased, the power and influence of these Muslim empires were undermined. With British colonisation of the region (1612-1947), various changes were implemented, undermining traditional institutions and teachings by the Muslim Madrasahs, resulting in loss of power and income to these groups. Additionally, the British made use of the “Divide and rule” approach to maintain power, creating rifts and rivalries which resulted in discord between different ethnic and religious groups in the region (Kulke & Rothermund 2016:194-231; Lapidus 2002:382-97; Xypolia 2016:221).

By 1947 when independence from British colonisation was obtained, great rifts and intense discord had formed between Muslim, Hindu and other citizens in the area, creating fear, mistrust and great concern amongst Muslims regarding the future of their faith and cultural heritage. Intense rioting, violence and genocidal killings between the different factions in the region during the transitional period towards independence resulted in the loss of an estimated 200 000 to 2 000 000 lives. (Kulke & Rothermund 2016:194-231; Lapidus 2002:382-97; Tashia 2002:131; Wolpert 2006:163).

A call went out for an “Independent and Separate Muslim state” to protect the rights, future and continued existence of the Muslim population. In 1947 Pakistan was founded with the first Governor-General, Jinnah, envisioning a “pure” and ideological Islamic state and utopia with all Muslims of the World uniting to protect themselves against their aggressive enemies by honouring and expanding Islam (Jaffrelot 2004:224; Lapidus 2002:382-97).

Through many different phases of history and development this ideology persisted, resulting in Pakistan adopting a new constitution in 1973 stipulating Islam as the state religion and all laws conforming to “the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran.” Currently an estimated 95-98% of the population in Pakistan are Muslim and opportunities for governance and political-social rule and position are restricted to Muslims only (Jaffrelot 2004:224; Khurshid 2010:189).
It is within this context that Gulalai’s story unfolds in a “remote, traditional and religious” village where “discrimination is deeply ingrained.” The historical memories, accompanied by fear of annihilation, are carried over into modern society, creating enemy images of any challenges to the current belief system. Preventative efforts are organised through violent jihad to annihilate any possible threat to the Muslim identity and existence, aided by suicide bombers who become martyr-heroes in the quest to protect and preserve the continued existence of the (previously) threatened Muslim identity and culture.

Gulalai’s father however, has witnessed alternative possibilities and results through exposure to non-violent heroes and activists who served as role models during his life time. As a peace-loving and non-violent person he has managed to overcome many of his fears and discriminatory approaches towards others and life. He no longer feels threatened by differences and can find the courage to take risks to introduce his own children to new and alternative possibilities, breaking down rigid boundaries and transforming fear and an “us” versus “them” mentality into a more open, tolerant and accepting approach, encouraging them to respect differences but to also be grounded in their own unique and personal identities and culture.

This is a good example of creating and maintaining healthy boundaries: Instead of a rigid boundary between “us” and “them,” openness is encouraged, allowing for interaction with “the other/them”; exchange of ideas and resources can take place; understanding and tolerance can increase; relationships can improve. At the same time this is balanced with a firmness of individual boundaries to provide the necessary protection, order and accountability. A similar balance between open and firm boundaries is visible in the approaches used by this peace-building movement: young people are introduced to differences between themselves and encouraged to better understand and celebrate these differences. At the same time, they are encouraged to re-connect with their own historical and cultural history and identity as opposed to isolating themselves from it. This ensures that the individual identity does not “disappear” in service to group identity/ideologies, providing a healthy
psychological foundation and balance to manage interaction and conflicts between the “internal” and “external” worlds of systems (individual, family, community, nations). Opportunity to foster peaceful co-existence and development is provided (Heyns & Stefiszyn 2006:245).

Through Gulalai’s own participatory openness and efforts she becomes aware of the pain caused to both victims and victimisers by violence, discrimination and false, un-examined and out-dated beliefs. She is transformed and manages to overcome her fears of the “enemy-other.” Her own inner conflict and need to escape from her shame and restrictions through the ideal of violent jihad, transforms into a dream to move away from violence towards a more peaceful, hopeful approach. Not only will she preserve her own life and prevent harming herself and others (Ahimsa), but she wants to share this non-violent vision for a peaceful and prosperous community life with her peers. Not only does she want freedom and resolution of her own inner conflict, but she also works for freedom, independence and responsible decision-making for others through relationships and bonding. Assisted by the example and contributions of her peace-loving father, Gulalai can make a paradigm shift in her own thoughts and actions which in turn sets an example and contributes towards the transformation of thousands of other young people.

Gulalai emphasises the basic human need to belong and to participate within a community where individuals share a common vision regardless of their individual differences. Violence and other forms of extremism are often attributed mainly to socio-political contexts with the exclusion of sufficient consideration for the individual and family contexts. For Gulalai transformation was facilitated by her fathers’ contributions interacting with her own willingness to participate. For this to be possible, a relatively healthy relationship between Gulalai and her father was essential. Relationship and the basic universal human need for bonding and love, is key to providing opportunities for different choices to bring about change (Stephan 2016:1).
Nocum (2016:1) explains how terrorists and other organisations use the vulnerabilities of youths to attract them. These organisations provide what the youth search for but cannot find in their own families, schools, communities or jobs, such as acknowledgement, belongingness, a sense of identity, purpose and to be respected and valued. A report by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (PSC Interview: “Not all young people in jihadist groups are ‘radicalised youth’,” 2017) confirms that “radicalisation through indoctrination” can be a misleading concept as many youth don’t join violent organisations primarily for religious or financial reasons but as a result of a “collision” between their own personal/individual experiences and a multitude of other factors including social, economic, religious, political and historical contributors. As Gulalai states: It is very important to focus on and understand the individual and her / his specific triggers and contextual motivations which are driving participation in violence, and to provide opportunities to enable the person to make different choices for living and contributing towards a more peaceful way of life (Ismail 2017).

**OTHER BRIEF CASE EXAMPLES**

**Conflict Transformation and Peace-building in Kenya**

Kimau (2016:1-3) discusses how the practices of non-violence and her experiences since 2009 inspired her to be an agent of change. She became involved in conflicted communities in Northern-Kenya where most of the community members were born, grew up and are now aging in perpetual war and violence. As Kimau was living in the community and teaching the traumatised children at school, she came to understand the culture of violent conflicts with perpetual cycles of revenge and hatred which is passed over from one generation to the next. A deep divide between the two pastoral groups of the Rendille and Borana communities in the area became increasingly entrenched as rigid boundaries were maintained between “us” versus “them.” No interaction or exchange / sharing of resources was allowed. The “other” was perceived as the “enemy” or
“devil” and any conflict led to violence and killings, with praise from within the community for the “hero” who “defended” his own community against the “other.” Children were socialised in these violent approaches as being the norm, resulting in vicious cycles of violence, loss, pain, bitterness and anger.

Kimau set about to intercept this vicious cycle of violence by first building trust and encouraging interaction and dialogue within and between the communities, starting with the elders and decision makers. Transformation gradually occurred as the elders listened and perceptions changed. Understanding and tolerance improved as “enemy images” changed into “human beings” and boundaries could gradually open up to allow more positive engagement and communication. The elders started encouraging the people to take ownership and responsibility, to unite and work towards the common goal of reducing the violence and to build peace. As collaboration increased and communication improved, violent attacks were reduced, eventually resulting in trading and sharing of resources between the two communities. Kimau (2016:3) reports that for the past three years the two communities have been living in a peaceful environment where bloody conflict is no longer the norm and where respect and appreciation for the preciousness of every life has been restored within a shared vision for peaceful co-existence and development.

Addressing the Violent Policing Crisis in the U.S.A.

Maples (2016:1-6), a former police officer, discusses the current crisis in policing in the U.S.A., where unnecessary and even deadly force is sometimes used along with racial profiling and bias. Maples referred to the application of some Buddhist approaches which made it possible for him to prevent harm and to commit to non-aggression. He learned that a police officer needs to be able to “employ both the gentle compassion of understanding and the fierce compassion of setting boundaries to protect.” Wisdom and the ability to be able to discern whether gentle or fierce compassion is required in a specific situation, needs to be fostered.
The current crisis is attributed to certain militaristic influences, racism, the lack of trust, trauma and emotional compounding factors. A mind-set of “being at war” is perpetuated in police departments. The “war on drugs” has been exchanged for the “war on terrorism” after 9/11. This mind-set creates tension and an armoured defensiveness in police officers experiencing their environment as a hostile “war zone” and no longer as a task to protect and serve fellow citizens. The initial yearning and commitment to alleviate suffering, to protect and to prevent harm in non-violent ways is buried. Mistrust has grown between police officers and the community, perpetuating the cycle which often culminates in violence and injustices.

Maples (2016:1-6) suggests a return to the purposes of preventing crime and working for justice, with acknowledgement of the interdependence and shared responsibility between the community and the police officers. Rigid boundaries need to be opened up through effective communication and interaction. Both police officers and community members need to find alternative ways to respond instead of the current ways of reactivity, resistance and violence as fear is triggered. Trust needs to be restored and efforts by individuals, the community and the police department need to be integrated to address fear, reactivity and crime through a shared vision and commitment to non-violence, prevention of harm and the use of compassion and caring as “weapons.”

Maples (2016:6) concludes that “Any one of us can be the person who, rather than exacerbating pain and violence, transforms it by the way we bear witness and respond.”

**THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

The need for conversion of both minds and hearts of humans in society in the quest for a more peaceful way of life emphasises the importance of including and integrating rational / practical / behavioural as well as emotional / psychological / spiritual components of human nature into nurturing. Any socialisation, including parental influences; formal
education; religious formation and institutional operations need to take all these various elements into consideration (Ramose 1999:59).

In the African term *Ubuntu*, based on the concept of *wholeness of being* against fragmentation, reference is made to a constant sharing, interaction and adjusting to the dynamic life forces as order and harmony is perpetually sought and re-established. *Ubuntu* helps to maintain the balance of human, natural and spiritual forces. There is a constant search for harmony where *reason* can only be expressed through *emotion*. The two cannot be separated in a fragmented way. Neither can human, natural or spiritual forces be separated nor past and future generations be discarded or ignored in a fragmentary way. The union of opposites becomes possible by the acknowledgement of inherent contradictions that need not be exclusive, but can be used to create “a unified and interconnected conception of human existence” (King & Miller 2006:42). Through collective characteristics such as love, tolerance, respect, caring, empathy, responsibility and accountability, conflicts and contradictions can be transformed into a more harmonious way of life. Professor Seleti (in King & Miller 2006:42) says: “Due to the centrality of the other person in my own existence it (*Ubuntu*) does not discriminate on the basis of race, gender, ability, or handicap. It accepts all persons as belonging to the community of the living.”

This then also infers that the responsibility for *peace* and justice in society can no longer be considered the sole responsibility of formal institutions or governments, but it becomes a collective responsibility where every individual, family, community and national institution actively participates in shaping and maintaining a more *peaceful way of life*. In this *way of life* justice will flow from the perpetual search for cosmic and collective harmony where *peace* is based on “joining together” and tolerating opposites, contradictions or ambiguity to facilitate *wholeness, inclusion, belonging and participation* (King & Miller 2006:41-7; Ramose 1999:64). In the words of Psalm 85:10, “Steadfast love and faithfulness will meet; righteousness and peace will kiss each other.”

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CONCLUSION

Peace is not a static state that can be pursued, attained and forever held onto. Peace is a dynamic, complex and multifaceted process that is constantly changing and evolving. It fluctuates between “more” or “less” peaceful, either promoting or hampering desired development. A Peaceful Way of life will be committed to personal and social responsibility, justice and the non-violent transformation of conflict (Harris 2010:295).

For a Peaceful Way of life to be fostered in a sustainable way, a comprehensive and integrated approach is needed to convert human hearts and minds and to encourage the non-violent management/transformation of conflict built on mutual respect and commitment to a common vision.

As illustrated in the case examples above, every person holds the potential to make a difference by choosing non-violence and living a peaceful way of life. Global involvement of people everywhere is required to transform the violent and destructive power of systemic, military and other forms of control and injustices to the gentle but firm power of more respecting, open and trusting relationships through which fear, greed and despair can be transformed into compassion, hope and wholeness (Juma 2009:68-70).

NOTES

1 Cited after the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) of the Bible.

REFERENCES


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The South African War (1889-1902) and Post-War Afrikaner Identity

An Impact of Violence on the Construction of Ethnic-Social Identity

HEIDI PASQUES

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the factors that contributed to the construction of Afrikanerdom via the forging of alliances between a disparate group of people and the creation of a unified image of a volk based on mythologised Afrikaner figures from the past. My intention is to gain a deeper insight into the link between group social identities negatively impacted by inter-group violence and the building of sustainable peace. I argue that a better understanding of the role of violence in the construction of ethnic-social identity could serve to address the deeply entrenched emotional needs of people who have suffered violence more adequately in order to prevent future violence.

INTRODUCTION

South Africa has experienced decades of inter-group violence. This article seeks to develop insight into how social identity is re-constructed as a result of suffering inter-group violence and how it then may lead to further violence. While many ethnic groups in South Africa suffered as a result of the South African War, this analysis will be restricted to the Afrikaners as they later became the group that rose to power in the post-colonial period of the country’s history. My research focuses on the factors that contributed to the construction of Afrikanerdom via the forging of alliances between a
disparate group of people and the creation of a unified image of a *volk* based on mythologised Afrikaner figures from the past. I argue that a better understanding of the role of violence in the construction of ethnic-social identity could serve to address the deeply entrenched emotional needs of people who have suffered violence in order to prevent future violence (Cloete 1992:45). Thus, in a broad sense, this research aims to deepen the understanding of the link between group social identities negatively impacted by inter-group violence and the building of sustainable peace.

This research is framed by Social Identity Theory (SIT), pioneered by Tajfel and Turner (1979), whose work relate particularly well to scenarios of intense conflict. Using the Afrikaners who were the victims of British Imperialism in the South African War (1889-1902) as a case study, this article explores how Afrikaners reconstructed their social identity after the war when they found themselves in the lower classes of White society.

**THE AFRIKANER VOLK AT WAR WITH THE BRITISH EMPIRE**

In the Afrikaner mind the poem *Forgive and Forget* is forever associated with suffering at the hands of the British during the South African War.

> “That you do not forget the things which your eyes have seen” (Deut. 4:9).
> A green and growing thorn-tree
> Stood right against the track
> Where long spans of oxen
> Passed to the north and back...
> ...
> But one day as it grew there
> a wagon rode it down
> the big wheels cut a pathway
> across the bright green crown...
> Its loveliness was shattered,
> its young bark broken through;
> one place the sapling body
> was nearly cut in two...

(Totius 1908 in Moodie 1975:43; trans. Anthony Delius)
Afrikaners speak about the Anglo-Boer War, while the British called it simply the Boer War. Afrikaners also call it the Second Freedom War, the name which is still used on current Afrikaner websites such as Gelofteland (www.gelofteland.org). In recognition that this was not only a white people’s war, the term “the South African War” will be used in this article (Thompson 2000:141).

The path to inter-group conflict is a long winding one and encompasses a multitude of factors which eventually culminate in cruelty to others. Within South Africa’s complex history the Afrikaner ethnic group has played a central role. History judges them as the group that instituted the system of apartheid which resulted in painful suffering for the majority of South Africans. Here my intention is to take a step back, as it were, in order to probe the factors that contributed to the construction of Afrikanerdom via the forging of alliances between a disparate group of people and the creation of a unified image of a volk based on mythologised Afrikaner figures from the past.

In 1852 and 1854 respectively Afrikaners emigrated out of the British sphere of influence and established the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics while self-consciously fashioning a historical tradition, calling themselves Voortrekkers and their movement the Great Trek (Thompson 2000:69; 96; 109).

The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley (1867) and gold in Johannesburg (1886) were contributing factors to making South Africa a very desirable region for direct control by the British who were seeking to expand their empire. By the late 1880s Britain executed direct or indirect control over a large number of African societies, and was only thwarted in creating a South African federation by a successful Boer rebellion in the Transvaal. By the close of the 1890s, South Africa had been divided into British settler colonies and Boer Republics while indigenous independence had been destroyed (Worden 2007:22; 27).

The Transvaal Republic became the most economically viable region in South Africa and alarmed by the influx of Uitlanders (foreigners) –
consisting of English speaking British, Scots, Irish, Continental Europeans and Australians – to the gold fields, Transvaal President, Paul Kruger, took steps to limit their franchise as they soon outnumbered Afrikaners. Predominantly British Mining magnates and industrialists favoured British control as they identified “Britain with economic opportunity and the Boers with economic restriction” (Thompson 2000:138). A plot between Cecil John Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State in charge of colonies, to force the Transvaal Republic into the British Empire by supporting an uprising of Uitlanders, led to the failed Jameson Raid in 1889 which exacerbated tensions between the Uitlanders and the Transvaal state. Anti-Kruger propaganda and Uitlander grievances were used by Lord Milner as reasons for amassing troops in the Cape and Natal (Thompson 2000:139).

In October 1899, Kruger declared war on Britain and invaded Natal and the Northern Cape. Many Boers saw this as a necessary pre-emptive act in order to defend their homeland, especially those impoverished by recent droughts and a rinderpest epidemic who believed that a British regime would favour the prosperous English landowners and industrialists (Worden 2007:32). The British, underestimating the passionate Boer belief in the justice of their cause, were expecting an easy victory. At the onset of the war, a British writer Pakenham expressed the prevailing view of Boers, clearly identifying them as “other” to the British: “We have conjured up for ourselves a fantastic and outrageous image which we call a Boer. This savage being was hideous in form, unkempt, and unwashed, violent, hypocritical, a persecutor and an assassin of the English” (Giliomee 2003:254).

The fighting fell into three phases: in the first phase the Republican Afrikaners took the offensive and held the upper hand. In 1900, the second phase consisted of British victories as they relieved the besieged towns and captured 4000 Boer fighters. Confident that the war was nearly over Lord Roberts drove Kruger into exile and proclaimed the annexation of the two republics in December of that year (Thompson 2000:142). During March to July 1900 approximately 13000 Boers surrendered and those who
signed an oath of neutrality returned to their farms. In the third and final phase of the war, the remaining Afrikaner fighters (*Bittereinders*) resorted to guerrilla warfare as small mobile units attacked the British units on the fringes, seized their supplies and cut railroad tracks to impede troop movements (Thompson 2000:142). General Smuts described them as “men of invincible hope in the future and a child-like faith in God. Faith in the justice of their cause and faith in God had become synonymous” (Giliomee 2003:253). In response, Lord Kitchener adopted a scorched earth policy in which Afrikaner crops were burned and 30000 homesteads destroyed in order to make it impossible for commando fighters to find supplies or places to hide. Captured commandos were exiled and the civilian population was removed to civilian population camps. Approximately 28000 Afrikaner civilians, mainly women and children, died in these inefficiently administered camps, most of them of disease. Overwhelming military control of the Highveld finally forced the Afrikaners to surrender by signing the Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902 (Thompson 2000:142-3).

The South African War was immensely destructive to life and property on both sides and while the indigenous Black population suffered too, the Afrikaners in particular felt they had suffered greatly in the process of losing their independence.

**SCHOLARSHIP ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR AND AFRIKANNERDOM**

A number of scholars have explored the impact of the South African War on Afrikaner nationalism but very little work has been done on the link between conflict and social identity formation. De Reuck (1999:69-70) explores the “Politics of Pain” and its cultural appropriation in order to forge a national Afrikaner identity after the Treaty of Vereeniging. Her focus however is primarily on the neglected experiences of women and the Black indigenous population and the politicisation of their private pain, whereas the present analysis is concerned with how this war
narrative was exploited in the context of reconstructing a post-war Afrikaner ethnic identity.

Psychological research suggests that as intergroup conflict escalates each group will develop their own “collective narrative” about their role and the role of the “other” in past antagonism. Aiken (2008:10; 16) posits that groups shape their historical narratives of past violence in order to ennable themselves and portray the “others” as unjust. These historical beliefs become “truths” that are actively socialised, institutionalised and transmitted in order to maintain and rigidify group boundaries while the “other” is distorted by myth. These collective memories serve to reframe history in an “antagonistic and exclusionary manner.” Afrikaner suffering and bravery in the South African War are examples of myths of exclusion, and Krog (2013:161) demonstrated how the lack of multi-voiced versions of the war has caused Afrikaners to grow up with stories that acknowledge only their suffering in the face of British cruelty. This theme is further explored by Grundlingh (1999:354), in his paper on the Afrikaner’s role in World War II, where he alludes to the Afrikaner identity being found in all things anti-British while emphasising a common past of suffering at the hands of their Regime.

The present analysis seeks to explore how this narrative was employed by cultural entrepreneurs and served to rigidify boundaries of group identity which, according to Aiken (2008:116), is caused by the remaining communication between the groups, in this case the Afrikaner and the British, being distorted by myth. The use of selective “facts” to justify nationalist determination to regain control of the “fatherland” (sic) from British control was addressed by Stanley (2008:3; 60) in her exploration of the commemoration of the South African War. She focuses on manufactured “memory” as a product of political mythologising which fed the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. Here I intend to explore which of these selective facts were utilised in the construction of an Afrikaner identity.

Having engaged with the current generation of young Afrikaners, Jansen, in his book *Knowledge in the Blood* (2009:31-2), explores the impact of
social change in democratic South Africa on Afrikaner identity and provides insight into the impact that defeat at the hands of the British had on Afrikaners who as a “disparate group of white settlers from Europe” established a strong enduring tribal identity in Africa. He states that powerful stories around the trauma of loss and defeat along with feelings of inferiority and fear of poverty are told by Afrikaner historians like Gilliomee in an attempt to explain the “rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the emergence of Afrikaner identity in the 20th century” (Jansen, 2009:67). Jansen unpacks the influence that post-memory narratives of defeat and loss, which dominated the Afrikaner experience, had on their ethnic mobilisation.

A number of authors in the 1970s, at the height of apartheid and Afrikaner political power, provided insight into how Afrikaners used their historical narrative to define themselves and construct their social identity in relation to other groups. In his opinion piece, Paton (1979:20) speaks to the incompatibility of the alien gold-seekers and the Afrikaner farmers in the Boer Republic of the Transvaal which along with the power dreams of Cecil Rhodes and Lord Milner, made the South African War an inevitable and overwhelming event. The “gradual awakening of ethnic consciousness” in Afrikaners took place after the war as leaders fostered the bitterness of being a despised minority in the very republic they had established (Gilliomee 1979:84). Out of this experience Afrikaners developed the “conception of their distinct place in the social structure and believed that group-belongingness, group mobilisation and the defence of group position” was a positive and universal response. This was a gradual process that found its culmination after 1948 when Afrikaner political power and ethnic unity reinforced and consolidated each other and made apartheid a feasible and desirable response (Gilliomee 1979:115).

Expounding on the saga of Afrikanerdom, Moodie (1975:1) quotes Pienaar who states that the “history of the Afrikaner... makes one feel that Afrikanerdom is not the work of men (sic) but the creation of God.” Throughout their history runs a thread of eschatology which has sustained Afrikaners as they equated their national suffering with Christ’s suffering.
Any appeal to the sacred Afrikaner past was a reminder of their coming glory and this hope transformed their suffering. Therefore because of the divine election of Afrikanerdom, “anything threatening Afrikaner separateness became demonic” (Moodie 1975:14-5).

Although work has been done to explore the impact of violence on ethnic identity, I believe a gap still exists in understanding the full impact of the South African War on the shaping of Afrikaner ethnic identity. Further exploration is needed as to how it was re-constructed in the post-war years and how this may have contributed to the establishment of apartheid as a form of structural violence. This may provide insight into the impact of violent inter-group conflict on the construction of social identity, which could prove useful within the context of building sustainable peace in the aftermath of violent conflict.

THE BUILDING OF THE AFRIKANER NATION

_The wagon rolling onward_
_ was gone behind the hill;_
_ slowly the thorn came upright,_
_ slowly by its own will..._

(Totius 1908 in Moodie 1975:43)

At the unveiling of the monument commemorating the Great Trek in 1949, General Smuts referred to Afrikaners as a young nation with a romantic history with far-reaching human interest (Gilliomee 2003:xv). In order to fully understand the impact the War had on the Afrikaner ethnic group and their particular need to actively reconstruct their social identity after the war, it is important to explore the Afrikaner’s social identity before the war.
Afrikaner Social Identity before 1899

Afrikaners are mainly descendants of Dutch, German and French Huguenot progenitors who initially identified themselves as Dutch, Christian and European; however they soon began to see themselves as people of Africa rather than Europe. This distinction contributed greatly to the creation of what Paton calls (1979:17) “a new nation or ethnic group on earth.” These early settlers were deeply religious Calvinists with a “fierce and possessive” love for the land which they believed was given to them by Godself (Paton 1979:18; Thompson 2000:56).

When the British took control of the Cape Colony in 1806 and the first large group of British settlers arrived in 1820, the Afrikaners were an isolated community of semi-literate frontiersmen who formed a complex, violent and largely anarchic society scattered over a vast hinterland. An immense cultural gulf existed between the lower middle-class British settlers and the rural Afrikaner settlers – called Boers by the new arrivals (Thompson 2000:53; 112).

In 1824, the original settlers were described as Dutch-Afrikaners – a culturally distinct group of loyal British subjects with their own particular history and identification with Dutch culture (Giliomee 2003:194-95). In 1830 the term Afrikaners, meaning loyal to South Africa, was used for the first time in a Dutch Newspaper, De Zuid Afrikaan, and is still used interchangeably with the term Boer (Giliomee 2003:1). The initial Afrikaner treks further north in the 1830s were not a bid for independence from Britain but rather a search for new land on the East Coast (Worden 2007:10; 15).

By 1865, the Cape Colony had grown exponentially under the British Regime, ending the autonomy enjoyed by the Afrikaners under the Dutch East India Company. They started to experience the impact of drastic institutional and cultural changes implemented by the coercive colonial state (Thompson 2000:68). For example, the British abolition of slavery and shift to wage labour caused the Afrikaners, who were dependent on slave labour, great financial loss and left them indebted to British-backed
merchant houses (Worden 2007:38). However, changes in labour availability were not equally felt. While Afrikaners in the Western regions had integrated into the new market economy, those in the Eastern Districts experienced more daunting challenges: financial setbacks caused by the loss of livestock and land in Xhosa frontier wars; poor British Government compensation for emancipated slaves; the assertion of English (a foreign language to Afrikaners) as the official language in government offices, law courts and public schools. As a result Eastern Afrikaners, who were less sedentary, started experiencing dislocation and alienation from the British regime that they held responsible for their current misfortunes. Adding to their sense of alienation, British evangelical missionaries challenged their ingrained racial assumptions and practices with no perceived sensitivity for their predicament. One of their leaders, Piet Retief, recorded their reason for leaving the Cape in his journal:

We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast upon us by interested and dishonest persons under the cloak of religion (that is, the missionaries), whose testimony is believed in England, to the exclusion of all evidence in our favour; and we can foresee, as a result of this prejudice, nothing but the total ruin of our country (Thompson 2000:87).

In comparing their group to the British, Afrikaners perceived stable and explicit inequality and began to form a strong social identity around markers such as ethnicity, race, class, culture and language. Under strong leadership a quarter of the Eastern Afrikaner farmers participated in a mass exodus which Afrikaners later named the Great Trek of 1836-1854 (Thompson 2000:68-9).

Towards the end of the 19th century, Afrikaners outside the Cape Colony were poor, scattered, disgruntled and politically inexperienced (Thompson 2000:109). Few were urbanised and survived as poorly educated subsistence farmers barely able to feed their children. This lack of basic formal education meant they were unable to make the transition into a cash-economy and market orientated farming. Mass urbanisation of Afrikaners, however, took place in 1890 after the Rinderpest destroyed much of their cattle (Giliomee 2003:319-22). Concurrent large-scale
European immigration of skilled workers to the cities (1875-1902) left the un-skilled Afrikaners un-employable and destitute as they had to compete with the 200000–300000 unskilled Black migrant workers willing to work for lower wages. Afrikaners experienced job competition which officially favoured educated British workers and contributed to the construction of their social identity as a beleaguered group.

**THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POSITIVE POST-WAR AFRIKANER IDENTITY**

...*But slowly, surely upright*
the stricken tree has come,
*and healed its wounds by dropping*
the balm of its own gum.

*In course of time the hurt-marks*
*fade where the wheels had lunged –*
only one place endures
*that cannot be expunged...*

(Totius 1908 in Moodie 1975:43)

**Afrikaner Social Identity Impacted by War**

The British scorched-earth policy during the war made a return to farming impossible for the Boer Commando fighters, resulting in another wave of urbanisation in 1902. The end of the war saw impoverished Afrikaners “roam[ing] the streets of the cities and towns nourishing a bitter grievance about the war and a fierce desire to return to the land.” The British regime, capital and organised labour which was staunchly imperialist had little sympathy for Afrikaner aspirations (Giliomee 2003:329; 406).

A 1932 Dutch Reformed Church study provided the following portrait of the post-war Afrikaner:
His poverty, servitude and desperate search for work feeds a sense of dependency and inferiority. Feeling himself unwelcome, he presents himself poorly, he is timid, walks hat in hand and lacks the greater self-confidence of the English work-seeker. He wields no influence and no one intercedes on his behalf; his volk is small and subordinate to a world power that backs up the English work-seeker.

By 1939, few Afrikaners, who made up 56 percent of the White population, had finished school, made up less than one third of all white university students and were poorly represented in white-collar jobs (Giliomee 2003:406).

British colonial occupation of South Africa resulted in the Afrikaner’s occupying a subordinate position as they struggled to compete with educated European immigrants and navigate British systems which had replaced relaxed Dutch control. Poverty, a lack of education and being the victims of what they perceived as an unjust war left Afrikaners feeling despised and marginalized in a land they believed was theirs. Between 1910 and 1939, when the White South African population discussed the race-question, they were referring to English versus Afrikaans speakers (Thompson 2000:157).

As stated, a positive social identity is largely based on favourable comparisons between in-groups and relevant out-groups, and to the Afrikaner that relevant out-group was the white English South African and the comparison was unfavourable. In line with SIT, some individuals tried to achieve a more positive social identity by exercising individual mobility during the war by joining the British. However, this despised group were classified as Hensoppers (“those who surrendered”), Joiners or “Hanskakis” (Fake “Khakis” – the name for British soldiers) by other Afrikaners. This betrayal and cowardice was not considered a viable option for most Afrikaners and after the war Burghers (the term used to describe Afrikaners who were part of the two Boer Republics) wore rosettes to distinguish themselves from the Hensoppers (Van Rooyen 1932-1939). Women’s war testimonies played a significant role in immortalising the suffering of the Afrikaner people and reinforcing group boundaries. The compilers accepted
no testimonies from women whose husbands had surrendered, supported the British or were neutral during the war (Stanley & Dampier 2007:512). Consistent with SIT, these moral and ideological barriers to leaving the group meant Afrikaners had to seek creative ways to develop a positive social identity and create a positive distinctiveness for their group.

**Afrikaner “Uniqueness”**

The violence Afrikaners experienced served to heighten their identification with and positive attachment to their in-group. The impossibility for individual Afrikaners to “get out” of their “inferior” group position on their own, served to strengthen the likelihood of their acting in concert with group values and norms in relevant intergroup situations.

Dr D.F. Malan understood that for the nationalist movement to succeed, its members had to believe their community was unique (Gilliomee 2003:385). Afrikaners had to be mobilized around the elements that served to segment, classify and order their social environment so that individuals could undertake social action to improve their group’s status. Afrikaners had to be shown their place in society and had to be defined as different to and better than the out-group. Many Afrikaner organisations were established at the time to promote Afrikaner interests, such as the Afrikaner Broederbond (League of Afrikaner Brothers, 1918) founded by a group of railway clerks, clergymen and policemen. It was firmly established a year later when large numbers of teachers, including the Chairman of the Transvaal Teacher’s Union, joined its ranks (Moodie 1975:50-1).

In 1818 a clergyman, Dr. S.J.D. du Toit (Totius) had actively started creating the Afrikaner mythology of being God’s chosen people and by 1938 Afrikaners believed this to be true (Thomson 2000:135; Moodie 1975:21). After the war in particular, historical narratives were employed to show God’s hand throughout the history of the Afrikaners to confirm their uniqueness. In a speech on 16 December 1965 to commemorate the Day of the Vow (also called Dingaan’s Day commemorating the “miraculous” Voortrekker victory over the Zulus at the Battle of Blood
River in 1838), Eiselen (n.d.) calls this sacred vow – to turn this day into a perpetual commemorative religious holiday – the birth of the Afrikaner nation as they followed God’s call to create a homeland for their progeny and to carry paternal responsibility for the Black nations.3

The Afrikaner history is retold as a parallel story to the Israelites in the Old Testament (De Klerk 1979:91). Francis Reitz,4 writing in 1900, likens the Boers fleeing from the British army to that of Pharaoh following Israel and being beset by unbelieving black “Canaanites.” The recurring narrative is one of God’s people being led by God’s hand and delivered from their enemies (Moodie 1975:5). In his memoir, Kusche (1964) records his mother’s letter dated 19 August 1889, expressing the fear that the Boers are no match for British deceitfulness and bribery.5 However, she draws hope from the fact that God is righteous and will “make His (sic) voice heard in the upcoming war.” The inference is clear that God is on the side of the righteous Boers. On 17 May 1900, she expresses the hope that “The Lord God might through this heavy yoke [war], grow the Afrikaners into a nation.” Within this sacred history there are two cycles of suffering and death, the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer war where God tests God’s innocent servants (Moodie 1975:12). Henning Klopper,6 one of the founders of the Afrikaner Broederbond, in his Ossewa Gedenkboek, 1940 (Oxwagon Memorial Book), states that God has refined God’s people through cycles of suffering. He continues: “Oppression by British overlords and harassment by black hordes (sic) could thus be understood as an honour to be accepted and glorified for its own sake as the seal of God’s election” (Moodie 1975:13). According to SIT, Afrikaner “uniqueness” as a group is evident in how they defined themselves not only in relation to other groups (the British) but also outside of the intergroup context (in relation to God). By defining themselves as “God’s chosen nation” any further intergroup comparison becomes irrelevant because God as the ultimate authority, ruler of heaven and earth, has placed them above all other groups – it is a position beyond any human challenge. Furthermore the fact that Afrikaners recognised only one true
God also ruled out the possibility of another deity bestowing the same designation to a rival group.

The concept of a unique nation in a more precarious position than others’ is echoed in the memoirs of Scheepers, Van Rooyen and Kusche. Eiselen (n.d.), in numerous speeches made to either ordinary Afrikaners on days of commemoration or the elite as he provided an apologist view of apartheid, includes this historical narrative. Egwu (2007:99-100) defines this process as political ethnicity, as cultural and political movements begin to socialise and mobilise the ethnic group based on a real or invented shared past creating a sense of belonging found in “otherness.”

Within this sacred narrative of a distinct nation, cultural entrepreneurs began to define Afrikaner characteristics in contrast to those of the British in particular as their paternalistic and superior role towards the indigenous Black population was not in question. Within the memoirs and letters a picture is painted of the British as deceitful, an abusive cowardly nation who in their position of power crush the weak; a cruel enemy stealing the Afrikaner’s land. English city-dwellers are described by Kusche’s father in a letter in 1900 as “smart” boys and “cheeky” girls who break the Biblical fourth commandment by not respecting their parents or bosses. An Afrikaner Weerstands Beweeging⁷ (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) pamphlet in the 1970s nurtures the narrative of heroic Boer commandos resisting the English in their attempt to steal their mother-land, destroy their mother-tongue and trample their cultural norms.

In contrast, Afrikaners are presented as brave and courageous with God on their side – a chosen people. Eiselen (n.d.) makes numerous references in his speeches to ordinary Afrikaners displaying noble heroism in the war, their passionate independence and attachment to the land, and their pride in preserving their God-given identity as people who are determined to do what is right. De Klerk (1979:93) describes Afrikaners as Besembos (“broom-bush”) people: “severe wind, drought, frost and heat cannot affect it… because as a Calvinist his sense of destiny, authority and his work are religion.” A large part of the Afrikaner identity is constructed around being
beleaguered. Scheepers\(^8\) [n.d.[b]] describes his nation as small, embattled and having to fight for survival after being forced into submission through the unjust violence of their freedom wars. In a 1967 speech to the Rapportryerskorps\(^9\) (“Dispatch-riders”) in Pietersburg entitled \textit{Die Betekenis van Kultuur} (“The meaning of culture”), Eiselen refers to the concepts of martyrdom, oppression, betrayal, abuse and obstacles dating back to the East India Company as recurring historical themes serving to unify the Afrikaners.

The Anti-khaki movement in 1916 was one manifestation of the Afrikaners defining their group as “other” to the British. Afrikaners in the \textit{Burgermag} (“Citizen Force”) of the South African Union protested against wearing the same Khaki uniforms as Imperial troops: the anti-khaki movement, established by Christo Kriel, declared in a press release (29 November 1916) that, “strong feelings are still being provoked today amongst Dutch-Afrikaans people when wearing a uniform linked to unpleasant memories dating back 14 years” (Kriel 1916). A Mr McLachlan was fined for refusing to wear the uniform and funds were raised by the Anti-khaki movement who petitioned the government to provide a new uniform. McLachlan’s reasons for refusing to wear Khaki focused on his suffering and loss during the war which received much support. An anonymous letter to the editor of \textit{De Burger} on 20 December 1916 stated that it was “unreasonable to expect sons of the concentration camps, boys whose mothers, sisters, brothers and fathers were victims of the wearers of khaki” to wear the uniform (Anon. 1916). The matter was brought before parliament on 19 March 1917 for discussion (Foster 1917). The way in which Afrikaners were mobilised through these events are in line with Grundlingh’s (1999:355) hypothesis that Afrikaners built their identity on all things anti-British while emphasising a shared past of suffering.

**Keeping the Historical Narrative Alive**

Reitz in 1900 writes, “[Our] people had to pursue their pilgrimage of martyrdom throughout South Africa, until every portion of that unhappy country had been painted red with blood, not so much of men capable of
resistance as with that of our murdered and defenceless women and children” (quoted in Moodie 1975:5). Nnoli (2007:88) points to collective memory being a powerful tool in ethnic discourses as it addresses the “deep seated affective psychic needs” of a people and as these narratives are carried through to successive generations they serve to mobilise a group around ethnically defined goals. I suggest that some of those goals were national independence through the establishment of another republic, Afrikaners no longer inferior to the British, the nation being proud of their history and language and thus willing to fight for their ethnic survival in the midst of hostile indigenous peoples.

The narratives of the Great Trek and the South African War have become the myths around which to build Afrikaner ethnic identity. Krog (2013:149) speaks as an Afrikaner when recalling memories of the concentration camps:

The war has always been a presence in my life: as point of reference, an explanation, as continuity, as backdrop – seldom the suffering, only the statistics, often the betrayal, always the bravery and never, never stories other than those about the Afrikaner.

Hofmeyer (1988:525) refers to films, magic lantern shows, historical fiction based on the Great Trek and the South African war as well as commemorative days such as the Day of the Vow which served to popularise history. According to Krog (2013:161) this turned these “stories into myths of exclusion.” The myths were grounded in stories of a small brave nation being the victim of the mightiest nation with no-one to fight on their behalf. Eiselen in his 1967, Rapportryerskorps speech, makes reference to Afrikaner beleaguerment and states that while the war shattered their trust in people, it deepened their faith in God. He refers to cultural symbols such as Cape-Dutch Architecture, Voortrekker clothing, ox-wagons, and the two flags of the Boer Republics playing a major unifying role in national festivals.

The cultural entrepreneur, Kriel was also active in popularising history via a magic lantern show which toured rural towns for a number of years. The
slides and accompanying lecture were shown to adults and school children and divided English and Afrikaans South Africans. The pro-British newspaper, the *Natal Witness* on 22 July 1920, lambasted “the astounding entertainment” which was “stirring up sedition and promoting anti-British feeling.” The slides and lecture covered amongst others: *Boers* in Natal joining the commandos; blown up bridges; women wounded in the war; pictures of the concentration camps with emaciated *Boer* women drawing rations; gruesome pictures of starving babies and children. On 30 July 1920, the same paper reports with derision the “cheers, laughter, and hearty appreciation of the *backveld* (rural and uneducated) audience” to the “alleged atrocities by the British over 20 years ago.” In contrast, the pro-Afrikaner newspaper, *Die Volksblad* (“Aanstootlike Prente vs. Histories Portrette,” 8 July 1920) reports that on invitation of the *Historiese Bond* (“Historical League”), Kriel moved the audience as they relived the horrors of the war while making an impassioned plea to Afrikaner youth to remember their history – the mark of a true Afrikaner. A later Afrikaans editorial (Anon. 1921) reports on attempts by the Administrator of Linley to prohibit the show and expresses outrage that a born Afrikaner should fear his own history. The Magic Lantern Show was used to highlight only certain aspects of the conflict in order to shape a collective memory of suffering as a cognitive tool for the reconstruction of social identity. De Reuck (1999:69-70) refers to the use of concentration camp pictures as the “politics of pain” as they were culturally appropriated to forge a national Afrikaner identity.

Afrikaners were successful in reframing their nation’s historical narrative in such a way that they appear ennobled, the only ones to have suffered and the British as unjust (Aiken 2007:16). The over-arching Afrikaner historical narrative is one of the Great Trek, Blood River and the First Freedom War (1881) symbolising times of triumph; testing by God follows via the South African War and the suffering in the concentration camps; the rise of nationalism in the 1930s and the victory in 1948 indicate the return of God’s favour (Stanley 2008:5).
The Afrikaans Language and National Identity

Sociologists have argued that “the promotion of language is central to building a nation state” and the “fulcrum within which a national identity can be built” (Louw 2004:43).

English was first imposed as South Africa’s official language via Lord Somerset’s Anglicisation policy (1814-1826): Scottish Ministers were appointed in Dutch Reformed Churches, official posts were filled by English Speakers and only English was used in official documents; Afrikaans was forbidden in schools (Moodie 1975:4; Louw 2004:44). Anglicisation was initially largely accepted and in “good” Afrikaner homes English was spoken. However, the failed Jameson Raid (1895) and the South African War drastically changed language sentiments as Afrikaner nationalism was awakened. While pre-war Afrikaner children had names such as Sydney, Lancelot and Henry, they were replaced by Afrikaans names such as Wilhelmina, Daniel and Frederick after the war (Moodie 1975:41).

Louw (2004:49) explores the Afrikaans language as an example of a modernist relationship between language and nation building. Afrikaans middle-class cultural activists promoted Afrikaans as a language distinct from Dutch and English and forged an alliance with nationalist politicians to ensure it was made an official language in 1918. Education was the cultural facility the Afrikaners used to “uplift themselves from poverty and despair” and in this context Afrikaans played a key role. A prominent academic protagonist and poet, N.P. van Wyk Louw, is quoted as saying:

The poor were 40-50 percent of the Afrikaner community and without Afrikaans they were powerless, without meaning, doomed to poverty and backwardness, doomed to worthlessness, ready to be forgotten – people without language and without hope. I wish to make the claim that Afrikaans as language of communication and as official language did more to uplift the Afrikaners than work reservation (Jansen 2009:33).

Before the arrival of the British, the Afrikaners considered themselves to be a nation in their own right (Moodie 1975:12). Kusche’s father, in a
letter dated 1 November 1900, laments the English attempts at breaking the back of *inboorlingvolke* (“indigenous nations”) through systematically robbing them of their language and replacing it with English. This became a recurring theme: Scheepers (n.d.[b]) in his memoirs refers to not only the nation being lost, but also her children being “stolen” as a result of Anglicisation. The Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church played a key role in fighting for Afrikaner identity and recognition of Afrikaans; they established Christian-Nationalistic Schools where children could be taught the cultural norms and traditions of their nation in their own language. As the editor of *Die Transvaler*, Scholtz (n.d.) states that this was done in the belief that unless Afrikaans is preserved the nation’s total annihilation could not be averted.\(^{10}\) Scheepers (n.d.[b]), whose father died in the war, was sent to such an orphanage church-school for fallen *burghers* by his mother as a drastic measure to prevent him from being taught in English.

The anguish of the war saw the birth of lyric Afrikaans poetry of remarkable literary merit which lauded *Boer* suffering and heroism by the so-called “camp poets”: Totius, Eugene Marais and Louis Leipoldt (Moodie 1975:41). In his memoir, Scholtz recalls the creation of unique and new Afrikaans literature and the role it played in enabling Afrikaners to resist British attempts to destroy them. The role of Afrikaans war poetry is described by Van Wyk Louw (1959) as the “spiritual transfiguration of the war... so that it would become meaningful and not remain a brute material happening for us... so that we could again become men (sic), with human values and evaluations.” War poetry, women’s camp testimonies, and emotive fictionalised stories of war heroes, such as Gustav Preller’s Afrikaans story of the *Voortrekker* leader Piet Retief “created beauty in the midst of suffering and helped restore dignity and purpose to the people” (Moodie 1975:41). This new Afrikaans literature helped formulate a clear consciousness of a national identity. Afrikaner leaders feared that the scarring left by the war and mass urbanisation would bring about the Anglicisation of the entire Afrikaans speaking white population (Moodie 1975:41-2).
The Birth of a Language Movement

In the early twentieth century, Stellenbosch was the only university educating the young post-war Afrikaner elite with lectures either in Dutch or English. Dr Malan, who became Prime Minister in 1948, delivering an apology for Afrikaans at the university in that year, stated that Afrikaans needed to be “the bearer of our culture, history, national ideals and so raise our self-respect” which gave rise to the Stellenbosch Language Movement. From the outset, the language issue was an emotive one as Afrikaans was linked to nationalistic ideals and on these grounds Stellenbosch students united to oppose their professors in replacing English with Dutch as the medium of teaching, as Afrikaans was still considered too simple a language for academic use (Moodie 1975:47-8).

Progress in changing language policies was slow and in September 1912, students planned a language demonstration and festival. In his speech N.J. van der Merwe (1921), as head of the Student Committee, stated that their language “pilgrimage” was focussed on safeguarding their “individual national existence in South Africa” by ensuring that Afrikaans and English had equal status. General Hertzog, in turn declared that “the language question was a sacred, a national question, and came next to their religion.” By 1918 Afrikaans had replaced Dutch as an official language but still struggled to find equal footing with English (Moodie 1975:48-9).

Afrikaners Mobilised around Their Language

Despite the recognition of Afrikaans as an official language next to English, all government and commercial business was still conducted in English and thus belied the claims of equality. This caused Afrikaners like Van Rooyen (1932), to lament “that my people are aliens in their own land.”

In his letter to Ons Vaderland, Scheepers (1926) made an emotive call to fight for the equality of Afrikaans. He called for the motto: “Official work carried out by all Afrikaners in the civil service, must be conducted with pen and ink in Afrikaans.” His concern was that Afrikaans children were
still becoming Anglicised when entering the workforce – “Our nationality and national soul is dying. No language – no Nation.” This call was taken up by the Afrikaner Broederbond in a circular to all their divisions on 24 May 1929, calling on all members to write letters to the press in support of this call for the sake of “their self-respect and national pride.”

Afrikaners were mobilised to publically insist on being served in Afrikaans ensuring that Afrikaans would not only be a literary language, but used in everyday speech. Scheepers (n.d.[a]) continued his letter writing campaign to the Department of Postal Services, for three consecutive years, refusing to complete forms unless Afrikaans was no longer under English. Furthermore, the Department of Education was petitioned for more Afrikaans schools as many were run in church halls. As inspiring the youth with the nation’s history was central to these new Afrikaans schools, they were named after children who were heroes in the War. The development of Afrikaans School Eisteddfods cultivated language pride in children and their extended families. School cultural functions were used to encourage and develop enthusiasm for Afrikaner history, cultural and language. Van Rooyen (n.d.) proudly describes the establishment of the Oostrandse Kunsvereening (“East Rand Art Society”) which promoted Afrikaans, drawing local schools into Art Festivals consisting of Afrikaans poetry recitals, plays and music.

Scheepers (n.d.[b]) explains how Afrikaans teachers, committed to fighting the Anglicisation of Afrikaner children, developed an Afrikaans vocabulary to systematically replace the English words used in everyday Afrikaner speech, for example: Lion Safety Matches, electric lights, motorbike and various grocery items were given their Afrikaans equivalent. The Handhawersbond (“Organisation of Upholders”) was established in the early 1930s and tasked with developing and entrenching this new vocabulary. Their belief was that learning this new vocabulary would develop a deep volketrots (“national pride”) amongst the Afrikaner children which they then would carry over to their parents.
Van Rooyen states that Afrikaner response to the work of the _Handhawersbond’s_ was slower than they had hoped. Therefore a number of Afrikaans teachers, clergy and police officers, established the _Afrikaanse Skakelkomitee_ (“Afrikaans Liaison Committee”) to bring together Afrikaner organisations, schools and churches. This organisation developed into a “mighty weapon in the hand of the Afrikaner” as it encouraged Afrikaners to speak Afrikaans everywhere business was being conducted in English.

Afrikaans became central to the re-building of national pride and became the “connective tissue binding together a disparate and desperate group of people,” playing a major role as a cultural marker around which the Afrikaner social identity was formed (Jansen 2009:33). South Africa today remains the only nation to erect a monument to their language.

**CONCLUSION**

..._The wounds grew healed and healthy,_

_with years that come and go,_

 _but that one scar grew greater_  
_and does not cease to grow._

_(Totius 1908 in Moodie 1975:43)_

In this article I was interested in ascertaining how post-war Afrikaner social identity was reconstructed and whether it was one of the contributing factors that led to the structural violence inflicted on Black South Africans during apartheid. I have shown that, as a theoretical framework, Social Identity Theory can be used to evaluate the impact of violence suffered during the South African War on the post-war construction of Afrikaner social identity. Aiken (2008:14) and Nnoli (2007:90) posit that external threats, suffering direct or structural violence heighten group cohesion and lead to a narrow and inclusive framework of ethnicity making groups victimised by violence more likely themselves to
commit violence while legitimising its use. This is an important concern to address within the context of peacebuilding.

One of the critical dimensions of SIT is that of inter-group competition and the negative impact of unfavourable comparison to others. Unlike the British victors, uneducated post-war Afrikaners were marginalised and impoverished with limited access to state-controlled material rewards, status or recognition. Comparison to the English-speaking South Africans revealed an unfavourable, stable and explicit inequality which contributed to Afrikaners viewing themselves as an eternally beleaguered group, unjustly subjugated in the very Republics they had formed.

Individual group mobility was not an option for the majority of Afrikaners seeking favourable group comparison. They therefore sought to re-define themselves by constructing a positive distinctiveness through altering the elements of the comparative situation. Afrikaners were very intentional in re-constructing their post-war social identity with the following goals: restoring their independence, addressing their inferior position, creating pride in their history and language and most importantly ensuring their ethnic survival in the midst of a hostile indigenous population. A distinct, narrow and inclusive ethnic boundary was authenticated by actively creating a history, ideology, symbolic universe and system of meaning (Nagle 1994:162).

As early as 1818, cultural entrepreneurs like the poet Totius, began to construct the myth of being God’s chosen people thus birthing a historical thread of eschatology which sustained Afrikaners by equating what they perceived as their national suffering with Christ’s suffering. After the war this theme became entrenched and the divine election of Afrikanerdom came to mean that “anything threatening Afrikaner separateness [was] demonic” (Moodie 1975:14-5). Collective memory was a powerful cognitive tool used by Afrikaner leaders as they nursed the nation’s bitterness around stories of only Afrikaner suffering on which to construct the “conception of their distinct place in the social structure” (Moodie 1975:15). In this process group cohesion was built on the recurring
historical themes of martyrdom, oppression, betrayal, abuse and obstacles dating back to the East India Company. Identity as God’s chosen people as a social category served not only to enhance self-esteem but firmly placed Afrikaners outside of any group comparisons.

The establishment of influential Afrikaans newspapers linked to the National Party provided a platform from which to develop these ideas and create a social environment reinforcing Afrikaner nobility versus British injustice and cruelty. This along with the creation of unifying cultural symbols employed at national festivals served to create an environment in which Afrikaners could undertake social action led by particularly the clergy and educators. The Afrikaans language was a crucial cultural marker as lyric Afrikaans poetry lauding Boer suffering and heroism during the war, women’s camp testimonies and highly emotive fictionalised stories of war heroes played a critical role in restoring Afrikaner dignity and purpose (Moodie 1975:41-2). A clear consciousness of a national identity began to emerge among Afrikaners leading to an increasing disassociated from all things British, e.g., refusal to wear Khaki uniforms, language equality in government services and student language protests. These ethnic markers provided a basis for the political mobilisation of their ethnic group identity in which a sense of belonging was found in their “otherness.”

Based on my research, I would suggest that the violence suffered by the Afrikaners during the South African War played a major role in their reconstruction of a very narrow ethnic social identity. The overarching Afrikaner historical narrative of being God’s chosen people refined through the suffering of the Great Trek, the battle of Blood River, the first Freedom War (1881) and finally in the concentration camps of the South African War gave rise to a form of nationalism that culminated in the system of apartheid as an expression of the fulfilment of God’s promised self-expression and a means of ethnic survival. This reconstructed social-identity was built on the one hand upon their God-given paternalistic ownership of the land and their deep fears of “the black hordes (sic) in the interior, British Imperialism, tropical diseases, being the losing party in two wars of independence and alternatively the threats of Roman
Catholicism and Black communism” on the other, all which contributed to the Afrikaners, while viewing themselves as victims, de facto becoming perpetrators of violence (Cloete 1992:43).

Increasing Black anger in South Africa around issues of marginalisation, limited access to wealth and status along with student protests over being taught in Afrikaans at the very institutions where Afrikaans students fought for mother-tongue education, would suggest that future research into how Black social identity was re-constructed as a result of suffering the structural violence of apartheid is crucial if sustainable peace is to be built in South Africa.

NOTES

1 This article is based on the research paper titled “The role of violence in the construction of ethnic-social identity: The impact of the South African War (1889-1902) on post-war Afrikaner identity,” which was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of BA(Hons) at St Augustine College of South Africa in November 2015. The original text has been significantly shortened and adjusted to meet the requirements of an academic article. Due to the tragic death of the author, the necessary editorial corrections were completed by the editor of this volume.

2 I.M. Van Rooyen is the author of Herinninge omtrent die tydperk voor en na die Anglo-Boere Oorlog en die toestande in Brakpan (1931-1939) (“Memories of the time before and after the Anglo-Boer War and the conditions in Brakpan [1931-1939]”).

3 Based on the speech delivered by the Commissioner General for the Northern Sotho, National Unity, in Kestell on 16th December 1965 (Die Kommissaris-Generaal vir die Noord Sotho Vokseenheid te Kestel op 16 Desember 1965).

4 F.W. Reitz (1844-1934) served as the President of the Orange Free State and as the State Secretary for the Transvaal before the war. He wrote a book “The Century of Wrongs,” recording the Afrikaner history in Biblical terms in 1900 (https://www.oliveschreiner.org/vre?view=personal&entry=348).

5 G.A.C. Kusche (1964), a son of H. Kusche, a missionary with the Berlin Missionary Society, described his post-war experiences as a teacher on the Witwatersrand (1886-1966) in a family history and memoir.

6 Henning Klopper was the one who conceptualised the Voortrekker Centenary Celebration.

7 Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB) was founded in 1973 by Eugene Terreblanche as an organisation fighting for God, Volk, Vaderland (God, Nation, Mother-land). Cf. www.awb.co.za.

8 J.J. Scheepers, an Afrikaner teacher, recorded his memoirs as part of the Afrikaners on the Witwatersrand Collection, 1886-1966.

9 The Rapportryerskorps was established in 1949 as an organisation to protect Afrikaans culture, values, norms and Christian National Identity.

10 G.D. Scholtz is an author of the manuscript titled Die Idee van ’n Afrikaner (“The idea of an Afrikaner”) which constitutes the part of The Afrikaner Project (cf. references).

11 I.M. Lombard (Secretary of the Broederbond) wrote a circular (Nr. 6/29) attaching Scheepers’ letter to the press and officially requesting that at least two members in every division urgently write similar letters to the press.
REFERENCES


The 14th of November 2017 began a series of major life changing events in Zimbabwe that ushered in and redefined the political and constitutional landscape of the country. On the evening of the same day, elements of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces gathered around Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, and seized control of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and other key areas of the city. What a Christian can do as a citizen in a coup d’état situation will differ from country to country, but the Christian’s responsibility to take his/her citizenship seriously is everywhere the same. John Calvin’s political theology was shaped by religious schism, persecutions for heresy, and civil wars that characterised 16th century Europe. However, Calvin did not directly address the coup situation in his Reformed theology. This article will interrogate how Calvinist churches in Zimbabwe drew theological snippets from the attitude of the Reformed Tradition on politics to address the coup situation in the country.

INTRODUCTION

The world woke up in the early hours of Wednesday, 15 November 2017, to learn that the long standing Zimbabwean Head of State and Commander in Chief of its Armed Forces, President Robert Mugabe, had been placed under house arrest. The events of that Wednesday also culminated in the
arrest of key officials of President Robert Mugabe’s government. This development gave rise to nothing but a *coup d’état* – removal of government using unconstitutional means. Christians in Zimbabwe were experiencing a *coup d’état* situation in their country for the first time. The Christian responsibility for society has been recognised throughout Christian history, but it has taken very different forms in different situations. God wills that his people should live under political institutions so as to establish and preserve order; but, more than that he wills that this order should be of the kind that is favourable to both social justice and spiritual freedom. Calvinist churches in Zimbabwe were in uncharted territory when the Zimbabwe Defence Forces effected a *coup d’état* on the 15th of November 2017. The Calvinist theological family tree stretches back John Calvin and his peers, some five centuries ago. Reformed Churches, which share a common origin in the 16th-century Swiss Reformation and the teachings of John Calvin, did make a lasting imprint on the landscape of Zimbabwe and still continue to impact the theological map in the country. Some of the main Calvinist churches in Zimbabwe are the Reformed Church, the Episcopal Presbyterian Church, United Church of Christ, Methodist Church and United Methodist Church. These Calvinist Churches are the member churches of the umbrella body called the Zimbabwe Council of Churches.

The 2017 *coup d’état* had huge implications for churches in Zimbabwe. The churches’ failure to keep abreast with political happenings has been particularly disappointing when one considers that the Christian church has the largest constituency in the country. Mhloyi (2003:3) pointed out that about 73% of the Zimbabwean population is Christian, including many in political leadership. For many people religion provides a source of their identity as people, especially when they face a crisis situation. Religion has been a sustaining power for long periods of suffering. The role of passive obedience natural to Christians in the first two centuries was because they were a helpless minority, with no political power and no opportunity to influence opinion among ruling groups in the empire. In Zimbabwe the church is national in character and provides moral
integration for the state. The churches are closest to the people and have a credible voice. In my view, failure to address the coup d’état would have been a judgement on Zimbabwean churches’ leaders in particular and all Zimbabwean Christians in general.

There are two terms which, I think, need some clarification in our discussion: coup d’état and politics. There is a temptation to use both terms without much understanding. A coup, formally known as a coup d’état, is described as “a violent or illegal change in government” and illegal seizure of power from a government by armed forces (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 2011:217). Put differently, a coup d’état is the illegal – and often violent – seizure of power from a government, often carried out by the military of a country. A coup d’état occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order in an illegitimate way. Zimbabwe had not witnessed a coup since its independence war that resulted in emancipation from British rule in 1980, when Mugabe became prime minister. Definitions of politics vary from “politics is a struggle for power” (Morgenthau), “the study of influence and the influential” (Lasswell), to “the authoritative allocation of values” (Easton) (quoted in Heywood 1997:410). There is no universally agreed definition of the term politics. From these well-known definitions politics has served to designate the activities of the human group concerned with power, authority, law and social order. The coup d’état and politics became part and parcel of Protestant Calvinist churches’ theologising in Zimbabwe. Both terms became popular parlance in the country.

Calvin wanted to preserve a relatively just and peaceful social order, believing that such was a natural good of human beings. In pursuit of this principle, he upheld the basic principles of the just war tradition:

But kings and people must sometimes take up arms to execute such public vengeance. On this basis we may judge wars lawful which are so undertaken. For if power has been given them to preserve the tranquillity of their dominion, to restrain the seditious stirrings of restless men, to help those forcibly oppressed, to punish evil deeds – can they use it more opportunely than to check the fury of one who disturbs both the repose of
private individuals and the common tranquillity of all, who raises seditious tumults, and by whom violent oppressions and vile misdeeds are perpetuated? If they ought to be the guardians and defenders of the laws, they should also overthrow the efforts of all whose offenses corrupt the discipline of the laws (Institutes IV.20.11).

War, in this case a coup d’état, is justified because it preserves the common good, which consists at least partly in social peace.

Most people simply do not want to think about a coup d’état. This issue can seem too difficult, too complicated, all the options apparently unsatisfactory. Whether it is the rightness of making a coup d’état in general or the rightness of a specific coup d’état, the questioner can generally expect an onslaught of accusations of cowardice, lack of patriotism or childish idealism. There are several typical ways in which people think about coup d’état. First, all coup d’états are wrong. This position finds simply no justification, at any time or in any circumstance, for opposing another human being to the extent of taking that human being’s life, even in order to defend one’s own. The evils arising from conducting coup d’états are always judged greater than the evils from not effecting a coup d’état. A second approach sees coup d’état as a dirty business. Even a bloodless coup d’état in Zimbabwe would be regarded as evil.

The Reformed Tradition offers a third approach to the question of coup d’états. The other great reformer of the 16th century, John Calvin, was far more militant than Luther. In Calvin’s teachings religion and politics are intricately interwoven. John Calvin’s ideas were not always new, they were a refinement and expansion of the theology of St Augustine of Hippo, which itself was an examination of the theology of the Apostle Paul. Shubin (1999:31) pointed out that John Calvin emphasized that a Christian soldier should never use force to gain personal advantage, but “use force out of love for thy neighbour.” Standing by and refusing to act while harm befell a neighbour was not a virtue; it was a vice. He taught that the state was subject to the Church. Calvin created a “Christian state” by establishing the Geneva Experiment in Switzerland. The state was theocratic, like the concept of Israel in the Old Testament. There was room
for military conscription in his state. Calvin also believed in the execution of heretics. Reformed churches stick to Calvinist traditions as their foundational principles. Calvin’s greatest gift was the systematisation of Protestant theology and its application in practical terms. Calvin took over Luther’s doctrine of the two-fold rule of God. Calvin’s understanding of the two kingdoms was that the believer is a dual citizen of both kingdoms - the state and the Church. Many pastors are conversant with Calvinist teaching.

The battle cry for the Protestant Reformation was the principle sola Scriptura (Scripture alone), which was first articulated by Martin Luther and agreed upon by John Calvin, Ulrich Zwingli, Menno Simons, and other Reformers. A logical implication of sola Scriptura is the Protestant Reformers’ emphasis on the perspicuity of Scripture. John Calvin (1509-1564) espoused that the plain sense of Scripture was available to anyone who would let it say what it intended to say. Like the Nominalists of the fifteenth century, Calvin looked to the Bible, and the Bible alone, as the sole authority for Christian truth. Calvin’s understanding of politics was drawn from Scripture. Reformed tradition teaches that because violence is the matter of human freedom (human decisions and human choices), it is a moral question; there are circumstances in which violence can be justified, just as there are circumstances in which war cannot be justified. The decision about the justification of coup d’états is based on criteria ultimately concerned with the basic principles of human dignity and of respect for human life. These two principles, taken together, offer the basis for what is known as the just war teaching. Calvin subscribed to St Augustine’s just war theory.

The writer is an eyewitness to the public events of the coup d’état in Zimbabwe and what he witnessed is theologically reflected in this article. It was an experiential encounter with forces of militarism, power and brutality. I came face to face with soldiers in action. With my naked eyes I saw a convoy of army trucks. It was within this climate and historical context that my theological training was actuated. It became a Christological and “theological” experience with a profound impact in my life. Life is full of Christological situations. The setting revealed the
presence of Jesus Christ. I realized that even in the midst of armoured vehicles, tanks and guns, God was in charge. The need for Christian witness to identify with the suffering community in which they wished to embody the gospel was now a non-negotiable. In situations where the struggle for democracy appeared to be a matter of life or death, believers of different confessions and religions were able to come together to witness their commitment against misrule. Zimbabweans found an opportunity to stand up and be counted. It is an undeniable fact that President Robert Mugabe’s long 37 years in power brought suffering and misery to many Zimbabweans.

THE CONTEXT OF REFORMED CHURCHES’ THEOLOGY

The reformed churches’ theology was Christological. This Christology can be understood and appreciated within its own particular historical setting. The coup d’état provided Calvinist churches in Zimbabwe an opportunity not only to be public but also political as well. It was time to produce political theology. In effect theology became public and political in its intent. While we need to analyse the factors leading to the coup d’état in this section, one thing seems clear: the coup d’état was an idea whose hour had come. Nothing could stop it. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces opened our eyes to look afresh at the social and political dynamics weighing down our humanity in poverty. The struggle to succeed the ageing President took a nasty turn in 2017. The coup d’état took place amid tensions in the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party between former First Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa (who was backed by the ZDF) and First Lady Grace Mugabe (who was backed by a younger faction known as G40) over who would succeed the 93-year-old President Mugabe. A week after Mnangagwa was fired and forced to flee the country, and a day before troops moved into the streets of Harare, Zimbabwe Defence Forces chief Constantino Chiwenga issued a statement that purges of senior ZANU-PF officials like Mnangagwa had to stop (Anon. 2017a). In the first week of October 2017, tensions between Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa and Grace Mugabe, two leading figures
to succeed the 93-year-old Robert Mugabe as Head of State, escalated and were prominently displayed in the public sphere. Mnangagwa, a protégé of Mugabe’s who had been his ally since the Zimbabwe war of liberation in the 1960s, said that doctors had confirmed that he had been poisoned during an August 2017 political rally led by the president and had to be airlifted to a hospital in South Africa for treatment. He also pledged his loyalty to the ruling ZANU-PF party and President Mugabe and said that the story spread by his supporters that Grace Mugabe had ordered the poisoning via a dairy farm she controlled was untrue. Phelekezela Mphoko, Zimbabwe’s other Vice-President, publicly criticized Mnangagwa, saying that his comments about the August incident were part of an attempt to destabilize the country and undermine the authority of the president, since doctors had actually concluded that stale food was to blame.

The President fired Mnangagwa on 6 November 2017. A statement from Information Minister Simon Khaya Moyo said that Mnangagwa had “consistently and persistently exhibited traits of disloyalty, disrespect, deceitfulness and unreliability” (Anon. 2017a).

After a politically chaotic week – during which Mugabe fired his deputy Emmerson Mnangagwa and the head of the armed forces warned those in government to stop its “purge” – the Zimbabwean military seized control of the state broadcaster overnight on Tuesday 14 November 2017. Heavily-armored vehicles were now on the streets of Zimbabwe’s capital

Major General Sibusiso Moyo, a spokesman for the military, gave a televised address on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), in which he said that the 93-year-old president and his family were “safe and sound” and denied that a coup had taken place:

To both our people and the world beyond our borders: We wish to make it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover of government. What the Zimbabwe Defence Forces is doing is to pacify a degenerating political, social and economic situation in our country, which if not addressed, may result in violent conflict (ZBC 2017).
The military had been careful with its choice of words and was emphasising that it had not taken over the running of government. In particular, Sibusiso Moyo was keen to stress that the president had not been deposed:

We wish to assure the nation that His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Comrade R. G. Mugabe and his family are safe and sound and their security is guaranteed. We are only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice (Moyo 2018).

Moyo did not state specifically who the “criminals” were, but the military detained Kudzanayi Chipanga, the leader of the ruling ZANU-PF party’s youth league and Finance Minister Ignatius Chombo. However, many analysts have suggested that, despite the military’s claims to the contrary, a coup had been carried out. The constitution was broken via the coup d’état.

18 November 2017 witnessed well-attended and exuberant peaceful public demonstrations in Harare and in all major towns in the country, supporting the actions of the army and celebrating the apparent end of Mugabe’s presidency. Demonstrators also massed outside Mugabe’s office calling on him to quit. Protesters booed and jeered a motorcade that left Mugabe’s residence, although a security source stated that Mugabe was not travelling. On that day a massive, peaceful crowd marched from downtown Harare to State House, Mugabe’s residence, to demand his resignation. Similar demonstrations occurred in other Zimbabwean cities, in South Africa and in Britain, where many expatriates live.

Events moved quickly in ZANU-PF giving Southern African Development Community (SADC) no chance to intervene in the Zimbabwe crisis. SADC held an urgent meeting at the SADC headquarters in Gaborone on 16 November 2017. The meeting was called by South African President Jacob Zuma and was expected to be attended by the leaders of Angola, Tanzania, and Zambia. This was followed by another SADC meeting in Luanda by SADC Heads of State. The Heads of State resolved to send
Zuma as its chair to mediate in the Zimbabwean conundrum. On 19 November, ZANU-PF removed Mugabe as party leader and replaced him with Mnangagwa. The party also issued a deadline of 20 November for Mugabe to resign the presidency or face impeachment (Associated Press 2017). The party also sought the support of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to eject Mugabe. Mugabe did not resign, so on 21 November a joint session of Parliament and Senate met for his impeachment. In a sitting of the House of Assembly, Sen. Monica Mutsvangwa of the ZANU-PF caucus made the motion to convene a joint session of Parliament with the full Senate for the impeachment of Mugabe, and MP James Maridadi of the MDC-T seconded the motion. The MPs then adjourned to the Harare International Conference Centre for the joint session because the Parliament building could not accommodate a joint sitting. The joint session was tasked with deciding on impeachment by a majority vote and selecting a nine-member committee to investigate the allegations against Mugabe:

- serious misconduct;
- failure to obey, uphold and defend the Constitution;
- willful violation of the Constitution;
- inability to perform the functions of the Office because of physical or mental incapacity.

If this committee recommended impeachment, the joint sitting had to approve the recommendation by a two-thirds majority (233 seats of the 347-seat total). Section 97 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that “the Senate and the National Assembly, by a joint resolution passed by at least two-thirds of their total membership, may resolve that the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, should be removed from office” (Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013:55).

After the session convened, Mugabe sent a letter to Zimbabwe’s Parliament resigning the presidency before President Zuma’s delegation could intervene in the impasse. Second Vice-President Phelekezela
Mphoko legally became the Acting President. Subsequently, Mnangagwa was sworn in as President on 24 November 2017.

**CALVIN’S POLITICAL THEOLOGY**

Calvin’s greatest gift was the systematisation of Protestant theology and its application in practical terms. Calvin took over Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms. Calvin’s understanding of the two-fold rule of God was that the believer is a dual citizen of both kingdoms - the state and the Church. The two must be taken together to arrest the anarchy of the subjects and the self-absolutisation of the state leaders. While Christians were still on earth they needed political structure. Calvin was most emphatic in his insistence on the obedience due to civil authority. Subjects had always to remember that in obeying the magistrate, they were obeying God, “since the rulers’’ power is from God” (Calvin 2011:1509). The magistrate could not be resisted without God being resisted; these two realms were intricately intertwined. Private citizens, moreover, were to have no voice in governmental affairs; their duty was simply to obey.

Private citizens… may not deliberately intrude in public affairs… or undertake anything at all politically. If anything in a public ordinance requires amendment… let them commit the matter to the judgment of the magistrate, whose hand alone here is free (Calvin 2011:1514).

Obedience was due even to unjust rulers. Calvin insisted that absolute obedience was due not only to the benevolent ruler, but also to the tyrant. A wicked ruler could, in fact, be the judgment of God:

We are not only subject to the authority of princes who perform their office toward us uprightly and faithfully as they ought, but also to the authority of all who, by whatever means, have got control of their affairs… whoever they may be, they have their authority solely from him (Calvin 2011:1510).

The political sphere is part of the Christian’s business as well.
Calvin’s understanding of the Church-state model can be represented diagrammatically:

Calvin recognized that the state’s authority over the believer was limited to that which God had given to the state. If the state strayed beyond that authority, it acted without legitimacy, and believers were to resist it. Calvin believed that Christians had the right to challenge an unjust state. Calvin discussed the problem of bad government in his theology rejecting oppressive and autocratic rule. He postulated that princes (state leadership) should be the fathers of the fatherless and the shepherds of the people. He castigated oppressive and exploitative state authorities. In such cases the subjects would see nothing of the rationale of a government. The government had to be the servant of God who rewarded the righteous and punished evil (Rom 13:4). Calvin taught that bad governments were God’s punishment and curse for the sins of the people. Even the most corrupt prince was the bearer of God’s majesty, authority and power. God in his providence appointed and deposed kings as he willed. For example, even cruel tyrants such as the biblical Nebuchadnezzar and Nero were God’s servants. It was incumbent upon princes as servants to behave like servants of God. They would be punished by God for their disobedience. The subjects had no right to rebel. Subjects had to obey and
endure. They had to be humble and patient, and pray to God in whose hands the fate of all kings resides.

There are exceptions to this command of unconditional obedience. Calvin allowed two exceptions to this absolute obedience. Obedience to man was not to be allowed to interfere with obedience to God:

Such obedience is never to lead us away from obedience to him, to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to yield, to whose majesty their sceptres ought to be submitted… The Lord… is the King of Kings, who, when he has opened his sacred mouth, must alone be heard, before and above all men (Calvin 2011:1512).

Calvin used Nebuchadnezzar\(^1\) as an example of a wicked ruler to whom obedience was nevertheless owed (Josephus, *Antiquities* X.viii.5 [1981:220]).

**GROUNDS FOR REMOVING GOVERNMENTS**

Calvin outlined only two exceptions as grounds for removing a government. Both exceptions are largely used by revolutionaries to challenge oppressive regimes. The first exception obtained when God raised public avengers who took an unjust government to task, or used the anger of the common crowd to bring about change. Public avengers were legitimate because they acted in the name of God. They were used by God for his redemptive purposes. In book IV, chapter 22 of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1510), Calvin avowed that sometimes God “raises up open avengers from among his servants, and arms them with his command to punish the wicked with miserable calamity.” This appeared to open the door to the possibility of justified overthrow of a wicked ruler. This kind of “avenger” was “armed from heaven” and subdued “the lesser power [the unjust ruler] with the greater [the power and justice of God], just as it is lawful for kings to punish their subordinates” (Calvin 2011:1517). Even though Calvin’s intention in this passage seemed clearly antithetical to revolutions by
the people, many revolutionaries find justification in this in their struggle for freedom.

The second exception was when authorities commanded disobedience against God. Calvin implored Christians to act on behalf of God in removing an anti-God government:

    How foolish would that not be if one tried to satisfy humans and offended him for the sake of whom one obeys those humans in the first place? A command directed against God lacks all validity and one should ignore the dignity of the authorities in such a case. The Hebrews were punished because they had been too obedient to a godless king (Calvin 2011:1511).

Calvin realized that such resilience would be costly because rulers did not like to be disobeyed. If politics is solely the struggle for power, then those seriously engaged in politics are mentally faced with the question of how to ensure that those who resist a proposed programme of action can be persuaded to conform. This involves violence. Violence constitutes the improper use of force; violence is not sanctioned by law. No autocratic leader accepts change without a fight. Those in power who do not like change use their power to deal with all threats, and to them violence is whatever disturbs the status quo. But those who suffer under prevailing socio-economic and political conditions and want change view violence differently. To them violence is whatever precludes them from building a better tomorrow and maintains their suffering.
Calvin’s two-fold rule of God can be illustrated by the diagram below:


There are two exceptional courses available for Christians living under tyrannical rule according to Calvin as illustrated by the diagram above: Christians have a right to reject rule by minor authorities and can also resist corrupt government when instructed by God to do so.
TASK OF POLITICAL RULE

Calvin believed that political rule had the task of enhancing and protecting the outer framework of religion, true doctrine, and piety and the status of the Church. Furthermore, its task was to organise Christian life in the community, to train Christians in civil righteousness, to unite them, and to ensure peace. Calvin was influenced in his thought by the model of a “theocracy” found in the Old Testament.

Calvin assigned great importance to the state and to all leadership and authority. In his view the state was instituted by God and had received its task from God. It was the servant of divine justice and could not allow any unrighteousness to spread in public life. In principle, this is a cardinal belief in Reformed churches. Mugabe’s autocratic regime is an example of unrighteousness.

Do Calvinist Churches concur with Calvin who argued that the mission of the church was to renovate the world, including the state according to Christian concepts? The Calvinist churches’ practical action will be evaluated against the Calvinist understanding of the Church-State model. In the same vein, Wogaman (1988: 247) observed that there was no ethical justification for violence; the stronger governed because they had the power and, consequently, they ruled in their own interests. The weaker obeyed because they could not help it; they were the tools of the rulers. Therefore, violence was seen as immoral. However, merely moralising about war in a country ravaged by violence is insufficient. There is a need for Zimbabwean theologians to work along different lines. This is the time for theologians to organize and modify the just war tradition inherited from St Augustine.

DECIDING THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LINE OF ACTION IN A COUP SITUATION

Calvinist churches in Zimbabwe became prophetic and became the watchdog of democracy and ensured that no impediments were placed in the path of those wishing to exercise their constitutional right as citizens.
The commitment to the promotion of justice and peace is a constitutive element of reformed understanding of the church’s mission (Matikiti 2009:110). The strength of Calvinist churches in political matters affecting the country was shown by their fearless stance on the coup d'état. The church acted as the watchdog and custodian of peace encouraging the parties to work for the good of the nation. The church had to remain vigilant as watchdogs and not lapdogs by keeping abreast of political events.

Calvin’s political theology became very relevant to the coup situation in Zimbabwe. First and foremost, the coup met Calvin’s first exception that God would raise public avengers who took an unjust government to task, or used the anger of the common crowd to bring about change. These public avengers became the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. They used the public anger to force Robert Mugabe to retire. The coup in Zimbabwe emerged out of the setting of dictatorship camouflaged under the ‘one centre of power’ ideology in the ruling party. Mugabe’s resignation provided Zimbabwe with an opportunity to forge a new path free of the oppression that characterised his rule. Public avengers were legitimate because they acted in the name of God. Were soldiers used by God to overthrow Mugabe? Were the generals “armed from Heaven”? The army generals who led the coup continuously referred to the church and asked for prayers from Christians to establish order in the country. However, the commitment to God in the army is very much questionable especially given that the key actors were rewarded with ministerial posts.

The second exception was when authorities commanded disobedience against God. Elsewhere I argue that

the constitution of Zimbabwe largely guarantees almost all the human rights and individual freedoms that are enshrined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). This constitution of Zimbabwe provides for Bill of Rights. However, there has been a yawning gap between constitutional norms and practice. The line of mutual respect between church and State is disrespected as churches become nothing more than overt political mouthpieces during election campaign seasons.
When churches question Mugabe on human rights violations, he is quick to reprimand them to keep churches out of politics (Matikiti 2017:3).

Calvin instructed Christians to act on behalf of God in removing an anti-God government. The church, as part of its civic responsibility, had the guts to speak against the actuations and abuses of the Mugabe regime.

The coup was preceded by the scathing letter from the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) in September 2017. On 29 September 2017 the Council accused President Robert Mugabe’s government of behaving in an “irresponsible” way in the face of a growing economic crisis, and deemed the fears of Zimbabwe’s citizens “legitimate” (Anon. 2017b). In a strongly-worded statement, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) said the government had lost the trust of citizens and should urgently try to regain it. The churches said the legitimate fears were that

Zimbabweans have lost trust that the government is sincere in addressing national problems when they see the government officials choosing to send their children to foreign schools and being treated in foreign hospitals (Anon. 2017b).

The letter came after a crisis in Zimbabwe emerged when fuel queues resurfaced and panic buying of basic commodities gripped some stores. It came as fears abounded that the country was facing a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis that saw empty store shelves and fuel stations on the back of foreign currency shortages. The ZCC, which groups 26 different denominations mainly Calvinist churches, said the fears of citizens were legitimate. The government blamed the crisis on economic saboteurs possibly within the ruling party. The ZCC said the government would need to make a “deliberate choice” to show it was cutting down on its own use of scarce foreign currency and avoid bad economic decisions, corruption, greed and opulent living among those connected to power.

With the coup on-going on 15th November, the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations [ZHCD] issued a statement entitled “Zimbabwe Between a Crisis and a Kairos (Opportunity): The Pastoral Message of the Churches on the Current Situation” (ZHCD 2017). In tacit approval of the
coup Rev. Dr Kenneth Mtata, general secretary of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches said:

Many Zimbabweans are confused and anxious about what has transpired and continues to unfold in our nation. While the changes have been rapid in the last few days, the real deterioration has been visible for everyone to see for a long time, especially during the potential political rallies of the ruling party, coupled with the deteriorating socio-economic situation (ZHCD 2017).

The heads of churches called for prayer, peace, respect for human dignity, a transitional government of national unity, and national dialogue. The church derives its mandate from its calling as a sign of hope arguing that: “We are the people of God who are being called to champion the spirit of reconciliation” (ZHCD 2017). The nation’s challenge is one of a loss of trust in the legitimacy of national processes and institutions. The ZCC encouraged churches around the world to pray for peace and justice in Zimbabwe. The heads of churches thanked Zimbabweans for standing together in solidarity in the difficult situation and urged members to pray for peaceful developments in the country.

When Robert Mugabe announced his resignation as President of Zimbabwe on Tuesday 21st November 2017, as parliament began impeachment proceedings to strip him of power and open the way for prosecution, eight leaders from different Christian denominations issued a statement in Zimbabwe saying the end of Mugabe’s 37-year-rule could actually be an opportunity for the birth of a new country (Chimtom 2017). The church leaders noted that the deteriorating economic situation and social challenges reported were just symptoms of a deeper disease that has affected the nation for a long time. The leaders also said the problem resulted from the fact that the priorities of the poor have become relegated to the charity of those who have access to national resources without proper commitment to addressing the root causes of these problems. The clergy included those from the Catholic, Evangelical, Charismatic, and Protestant faiths.
As noted earlier, John Calvin emphasized that a Christian soldier should never use force to gain personal advantage, but use force out of love for thy neighbour. The aftermath of the coup in Zimbabwe has shown avarice. The greed for gain was shown in the immediate post Mugabe era. The Zimbabwe army generals and leaders who masterminded the coup could not resist the temptation of avarice. They found an opportunity to reward themselves with the spoils of the *coup d’état*. They did not just target criminals around the President; they forced the President himself to resign and replaced him with their own man. When Zimbabwe’s longtime ruler, Robert Mugabe, stepped down a week after the military’s move, allowing his erstwhile Vice President Mnangagwa, returned from hiding out in South Africa, to pick up the reins as interim President, Constantino Chiwenga was appointed Vice President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Sibusiso Moyo, the army officer who went on state TV on 15th November to announce the military’s takeover of power, was appointed Foreign Affairs and International Trade Minister, while air force commander Perrence Shiri became the new Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. A number of generals were appointed to influential posts in government. The church was conspicuous by its silence when soldiers grabbed government portfolios, a clear indication they have seized power and a coup is now complete.

**CONCLUSION**

Calvinist churches in Zimbabwe were in uncharted territory when the Zimbabwe Defence Forces effected a coup d’état on the 15th November 2017. Calvin assigned great importance to the state and to all leadership and authority. In his view the state was instituted by God and had received its task from God. It was the servant of divine justice and could not allow any unrighteousness to spread in public life. Calvin’s understanding of the two kingdoms was that the believer is a dual citizen of both kingdoms - the state and the Church. The two must be taken together to arrest the anarchy of the subjects and the self-absolutisation of the state leaders. While
Christians are still on earth they need political structure. Calvin was most emphatic in his insistence on the obedience due to civil authority. Subjects had to remember always that in obeying the magistrate, they were obeying God, since the rulers’ power is from God. However, Calvin provided for more than passive resistance to the most tyrannical political authorities; he approved active political resistance on the part of lower political authorities against higher authorities. This resistance, even for violent revolution, became a major factor in the history of Calvinism; and as a result, Calvinism helped to inspire revolutions in many countries including Zimbabwe. Calvin’s first exception to removing an evil ruler was that God would raise public avengers to take an unjust government to task, or may use the anger of the common hero to bring about change. This did not exclude the clergy. God could use the clergy as God’s public avengers to act in the name of God. Public avengers, such as clergy or ordinary Christians, acted in the name of God and were used by God for God’s redemptive purposes. Calvin opened the door to the possibility of the justified overthrow of a wicked ruler befitting the description of Mugabe provided above. Calvin gave Christians a leeway to deal with dictators abusing civilians. Zimbabwean Calvinist churches utilised the exceptions provided by Calvin to justify the removal of Mugabe from power.

NOTES

1 Nebuchadnezzar was the Babylonian king who crushed Jerusalem c. 587/586 BCE, and then dragged the Judean population into captivity, cutting off “the heads of the high priest and of the rulers,” according to Josephus (Josephus, Antiquities X.viii.5 [1981:220]).

REFERENCES


Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations: The importance of Being Sorry is a timely and pertinent book offering unique insights into the under-researched area of the relationship between reconciliation and international relations. Reconciliation after conflict is high on the world agenda, yet its position in politics and international relations is difficult to ascertain. This volume captures well the inevitable conflation of the interpersonal and the national, the theological and the political when it comes to matters of reconciliation in the global arena.

There was a time when most scholars and practitioners in the field of reconciliation would have agreed with Andrew Schaap (2003) and Eric Doxtader (2003) that reconciliation on the interpersonal level (and, what Schaap calls “theologically”) means something distinctly different than on the national level and in the political sphere. According to Schaap (2003:1), a theological understanding would involve a community being restored through the admission of guilt and the offering of forgiveness, but that “it is a political mistake to think of reconciliation in these terms, given the starkly opposed narratives in terms of which members of a divided polity typically make sense of past political violence.”

Nevertheless, this edited volume suggests that “the admission of guilt and offering of forgiveness” is now very much part and parcel of the International Relations environment. The many examples the authors draw on in the chapters of this volume point to the fact that apologies are being made by high level state representatives of one government to another all
the time. In this volume, for the first time, these apologies are being scrutinised for their content as well as their effect on the relationships between states.

In the introduction, the authors draw from a relatively thick understanding of *apology*, and throughout the volume words such as “reconciliation,” “atonement,” “guilt,” “remorse,” “redemption” and “forgiveness” are used. *Atonement*, in brackets, is described to mean compensation and memorialisation. A theological understanding would perhaps emphasise its doctrinal meaning, namely, the reconciliation between God and humankind through the life, suffering and death of Christ. Or at the least, *atonement* would imply reparations or amends. But the authors, in applying these terms to the cases, take a far more pragmatic approach. “Apology” is understood as a speech act with three crucial elements: an acknowledgement of a harmful act, an admission of responsibility for that act and a plea for forgiveness. The rich theological language of *apology*, sporadically used in the volume, does not always sit comfortably with this more functional understanding of it as it is applied to the cases.

The authors acknowledge the methodological, psychological, and philosophical problems inherent to the discourses of *guilt, apology* and *reconciliation* in international politics (p. 4) and attempt to work around this by categorising apologies and identifying key factors that seem to indicate why an apology was “successful” or not. To a large extent, this approach is effective. It assists us in mapping out numerous state apologies and their effect in the international sphere.

The country most often cited as initiating apologies is Germany for crimes committed under the Third Reich. Chapters in the book include Germany’s apologies to the State of Israel, Poland, the Czech Republic, and, deviating from the other cases, Namibia. Other apologies included in the volume are between Montenegro, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, between France and Algeria, Turkey and Armenia, Japan, China and the two Koreas, and Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The scope of cases reveals the broad relevance of *apology* in global politics.
Public apologies by state representatives include symbolic and diplomatic purposes. Judith Renner, in her discussion of the reciprocal apologies between Germany and the Czech Republic, for example, writes, “public apologies in international politics need not necessarily function as moral statements, but can be traded and exchanged as political and diplomatic commodities in order to settle political crises and pave the way for bilateral rapprochement” (p. 102).

Pioneer apologies can initiate societal debate which Renner suggests was the case in the Germany-Poland apology (p. 84) and the Czech Republic-Germany apology, where the “apology advanced a new and critical perspective on the country’s recent past … and led to protest and contestation” (p. 122). In some cases, such as with the series of apologies offered by Germany to the State of Israel, the purpose seems to have been more about genuine reconciliation and developing a common narrative about the past (p. 46).

Some of the factors identified that influence the reception of an apology include whether it is offered by a high ranking representative of a given government, how publicly the statement is made, whether it is accompanied by reparations, whether regret and remorse are expressed and what the political stakes associated with the apology are.

Apologies seem to have been less successful when coerced by external, international bodies. For example, in the case of Indonesia and Timor-Leste, Renate Strassner describes how the final joint apology was “forced out of Indonesia” by the UN Security Council, the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN Secretary General (p. 277). Continued denial of responsibility, or even of the crime altogether, as is the case of Turkey and Armenia, also has the potential of seriously deteriorating relations. In this case, Stefan Engert describes how there has been incremental movement from denial to “excuse” on the part of the Turkish government, which created an opening for Turkish civil society to petition for an apology from their government. This example shows how even a non-apology can create
opportunities for a movement towards an apology, and can have both destructive and constructive effects simultaneously.

The discussion of the cases shows that relatively thin *apology* language is appropriate and applicable in the international relations arena. This would bring into question the use of what are arguably thick, theological terms (*remorse, guilt, redemption, atonement, forgiveness*) in a political context. The authors stress that they are not interested in whether an apology is “genuine” but rather whether it has an effect on bilateral relations. Regardless of this, where does our idea of *apology* come from? Can it be translated into the political sphere at all?

The authors suggest that yes, it can, and perhaps they are right. Reconciliation processes have the difficult task of bridging the gap between politics and matters of the heart, the legal and the moral, spiritual and theological. Although the relationship between these remains clumsy, evidence for it keeps emerging, and however much we might want to keep the “personal” out of the political, its necessity keeps being reaffirmed.

Christopher Daase, Stefan Engert, Michel-André Horelt, Judith Renner and Renate Strassner have importantly focused attention on a neglected area of study in International Relations, and have opened the way for more detailed, nuanced engagement with the tricky issue of apology for crimes committed by one state against another.

*Reviewed by:*

**Cori Wielenga**

Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria
HAFFAJEE, F. 2015. *What if there were no Whites in South Africa?* Johannesburg: Picador Africa.


Twenty two years into democracy, South Africa remains a race conscious society. From attempts at correcting the injustices of the past to explaining the shortfalls of South Africa’s socio-economic landscape, the conversation inevitably takes on a racial dimension. This conversation amongst ordinary South Africans ranges from the well informed to the ignorant which has caused many to stumble in the minefield we call “race.” So when Ferial Haffajee, in her maiden book, poses the question *What If There Were No Whites in South Africa?*, it has the potential to backfire on the author before readers even turn over the first page.

Fortunately, however, Haffajee beautifully dissects South Africa’s historical narrative, both past and present, despite the provocative title. The book neatly integrates the author’s personal experience, discussions with a number of influential South Africans and hard hitting statistical facts aimed at getting readers to think differently about issues of race in South Africa.

Haffajee opens with a deeply optimistic account of freedom post-1994 in which one has witnessed large scale upward mobility, equity and cultural change in South Africa. Haffajee argues, through facts and figures, that freedom has generally been good to South Africans who were previously disenfranchised. However, the current narrative has become too focused on whiteness and white privilege in South Africa.

Why do so many subscribe to the view that White South Africans hold power when in fact they are an increasingly growing minority? In order to better understand this debate, Haffajee engages with numerous leaders on this issue. What emerges from these accounts is thought-provoking and indicates that South Africans have yet to “close the doors” on the past.
The author demonstrates sensitivity to her topic and even when she does not agree with points made by interviewees, one never gets the impression that she dismisses their ideas. Rather she recognises the need to engage in order to find common ground.

As a result those who are expecting the answers to Ferial Haffajee’s question to be “well, if there were no Whites, then South Africa would be in a complete mess” or “if there were no Whites, then all our problems would be solved” are in for a surprise.

In addition, the author’s captivating writing style honed through her extensive journalism experience keeps one intrigued while at the same time allowing for a number of light hearted moments in discussing the often too serious business of race.

This book provides fresh insights into the race debate in South Africa which has often become highly polarized and, at times, redundant. Those who are interested in issues of social justice, identity and understanding the complexities of race will no doubt find this a highly worthwhile read. Ultimately the book is a timely piece on the triumphs and challenges of being South African in the 21st century.

 Reviewed by:

Evan Cupido
Lecturer in Politics, St Augustine College
This well-written and well-structured book aims to “provide an introductory text for understanding the role of corporations in the global economy from a sustainable development perspective” (p. xx). This is a more complex task than it may seem and these authors recognise the challenge of speaking about “Globalisation” and “Sustainable Development”: two terms which have become part of popular as well as academic discourse, but which are often misunderstood, debated and conflated with other terms. To their credit, they have, at the outset, identified gaps in some of the literature, most notably the neglect of relationships between sustainability and economic processes and the scant attention paid to the relationship between globalisation, global governance and sustainability. Part of the aim of the book is to address these gaps, without requiring that the student has expertise in economics. This is important to note, because part of the great strength of this text lies in making economics, economic processes, and approaches to ordering the economy accessible to such an audience, without either boring or confusing them with incomprehensible formulae, graphs, and tables. The approach adopted is multidisciplinary, rather than siloed, and, given the nature of the subject matter, most appropriate.

The book is divided into three parts, each containing several chapters and each building on what went before. Part I is a foundational section on economics, governance and society. The authors provide a clear explanation of our current economic paradigm, a critical and thoughtful explanation of market economies and governments including discussion on welfare and the market economy, and on neoclassical free market understandings of economy. Chapter four, which discusses life in modern society, includes a section on human behaviour (unusual in this type of
text), on ethics and on modern society. It seems a rather eclectic mix, with the regrettable sandwiching of ethics between the other two. This section on ethics, is of dubious merit: it wavers uncertainly between conflating ethics with cultural practice, implying a kind of relativist or situational ethics, adding in a brief encounter with utilitarian and deontological approaches to ethics followed by an unfortunate foray into virtue ethics, which we are told “is more concerned with feelings” (p. 88)! In a world where ethical conduct is both important and necessary in business practice, this section adds little to our understanding of ethics and is both confusing and conceptually muddled. It tries, it seems, to be “all things to all people,” an attempt which leaves us “anywhere” and “nowhere.” Perhaps later editions (if there are to be such editions) should ensure the section is rewritten and not minimised in between notions of human behaviour and social capital.

That said, Part II (Sustainable Development and Globalisation) is an excellent section, linking sustainable development, the governance of sustainability, globalisation and the impact of the latter on sustainable development. Part III examines the business implications of globalisation and sustainability and includes a good discussion on the complex topic of CSR and some different and creative ideas on strategy development and the transition to sustainable development.

Two things strike one about the overall merits of the text. The first is its excellent structure and clarity: every chapter begins with an overview and learning objectives, followed by content, critique and discussion, supported where necessary with clear diagrams, and charts as well as succinct well-presented case studies (placed within a box). Each chapter also concludes with a case study and questions, a summary, a further reading list, three assignments and a series of self-test questions. Such an integrated structure is pedagogically sound and is to be commended.

The second striking feature of the text is its inclusive perspective. This text does not merely single out examples and case studies from developed, first world countries. Examples from Africa (very unusual), and India, as well
as Asia, are also included. This makes a refreshing change from the stock examples so often cited. It is also important to note that this book demonstrates awareness and provides discussion on the relationship between economy, globalisation, and sustainability in respect of issues like poverty, redistribution, common goods and human rights. It is encouraging to read a text which takes into account and debates such complex relationships without either moralising or merely pretending there is a simple one-size-fits-all solution. It is also encouraging to see that the perspectives of the developing world are taken into account rather than merely those of the first world developed countries. One is certainly left with the impression that our world is in need of the participation of all role players, business, government, and civil society to solve the complex challenges of sustainable development within the global context.

With the exception of the section on ethics, the book is well worth reading. It is also worth prescribing for students who want to understand more about sustainable development and globalisation without being either overwhelmed by technical data and difficult formulae or being merely exposed to hackneyed and popularist rhetoric on the matter.

Reviewed by:

Professor Marilise E. Smurthwaite
Academic Dean, St Augustine College


Many ceremonies and much media coverage are given to latter day heroes in Zimbabwe who on their deaths are interred in Heroes Acre outside Harare. In light of that it seems appropriate to make available, information about some of the many unsung heroes and heroines whose lives were spent in the service of the Gospel, particularly among rural people. The era was that of the tumultuous years of Zimbabwe’s second Chimurenga\(^1\) or Liberation War, and between 1983 and 1984, the time of the Gukurahundi\(^2\), a series of massacres of Ndebele civilians carried out by ZANLA and North Korean trained Fifth Brigade (Shona) in Matabeleland.

The 30 missionaries whose lives are celebrated in this readable volume include 2 lay missionary doctors; a lay catechist and a Secular Franciscan; several Jesuit priests and brothers; Mariannhill brothers, sisters and priests; Dominican sisters; Bethlehem priests; a bishop and a diocesan priest. The missions where they were killed during the turbulent years between 1976 and 1988 are in six of the eight dioceses in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. These 30 were among the 40 000 people whose lives were brutally taken by the Rhodesian army, the Selous Scouts or the fighters belonging to ZANLA and ZIPRA, the guerilla forces and regular army of the two main Liberation movements of the time. The ZANLA\(^3\) forces had been trained in China; ZIPRA\(^4\) forces in Russia. Ted Rogers, SJ, the author of the volume, now aged 93 and living in retirement in England, spent 51 active years in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, pioneering in the areas of social justice, AIDS and development. He personally knew many of the men and women about whom he writes in this book.

The first Chapter succinctly sets the context as one in which the subjects of this book, ordinary women and men lived, loved and laboured. It concisely
captures the various forces contesting for legitimacy along the western, southern and eastern borders of the country, and then slowly moving into the interior, targeting Whites. The missionaries on their remote rural stations were “soft” targets or “middle-men and women.” Not all of their assassins have been definitively identified. Were they government troops, lone gunmen, or undisciplined groups of dissidents? Were the victims in some cases even mistaken targets? A Truth and Reconciliation type process may bring clarity to such questions. The helpful map at the beginning of the book, although omitting Mutoko which was a site of assassination, helps the reader grasp just how wide-spread were those mission attacks, which took place over a period of 12 years. Many missionaries during this time, as Rogers reiterates, were offered the opportunity to move to safer places but did not accept this invitation as they wished to remain close to their people. Many times each of them must have faced up to the possibility of a violent death at the hands of hostile forces.

In the first chapter Rogers also recalls his meetings with and impressions of Ian Smith, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, political leaders during the period covered by this volume.

Having set the scene, Rogers captures in the following 9 chapters, the significant moments of the lives of each of the 30 individuals who are his subjects. Some, and particularly the Jesuits, as the book is written by a Jesuit, are portrayed in their full humanity, warts and all. This certainly adds colour and flavour to the narrative, as does the history of the missions in which they served. The reader is left with a clear picture also of the terror that must have underlined the daily struggle for survival, not only of the missionaries but of so many rural people, caught, not only in the efforts to weaken and undermine the colonial authorities, but also in the conflict that raged between the two main Liberation groups during this bush war. As one reads one gets a sense of increasing alarm and concern as the Bush war intensifies.

Rogers terms these 30 victims “martyrs.” The debate of what constitutes martyrdom is an ongoing one, and Rogers quotes F. Günter Schuhly, SJ, as
proposing a “broadening of the meaning of martyrdom to include those who die for social justice since that too is part of what faith means in the modern world.” Rogers also refers to the “two Churches in Zimbabwe” in his Introduction, the “settler” Church and the “missionary” Church. Not all missionaries were sympathetic to the liberation struggle. Exposure to the sufferings of the rural people often formed the social consciousness of the “missionary” priests, brothers, sisters and lay ministers, but sometimes the missions themselves were signs of the presence of these “two churches.” There are hints of this “dilemma” scattered throughout Rogers’ text. This may account for the fact that, contrary to the Latin American experience where the martyrdom of people such as Oscar Romero or Dorothy Stang prompted their quick acclamation as “martyrs” by the *vox populi* who identified them with the “church on the side of the poor,” there has been no such acclamation in Zimbabwe.

Two of the lay martyrs, Dr Luisa Guidotti and Fr. John Bradburne OFS (Chapter 8), have had formal proceedings for their canonisation launched so we may hear more about them in the future. But apart from any more formal recognition, Rogers’ book has assured that this dimension in the history of the church in Zimbabwe will not go unnoticed.

*Reviewed by:*

**Sr Brigid Rose Tiernan, SND**
Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur

**NOTES**

1 *Chimurenga* is a Shona word roughly meaning “revolutionary struggle.” It refers first of all to the Ndebele and Shona insurrections against the administration by the British South Africa Company during the late 1890s (the First Chimurenga), and then to the war fought between African nationalist guerrillas and the predominantly white Rhodesian government during the 1960s and 1970s (the so called Rhodesian Bush War or the Second Chimurenga).

2 *Gukurahundi* is a Shona expression meaning “sweeping out the chaff before the spring rains come.”

3 ZANLA (“Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army”) was loyal to Robert Mugabe and engaging almost exclusively in guerrilla warfare.

4 ZIPRA (“Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army”) was mainly a traditional army loyal to Joshua Nkomo.


This interesting and valuable book of bible studies has its origin in the Council for World Mission key theme Mission in the Midst of Empire at their 2014 consultation in Durban.

Three main themes are dealt with in the bible studies; broken bodies, colonised spaces and transgressive bodies. Under the first theme there are studies on truth versus propaganda, globalisation and corporatisation, gender justice, protection and honour within Empire, doubting Empire within the context of faith and trafficking and violence against children.

Themes in the second theme consider the extent and viability of the horizons of creation, anamnestic solidarity, the sphere of the fire behind the branding, economic and political justice, preaching jubilee in a post-industrial city, insurrection and resurrection, a re-reading (?) of Animal Farm, and the impact of mineral resources in multinational corporations.

The third section includes studies relating to ecology and vigilance, LGBTI issues, the politics of resistance, reuniting sexuality and spirituality.

What is so fascinating about these bible studies is their crucial relevance to issues which are globally pervasive and of critical danger to the present and the future of our corporate lives. Here there are no appeals to the development of an introverted personal holiness; but holiness is viewed as a corporate endeavour to get closer to God through our attempts to develop the humanity of all living beings in the face of the devastating forces of the constituent elements of Empire.

These issues do not contribute to a warm fuzzy feeling of all being at one with creation for they demonstrate the dirtiness and sordidness of the
process of growing into Christ through our corporate commitment to challenge the dehumanising forces that hold the world in sway and that prevent human beings from experiencing life in all its fullness.

Stories, illustrations, hymns, reflections and poems are integrated in such a way that it becomes possible for ordinary readers of scripture to relate to the urgency and enormity of the tasks ahead, despite the topics being difficult to understand and respond to. They can therefore commit themselves to action such that change does indeed become possible. Hence these studies are clearly not for *armchair* Christians but for those who are prepared to investigate, study, reflect and act in order to create a world in which all are safe and have the potential to become complete human beings able to reflect the image of Christ.

*Reviewed by:*

**Emeritus Professor Graham A. Duncan**

Faculty of Theology, University of Pretoria
OTHER VOICES

Bonum Commune Award
- Citation -
Br Jude Pieterse & Mr Paddy Kearney

(Graduation Ceremony, St Augustine College, 5 May 2017)

DOUGLAS IRVINE

The Bonum Commune Award, which is St Augustine’s equivalent of an Honorary Doctorate, honours people “who have made outstanding contributions to the common good or who have made significant and exceptional contributions to the academic endeavour, particularly those that contribute in some way to the welfare and betterment of society,” with a special emphasis on ethical leadership, in line with the College’s mission and vision.

Tonight we honour the two people who will receive the Bonum Commune award at this ceremony; but we are also very conscious of other presences, exemplifying Christian faith in action:

- Saint Augustine himself
- Pope John XXII and the bishops and theologians of Vatican II – and across a dialectical trajectory of some 60 years, Pope Francis
- Archbishop Denis Hurley OMI, and
- St Marcellin Champagnat – founder of the Marist Brothers.
Some 1600 hundred years separate us from Saint Augustine – that great North African bishop of the city of Hippo - but he would undoubtedly recognise strong affinities with these two South Africans who are the recipients of this award, Br Jude Pieterse and Mr Paddy Kearney. Like them, he too was a teacher, lecturer, writer, and busy administrator, deeply immersed in public affairs. And he lived in dark and troubled times. In 410 the Goths had entered Rome and sacked it, shaking the Western Empire to its foundations; in 430, he lay dying in a city besieged by the Vandals.

In the years after the sack of Rome, in response to this crisis and to explore its causes and significance, he wrote what may be his greatest work, *De Civitate Dei – The City of God*. Paradoxically, his message is one of hope and joy: the opening sentence speaks of “the most glorious society and celestial city of God’s faithful.”

Our highest good, says Augustine, is not in this life. We are pilgrims in this world and as Christians our gaze is on our destination, the City of God. Only there can we find true peace and justice, in a system of right relations with each other and with God. But while our goal is the City of God, we most certainly have duties in this world too, to our families, our neighbours and the communities in which we live.

With profound psychological insight, Augustine sees that the life of every person, and of nations, is shaped by our desires or, as he puts it, the objects of our love, worthy or unworthy; not simply our values, but the ends that we pursue actively for good or ill. Consequently in this world, good and evil are intermingled: in the institutions of state and even in the church itself. Whether the times are bad or good depends on the moral quality of individual and social life, on what our restless hearts are set on - and this is up to us. Augustine recognises that we need political institutions for the sake of order and cooperation to achieve our common purposes - but not simply any kind of order will do. Perhaps his most penetrating comment on politics and public life is this: “Take away justice, and what are governments but bands of robbers – gangsters – on a large scale” (*City of God*, Bk. 4, chap. 4).
Pope Paul VI said that if you want peace, work for justice. In their lives Br Jude and Paddy exemplify that commitment. Both of these men were formed within the Marist tradition and deeply imbued with its focus on education and social justice. The Institute of Brothers was founded in France in 1817. And so we celebrate its bicentenary this year, as well as 150 years of its presence in South Africa. Its mission was to educate young people – especially the most neglected – in a spirit of that devotion to Mary which was so powerful in post-revolutionary France. The Marist emphasis is on Mary’s humility, modesty and simplicity – but also her acceptance of the challenge of participating in the redemption of the world in and through service. (She did not say it’s all too big for me and retreat into a private devotion). We honour that young Jewish village girl under the wonderful title “Mother of God”; while we recall also that it was John Paul II who called her “loving mother of the church.” In this perspective, and according to Marist tradition, every individual brother is called to be an “instrument of mercy” for all people, but especially the poor, the uneducated, the people on the margins of society - whom Pope Francis has placed once again at the centre of his vision for the church.

Br Jude and Paddy Kearney: Two lives in parallel

Turning now to Br Jude and Paddy Kearney, we will see that their lives run closely in parallel at many points. In this citation, for each of them I will sketch the main chronology and then enlarge on one major practical contribution they have made to the common good (among their many other accomplishments and activities). In Br Jude’s case I will focus on the Catholic Institute of Education (CIE), and for Paddy, on Diakonia.

By a happy chance both were named Gerald: Br Jude – Gerald Pieterse; and Paddy – Gerald Patrick Kearney. Gerald is a Germanic name meaning “rule of the spear”; and we can truly say that these men have been warriors, but warriors for peace.

Br Jude was born on 01 September 1939, and Paddy on 28 August 1942.
Both were educated by the Marist Brothers: Br Jude in Cape Town at St Joseph’s College, Rondebosch; and Paddy at St Charles, Pietermaritzburg (as was the young Denis Hurley). Both completed first degrees at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg:

Br Jude – a Bachelor of Science (Physics, Chemistry), and Paddy – a Bachelor of Arts (followed by UED, and B Ed.). Both completed Masters degrees in the U.S.A.: Br Jude at the University of Seattle (Master of Religious Education, 1986); and Paddy, M Ed (Ohio, 1973) with a thesis bearing the title *Towards a Critical Analysis of Ivan Illich’s “Deschooling Society.”* What an evocation of the spirit and international intellectual climate of those times!

On leaving school both Br Jude and Paddy had joined the Marist Brothers (Paddy was a novice and brother for some ten years); and they both completed their novitiates in Australia. Both began their professional lives as teachers in Marist Brothers colleges.

Paddy taught English and Latin at St David’s in Sandton. After leaving the Marist Brothers he taught at Inanda seminary near Durban, and then lectured in the Education Faculty at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, until 1976 when he took up his appointment as the founding Secretary and co-organiser of *Diakonia.* That same year Br Jude became chair of the Education Council of Associations of Religious (ECAR), and was thrust out of school into the turbulent issues centered on education under apartheid.

**Br Jude Pieterse and the Open Schools Movement**

In the first instance we honour Br Jude for his service to the Marist Brothers and their work.

His first teaching post was at Marist Brothers, Observatory, in 1963. Two years later he was – as we now might say – deployed to Marist Brothers College, in Walmer, Port Elizabeth, where he taught Religious
Education, Mathematics, and Physical Science; and in 1970 he was appointed principal.

In 1975 he became Provincial of the Marist Brothers Province of South Africa, serving in this capacity till 1983. In 1997 he was once again Provincial of the South African Province and in 1999 became the Provincial of the new Province of Southern Africa (Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe), a position he held till 2004. In 2011 he became Provincial Councillor for Southern Africa, and still occupies this position. Currently he also chairs the Marist Schools Council.

From 2007 until 2010 he assisted with the establishment of new Marist apostolic works focused on young people in east Asia (West Bengal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Cambodia, Viet Nam, China) – a fascinating chapter in his life which deserves a larger frame than we have at our disposal tonight. He still maintains a connection with this programme.

Now let us take the story back to a crucial year in the apartheid era: 1976, the moment where the issue of education became central to the developing struggle in South Africa. As I have already noted, from 1976 to 1983 he was chair of the Education Council of Associations of Religious (ECAR), and represented religious on the SACBC’s Commission for Education. During this period Br Jude was deeply involved in the Catholic schools movement to defy racial segregation, and the concomitant difficult questions of funding for private schools. Archbishop Denis Hurley was Head of the SACBC’s Department of Catholic Schools at this time.

In January 1976 the Catholic bishops took a major step: they decided to open schools to all races. In principle this had been their policy since the late 1950s but implementation had been held back by all kinds of practical hesitations. Now, however, they were responding to a request for support from the AWR (Association of Women Religious), a formidable force. The open schools movement, as it came to be known, had developed in the early 70s, particularly among the congregations of women religious. The movement came from below, encouraged by the new climate of freedom, broadly influenced by the spirit of the times in the wider world and more
specifically by Vatican II, which had created space for searching and open criticism of church structures and practices.

A survey of Catholic schools conducted in 1973 had shown that resources were heavily concentrated in schools for whites – though 80% of South African Catholics were black. This confirmed a deep unease in various religious congregations. (Br Jude recalls being challenged about segregated schooling at a meeting in Rome in 1973.) But there were legislative barriers to opening new schools for black children. Therefore, in order to teach black pupils, the AWR decided in 1975 “to give practical Christian witness to social justice” by admitting black children to white schools (though in a policy of quiet infiltration, with as little provocative confrontation of the government as possible). In January 1976 the Cabra Dominicans jumped the gun and admitted a number of coloured girls to Springfield convent. Other schools began to prepare for change, recognising that this required careful planning and strategising at various levels. In January 1977 Holy Rosary Convent and St Dominic’s Priory in Port Elizabeth enrolled 33 African pupils. Sacred Heart College and others followed suit. The movement gathered momentum. It also attracted the wrathful attention of the government.¹

As the open schools movement unfolded, Br Jude worked closely with Archbishop Denis Hurley - among other things leading delegations (organised by Br Jude as chair of ECAR) to engage with Cabinet ministers and provincial administrations, which were responsible for education. They met with varying degrees of hostility, stonewalling and direct threats to de-register schools that were breaking the law. Behind the scenes, Koornhof as Minister of Education, was more sympathetic (even to the point of giving some advice on the preparation of a memorandum for Cabinet: “You must respond to the belief of some Cabinet members that black children’s brains are smaller”). In December 1976 the response came from on high: “Cabinet does not condone the admission of black pupils, but those already admitted can remain.” However, there were to be no new admissions without consultation with the relevant Provincial Education Departments.
Prolonged negotiations extended into the 1980s. As Paddy Kearney describes the course of events:

...the open schools movement went through three phases. The first might be called the civil disobedience phase when some schools simply took the initiative, and admitted black pupils, though they knew such admissions were illegal. In the second phase, the government tried to control the process by requiring a detailed application for each child [smothering the initiative through bureaucracy]. In the third phase, confronted by increasing numbers, the government abandoned that system and tried to control the situation by imposing quotas linked to subsidies: if the proportion of black students exceeded the quota the entire subsidy could be withdrawn (Kearney 2009:191-92).

The schools ignored this. Finally, some ten years on, the Government recognised that it had lost the battle.

Why was the open schools movement so important? It was a learning experience for the Church itself. As Br Jude has observed, “It gave the Church tremendous credibility in the eyes of ordinary people” (Kearney 2009:193), and it also broke the barrier to civil disobedience. Previously the Church - the bishops - had been reluctant to break the law, even if unjust, for many different reasons, including prudence in the face of historic hostility to Roman Catholicism in South Africa, the fear of very real penalties such as the withdrawal of residence permits for foreign clergy and religious, and Catholic conservatism. But the experience of the open schools movement gave our bishops the courage to tackle other racial injustices both in the Church and in the wider society.

**Br Jude Pieterse at the SACBC**

In 1988 Br Jude was appointed Secretary General of the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, a position he held until June 1997 (when he became the Marist Brothers Provincial). This was an extraordinarily taxing period in the last bitterly contested years of apartheid, with the new South Africa struggling to be born. There were numerous visits from security
forces; states of emergency; detentions without trial on a massive scale; assassinations; and, internationally, outrageous responses by the South African regime to the “total onslaught” including bombings in Gabarone and Lusaka.

In the 1980s the EU resolved to provide direct support for “victims of apartheid.” Resources were fuelled via European NGOs through the SACBC and SACC. Structures were set up illegally (perforce) to distribute funds to victims, human rights lawyers, the media (New Nation, UmAfrika). For security reasons the South African partners were adamant that there were to be no written reports - but every six months verbal updates were presented in Brussels. During this time Br Jude represented the SACBC on a variety of bodies including the European Union Foundation for Human Rights in SA, the Legal Resource Centre, SA Legal Defence Fund, the Independent Board of Enquiry, the Joint Enrichment Project, and the National Coordinating Committee for Returnees.

On the night of 12 October 1988, Khanya House (the SACBC headquarters in Pretoria) went up in flames in a meticulously planned, diabolical action by the Vlakplaas Unit, as emerged at the TRC hearings. In the basement they had also placed an incriminating arms cache. A number of people, including a couple of bishops, who had been at a meeting the previous day, were sleeping on the premises. Miraculously no one died, though their escape was dramatic.

Enough of such horrors. I now turn to something much more positive, the story of the CIE (the Catholic Institute of Education).

**Br Jude Pieterse and the Catholic Institute of Education**

During the period 1976–1981 Br Jude had directed two national consultations on the future of Catholic schools in South Africa, leading to the decision by the SACBC to establish a Catholic Institute of Education. From 1985 till mid 1988 Br Jude was fully engaged in setting this up.
In 1977 the Bishops’ Plenary had received a report on the state of Catholic schools. Br Jude spoke at the end of the presentation, criticising it vigorously. He was immediately appointed to chair a committee to explore the issues more closely. The committee’s report in the early 80s led to a National Consultation at which there was a strong call for the establishment of a Catholic Teachers Training College (to mitigate the declining number of properly trained teachers under Bantu Education). The Government refused point blank to approve a private Training College. So it was necessary to look to possible alternatives: the provision of in-service training, and contact with Catholic students in the state’s Training Colleges. Bishop Brenninkmeijer OP asked Br Jude to set up an institution to develop this initiative; which he did, and which he handed over to Sr Bidget Rose Tiernan SND in 1988.

As an associate body of the SACBC, the CIE is an NGO that, since 1985, has provided services to a network of 346 Catholic schools, focusing largely on rural and peri-urban schools situated in the poorer, less developed parts of southern Africa.\(^2\) The CIE’s mission, according to its website (www.cie.org.za), is to serve and strengthen the Catholic education network so that schools can offer values-based, quality education to learners in an environment that is conducive to their development – physical, emotional, moral, intellectual and spiritual. More specifically, the CIE aims to promote and support education for the common good through the formation of leaders and teachers in Catholic schools with a commitment to justice and compassion; offering a Catholic perspective on their engagement with society, and working in solidarity with people most in need.

The CIE’s work today includes:

- Teacher and School Development – there are 7000 educators teaching in Catholic schools;
- Leadership and governance development;
- Quality Promotion – improving primary school levels of literacy and numeracy;
▪ Religious Education;

▪ Health and Wellbeing – forming the values of young people and reducing the impact of AIDS, by integrating religious, values and HIV/AIDS education into the curriculum, and helping orphans and vulnerable children to receive an education;

▪ Policies and Advocacy – lobbying the government to improve education legislation and conditions in schools, and

▪ Support for faith-based skills centres.

Br Jude was once again involved with the CIE from 2005 till 2007, setting up a skills training programme which in time, led to the establishment of the Thabiso Skills Training Project. The CIE Thabiso Skills Institute is a support agency for faith-based skills development centres that contribute to improving the lives of people living in the poorest and most marginalised communities by providing practical skills training to youth and the unemployed. The Institute’s objectives are to source or design skills development programmes, assist in accessing funding, co-ordinate and streamline the administration, management and delivery of educational and training programmes, provide centralised assistance on accreditation, certification and quality assurance, facilitate communication, networking and resource sharing, develop and maintain a centralised depository of skills development and training materials, assist in developing the capacity of centre management and staff, assist in career guidance and job creation opportunities for learners, provide centralised monitoring, evaluation and reporting, and broker strategic partnerships.

The skills development centres affiliated with CIE Thabiso Skills Institute vary in size and focus. They range from small-scale rural centres offering Adult Education and Training (AET) to large-scale urban centres delivering accredited learning programmes. In addition to these practical skills, most centres augment their learning programmes with additional training in a basic business course and the compulsory CIE Thabiso Life Skills Programme, covering the Self, the World of Work and Family, and Community and Society.
When I was preparing this citation I put a question to Br Jude: “Looking back, what three achievements are you proudest of?” This was the wrong question to ask a Marist brother. Clearly it was not simply a matter of good grammar – to get an answer I had to rephrase it: “What three things in which you were involved over the years, give you particular satisfaction?”

This was his reply:

Firstly, getting the CIE off the ground, initiating the skills development project at the CIE and seeing what it has developed into today. Secondly – he said – his earlier involvement in the desegregation of the Catholic schools, and subsequently, his work as Secretary General of the SACBC during the last years of apartheid with its states of emergency and the ushering in of the new South Africa “give me a certain satisfaction as well.”

Now by my count that makes three. But he then added a fourth: “On the Marist front” – he said – “I am happy to have been able to initiate the opening up of senior posts in our schools to lay educators already in the late 1970s and to promote the involvement of lay people at governance level in our schools both at school level (the Boards of Governors) and later at country level (the Marist Schools Council).”

He said, further, that among the things that had given him particular satisfaction was “working with such a wonderful range of people,” mentioning specifically Sr. Margaret Kelly OP, and Archbishop Hurley.

**Paddy Kearney and Diakonia**

Paddy’s achievements are linked in an intricate and creative dialectic with Archbishop Denis Hurley’s life and vision in three areas of service and achievement:

- His indispensable role in the establishment and development of *Diakonia*, the remarkable ecumenical agency for Christian social action in the greater Durban area, which had its origins in Archbishop Denis Hurley’s commitment to working for justice and peace. Over a period spanning almost three decades until he retired in
2004, Paddy built an agency with an impeccable organisational and financial reputation and solid achievements that have been recognised locally, nationally and internationally.

- His crucial contribution to the development of the Denis Hurley Centre (DHC) at Emmanuel Cathedral, and.
- His magisterial biography of Archbishop Denis Hurley, *Guardian of the Light – Renewing the Church, Opposing Apartheid* (2009), and related publications.

At the first Roman Catholic Synod held in Durban in 1968 Archbishop Denis Hurley established a Justice and Peace Commission for the Archdiocese. We may note that its founding chair was a lay person; and over the years it was always chaired by lay people. The Commission soon realised that its mandate could not be addressed adequately on a purely voluntary or part-time basis and advised the Archbishop that it required full-time workers. The Archbishop’s highly creative response was to see that both in principle and practically, an ecumenical response could be the most efficient and effective way to promote Christian social action in the greater Durban area. *Diakonia* had its origins in this insight, and a proposal was put to the 1974 Synod of the Archdiocese, and also to the Natal Council of Churches.⁴

Paddy Kearney, who was a member of the Commission, was prevailed upon to help to establish such an agency. Working in a voluntary capacity, he organised consultations with community and church groups to test and build support for this initiative.

In 1976 when *Diakonia* was established he accepted an appointment as Secretary and Co-Organiser. Four years later he became its Director. When *Diakonia* merged with the Durban and District Council of Churches in 1994, he was appointed Director of the new *Diakonia Council of Churches* and served in that position till he retired in 2004.

Over a period spanning almost three decades, Paddy Keaney built a remarkable ecumenical agency for social action. Under his leadership,
which was exercised with sensitive concern for the member organisations and churches that owned and governed the agency, Diakonia played a significant role through many of the crises our country faced during the struggle for freedom and democracy. Paddy was very aware of both the strengths and limitations of a church-based organisation in the highly polarised KwaZulu-Natal environment, both under apartheid, and afterwards. He was able to mobilise its strengths as church-based body – its access to national and international resources, and its dedicated hard-working staff – while overcoming weaknesses through building up levels of trust across communities, committing Diakonia to non-sectarian interventions, ensuring a fair hearing from every side, and delivering results.

In the late seventies and early eighties the Centre that Diakonia established in St Andrew’s Street, now Diakonia Avenue, became a resource and haven for community activists, a beacon of light and support during the state of emergency, and then in the early 1990s, a resource for the peace processes in KwaZulu-Natal. As the current Diakonia website notes: “There was a time when anyone in Durban suffering as a result of the actions of the apartheid government would be told: ‘Go to Diakonia: they’ll help you’. And help would be found.”

Amongst the many projects his organisation initiated, the annual Good Friday procession for justice received national and international coverage. This particular activity, which was started in solidarity with treason trialists incarcerated in Durban Central prison, exemplifies the innovative, public, and strategic approach to justice and peace which Paddy engaged in during those dark and oppressive times.

Paddy was himself detained without trial in 1985, leading to a landmark judicial decision which placed the onus of proof of reason on the police – a decision which was to provide protection to many others in danger of detention.

When solidarity and support was required, he gave it. When communities or individuals were in need, he gave help and even more importantly, helped to find ways for them to overcome those needs. In these activities
he not only associated himself and Diakonia with existing initiatives, but also took the lead, helping to found organisations such as the Detainees Support Committee (Descom) and the Conscientious Objector Support Groups. Over the years his quiet but active presence was evident in very many areas where action to promote justice and peace was needed: in the development of the union movement, the UDF, the war in KwaZulu-Natal, local and provincial peace talks, community development, and more recently the challenges of unemployment and HIV/AIDS.

After the establishment of constitutional democracy, Diakonia continued to work for the poor and marginalised in highly ethical and collaborative ways, seeking partnerships with local government, churches, people of other faiths, and other political and social leaders. The Diakonia Centre continues to play a significant role in working for justice, peace and development, helping to strengthen the social fabric in the eThekwini metropolitan region. If asked to identify the reasons behind Diakonia’s notable contribution over the years to the common good and the greater well-being of our society in general and more specifically in what is now the eThekwini metropolitan area, Paddy in his self-effacing way would undoubtedly point to the larger organisation and his many collaborators – but unquestionably his leadership, dogged commitment and vision were key factors in Diakonia’s success.

Paddy Kearney’s achievements have been recognised with many honours and awards, including an Honorary Doctorate in Theology from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2009; and the eThekwini Municipality Living Legends award, 2014.

When he retired in 2004, he moved on to two new projects, both of them focused on honouring Denis Hurley.

**Paddy Kearney, the Denis Hurley Centre & Guardian of the Light**

The Denis Hurley Centre is a major new landmark building in what is possibly the busiest, most vibrant and diverse area of Durban. It is situated
between the Emmanuel Cathedral, the Grey Street Mosque, and the Victoria Street market, an area swarming with street traders and taxis. The DHC aims to serve the needs of the poorest people in Durban in cooperation with people of all faith traditions - perhaps most notably at this time, the Muslim community. The DHC was conceptualised by Paddy; he was the project co-ordinator and key fund-raiser; and is now Chair of the Board of Trustees. The Project Fund was officially launched in 2009. In the first five years it achieved (and exceeded) its target of R32million. The Centre was opened officially on 9 November 2015, Archbishop Hurley’s 100th birthday.

The DHC is a locus for activities related to care for vulnerable and marginalised people, including

- feeding the hungry – serving 1500 hot meals every week (prepared by Catholic and Muslim volunteers);
- caring for the sick – the clinic sees 2000 people a month, providing basic primary health care services including HIV counselling and testing; and linked home-based care services for people infected and affected by HIV, in particular orphans and vulnerable children;
- welcoming the stranger - providing practical help for refugees and migrants, ensuring that the homeless and refugees gain access to adequate treatment and social services;
- vocational education and training; and
- building social cohesion in a multicultural context.

It is also making a major contribution to the eThekwini inner city regeneration programme.

The DHC is a living monument to Hurley, not only as a hero of social justice, but also as a leader with a visionary commitment to ecumenical and interfaith action and friendship – which we see today as central elements in Pope Francis’s agenda for the Church.
Then finally there is Paddy as author: His biography of Archbishop Denis Hurley, *Guardian of the Light – Renewing the Church, Opposing Apartheid* (2009), is a work of which any academic could be proud. In a review in the *National Catholic Reporter* it was described as a “magisterial work” by Blair Kaiser, *Time Magazine*’s Rome correspondent during the Second Vatican Council. The *Tablet* review said of it that it was “meticulously researched and important.” *Guardian of the Light* won the Andrew Murray-Desmond Tutu Award for Best Theological Work in English, in 2010. Paddy’s related publications include the abridged version of the biography, *Denis Hurley: Truth to Power* (2012), which makes the story of Hurley’s prophetic role accessible to a wider readership.

**Br Jude, Paddy Kearney & Pope Francis: Lay people in public life**

Br Jude and Paddy Kearney have each played a role, both prophetic and practical, anticipating the spirit of Pope Francis’s call for a new way of evangelising: that the first words of evangelisation must be about the compassion and mercy of God, rather than a list of dogmas and rules. They took up the message of Vatican II - that we are all of us the People of God, and all are called to work in this spirit.

Recall Denis Hurley’s episcopal motto: *Ubi Spiritus, ibi Libertas* – “Where the Spirit is, there is freedom” (2 Cor. 3:17). Saint Augustine said something very similar: *Dilige, et quod vis fac* – “Love God, and do what you will” (or what you are inspired to do).

Let us conclude with a quotation from Pope Francis. Speaking to participants in the plenary assembly of the Pontifical Commission for Latin America in April 2016 he said:

> At this point we may ask ourselves: what is the meaning of the fact that lay people are working in public life? It means looking for a way to encourage, accompany and stimulate all attempts and efforts that ...are already being made to keep hope and faith alive in a world full of contradictions, especially for the poorest, and especially with the poorest. It means, *as pastors*, working in the midst of our people and, with our
people, supporting faith and its hope… It is never the pastor who should say to the layperson what he [or she] must do and say; [they know] well, and better than we do… in various spheres. As pastors, joined to our people, it is good for us to ask ourselves how we are encouraging and promoting charity and fraternity, and the desire for good, for truth and for justice [my italics].

I give the final word to Br Jude, who wrote in a note to me: “As I think back, I have clearly been very privileged to have had the opportunities and experiences that I have had and I have a great deal to be thankful for.”

Well, it is equally important for us to add that it was the way in which Br Jude and Paddy responded to these opportunities and experiences that has defined so much of their lives, and their contributions to the life of the Church and our society. And because of that, we have a great deal to be thankful for.

NOTES

1 The Nationalist Party government found itself in something of a double bind, however. In a quest for international acceptability, it was pursuing diplomatic relations in Africa; and in 1975 Catholic schools ( Mercy Sisters, Marists and Christian Brothers) had been asked quietly to take in the children of diplomatic representatives from African countries, for whom Bantu Education was not an acceptable option.

2 There are two categories of Catholic schools in terms of the South African Schools Act (1996). Firstly, there are 250 public schools on private property, i.e., church-owned property. They were formerly called state-aided schools and now operate under Section 14 of the Schools Act. Under agreements signed with provincial education departments such schools have the right to promote and preserve their special religious character. There are also 95 independent schools, owned by dioceses and religious congregations. The majority serve predominantly disadvantaged communities: 75% of these schools are in townships or rural areas. There are approximately 180000 learners in these Catholic schools, representing diverse cultures and religions: just over a quarter are Catholic; 90% are black; and 53% are girls. Fees charged by Catholic schools range significantly. Many charge fees below R50 per year. In total 72.8% of Catholic schools charge below R500 a year ( www.cie.org.za).

3 The skills programmes offered include: welding, motor mechanics, computer training, electrical installation and repair, sewing, cooking and catering, carpentry, bricklaying, plumbing, appliance repair, upholstery, agriculture, basic business and accounting skills.

4 At the Synod, Hurley explained that the idea arose from four “converging considerations”:
   a) The need for full-time personnel if anything was to be achieved in promoting social justice.
   b) That in responding to human needs, there was a considerable overlap in welfare, development and liberation. Therefore they should be worked on in tandem.
   c) That no church should ever do on its own what could be done with others. Christian service, or diakonia, ‘offers the best opportunities to the churches to engage in ecumenical collaboration’.
   d) That wherever there is a social problem, there is the side of the have and the side of the have-nots. The have need to become aware of the injustices and privations for which they are responsible, and the have-nots must have opportunities for development and liberation” (Kearney 2009:196).

5 The seven founding members were the African Methodist Episcopal, Anglican, Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian and United Congregational Churches.
The idea of founding a Catholic university in South Africa was first mooted in 1993 by a group of academics, clergy and business people. It culminated in the establishment of St Augustine College of South Africa in July 1999, when it was registered by the Minister of Education as a private higher education institution and started teaching students registered for the degree of Master of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy.

It is situated in Victory Park, Johannesburg and operates as a university offering values-based education to students of any faith or denomination, to develop leaders in Africa for Africa.

The name 'St Augustine' was chosen in order to indicate the African identity of the College since St Augustine of Hippo (354-430 A.D.) was one of the first great Christian scholars of Africa.

As a Catholic educational institution, St Augustine College is committed to making moral values the foundation and inspiration for all its teaching and research. In this way it offers a new and unique contribution to education, much needed in our South African society.

It aims to be a community that studies and teaches disciplines that are necessary for the true human development and flourishing of individuals and society in South Africa. The College's engagement with questions of values is in no sense sectarian or dogmatic but is both critical and creative. It explores the African contribution to Christian thought and vice versa. Ethical values underpin all its educational programmes in order to produce intellectual leaders who remain sensitive to current moral issues, who 'think rigorously so as to act rightly and to serve humanity better' (Ex Corde Ecclesiae).

The College is committed to academic freedom, to uncompromisingly high standards and to ensuring that its graduates are recognised and valued anywhere in the world. Through the international network of Catholic universities and the rich tradition of Catholic tertiary education, St Augustine College has access to a wide pool of eminent academics, both locally and abroad, and wishes to share these riches for the common good of South Africa.
CALL FOR PAPERS

In February 2019, we plan to publish a volume dedicated to the notion of dignity. The call for papers is open until the end of October 2018. Articles which focus on any of the following themes are welcome.

Human dignity in the contexts of:

(a) social (in)justice and ethical challenges in the globalised world;
(b) philosophical and theological discourses;
(c) religious and secular anthropologies;
(d) recent social-political and economic developments;
(e) Catholic Social Teaching and in particular the teachings of Pope Francis;
(f) ecumenical and interfaith perspectives.

Furthermore, potential authors are encouraged to submit papers on other (less obvious) aspects of dignity, including dignity of work, dignity of bodies (especially abused and excluded bodies); dignity of creation, dignity of natural environment and animals in particular, etc.

Guidelines for the authors can be found at the end of this volume as well as on our Journal’s website: www.staugustine.ac.za/sap.
AUTHOR GUIDELINES

EDITORIAL POLICY

St Augustine Papers is a biannual multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary journal published by St Augustine College of South Africa. This academic journal publishes scholarly, refereed articles and book reviews in all the fields in which academic programmes are offered at the College, including Theology, Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Peace Studies, Education, Social Sciences and the Humanities in general. Interdisciplinary articles are especially welcome. All manuscripts submitted for review undergo a double-blind peer review process. Final publishing decisions are made by the Editorial Committee.

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All submissions to be considered for publication in the peer-reviewed section of *St Augustine Papers* will be subject to a double-blind peer review process, i.e., the reviewers will not know the identity of the author(s) and the author(s) will not know the identity of the reviewers (each article will be sent to at least one reviewer). Reviews are usually performed within one month. All other submissions to the journal (editorials, book reviews, etc.) will be subject to review by the Editorial Committee.

PRESENTATION OF MANUSCRIPTS

Original research articles should be between 5000 and 9000 words in length in a particular field within or related to the focus and scope of the journal. Articles may be e-mailed to Prof Jakub Urbaniak at j.urbaniak@staugustine.ac.za using software that is compatible with MS Word. The first page of the manuscript should carry the proposed title and author’s name with highest degree. Under the name, an identification line, giving title and position held, the institution and its location, should appear. Personal details and a short biography (max. 100 words) should also be submitted. A brief abstract (no more than 150 words) should follow the author identification data.

NOTES

Notes should be numbered serially throughout the text by superscript numbers (without parentheses) to the right of any punctuation marks. The notes themselves should appear at the end of the manuscript but before the references, under the caption ‘Notes’.

REFERENCES

The Harvard Referencing Style should be used. All references should be specified in parentheses in the text (and in the text of notes) by surname(s) of the author(s), the year of the publication and page number(s), for example (Dworkin 1986:45-52) or (Solomon & Higgins 1996:157) or (Grant *et al.* 1976:58). ‘*Et al.*’ is to be used for three and more authors. The complete citation should appear at the end of the manuscript (after the notes, if any) under the caption ‘References’. Such citations should be listed alphabetically by surname of author; for authors cited more than once, by year of publication, with the most recent references first. Please note the use of capital letters, punctuation marks and italics in the following examples: